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Abstract 
This thesis uses economics-style incentivised laboratory experiments to study the effects 
of the political transformation in Arab Spring Countries (frequent recalling of 
governments, political and social polarisation, and campaign dynamics of founding 
elections) on economic outcomes; such as tax compliance, support for painful economic 
reforms, corruption, and interpersonal trust. The main focus of this thesis is on Egypt, 
being the largest Arab country in terms of population, historically the most influential in 
the region, and with a dominant cultural influence felt all over the Arab world. 
I find the following experimental evidence: (i) Giving citizens the right to recall 
government officials decreases the level of corruption in government through the 
increased accountability it imposes on elected politicians. Specifically, corruption is 
reduced by 14% in the presence of this right (p=0.04). (ii) Empowering citizens with the 
right to recall government officials was also found to decrease tax compliance by 20% 
due to the high frequency of divisive elections associated with this newly acquired right 
in a newly democratised country and the creation of losers who become unsatisfied with 
the outcome of the election process and thus the psychological costs associated with their 
incompliance are minimized. (iii) Ideological polarisation in elections can impede 
economic reform. And that (iv) negative campaigning in elections can impact negatively 
on the level of interpersonal trust in the society. 
   
 1 
 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The ‘Arab Spring Uprising’ that has swept a number of Arab countries since late 2010, 
and which has erupted against the old authoritarian regimes in these countries, has left 
researchers wondering whether the Arab World is on a path to a better future, whether the 
new set of institutions that have emerged are capable of bringing economic prosperity to 
ordinary citizens, or whether these countries are hitting stumbling blocks that are going to 
delay the process of political and economic transformation for many years to come.  
The focus of this thesis will be on studying the effects of the political 
transformation in these countries (frequent recalling of governments, political and social 
polarisation, and campaign dynamics of founding elections) on economic outcomes; such 
as tax compliance, support for painful economic reforms, corruption, and trust. The main 
focus of this thesis will be on Egypt, being the largest Arab country in terms of 
population, historically the most influential in the region, and with a dominant cultural 
influence felt all over the Arab world. This makes studying the Egyptian case very 
important as changes in Egypt are echoed in the region.  
According to Acemoglu and Robinson (2013), it is the political transformation 
that follows revolutions (manifested in overthrowing the elites who controlled power, 
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creating a society where political rights are much more broadly distributed, and creating a 
system where the government is accountable) that is required for a poor society to 
become rich. Consequently, Acemoglu and Robinson believe that the reason behind 
Britain being richer than Egypt is that in 1688 Britain had a revolution that transformed 
the politics and thus the economics of the nation. Indeed, the experience of Egypt has 
shown that politics affects economics. Despite the fact that Egyptians saw their economic 
problems as being fundamentally caused by their lack of political rights, a political 
transformation cannot be taken for granted to be a panacea. This is because most of the 
political institutions in old democracies are relatively new to Egyptians; concept of 
partisanship, experience with free and fair elections…etc. Examining the impact of these 
newly acquired political rights on the economy thus becomes of utmost importance. 
However, with Egypt being a developing country, the availability of reliable data 
becomes an issue given the fact that most of macroeconomic data are produced by 
government agencies that used to operate under authoritarian contexts, making such data 
either incomplete or impartial. Hence, to be able to test the above mentioned 
relationships, while overcoming the problem of data availability, an experimental 
methodology has been utilised. This technique not only solves the data problem, but it 
also provides us with a better understanding of the Egyptian culture through delving into 
the behaviour of Egyptians under different contexts in controlled environments. 
 Turning to the main drivers behind the revolution, one can see that fighting 
corruption has been central in all Arab Spring Uprisings. Indeed, most of the statements 
taken from Egyptians while protesting in Tahrir square had the word ‘corruption’ in them 
“We are living amid a corrupt system that has to change”, “We are suffering from 
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corruption and oppression”, and “I hope that by the end of this year, we will have an 
elected government and that universal freedoms are applied and that we put an end to the 
corruption that has taken over this country” (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013). In fact, 
corruption is not only a concern in Arab Spring uprisings, but also a concern of countries 
around the world due to its potential undermining of trust in government and reduction in 
the efficiency of public goods provision (The World Bank, 2004).  With most Arab 
Spring countries currently writing new constitutions and establishing new political 
systems, the time is right for understanding the role that political institutions may play in 
enhancing or mitigating corruption, especially that there has been little empirical research 
on the impact of political institutions on corruption.  The second chapter in this thesis 
thus uses a series of laboratory experiments to examine the impact of the ‘right to recall’, 
a political institution that has been recently enshrined in the Egyptian constitution, on the 
level of government corruption. We find experimental evidence suggesting that such an 
institution can decrease the level of corruption in government through the increased 
accountability it imposes on elected politicians. 
Another driver behind the eruption of the Arab Spring Uprisings is the 
deterioration in living conditions of the majority of the population. A multidimensional 
reform process is, thus, inevitable for governments of these countries to build a modern 
society with high growth prospects. On one dimension, a clear picture must be developed 
for the main factors affecting tax compliance behaviour of citizens. Unless people pay the 
taxes they are required by law to pay, a general welfare state will eventually collapse. 
Understanding the behavioural aspects of the tax compliance decision is what lies at the 
heart of the design of effective policies for reducing tax evasion. Although there is a 
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growing literature on the determinants of an individual’s tax compliance behaviour, with 
experiments focusing on factors like deterrence, fiscal exchange, and moral sentiments, 
no research has examined the effect of frequent recall of officials on tax compliance. A 
main purpose of the third chapter of this thesis is to bridge this gap in the literature by 
examining the effect of the ‘right to recall’, as a political institution, on tax compliance 
behaviour of citizens in newly democratised countries. I first create an income and 
taxation environment to test for compliance. Empowering subjects in a treatment group 
with the right to recall government officials was found to decrease tax compliance by 
20%.   
   Another dimension for tackling the problem of deterioration in living standards 
of the majority of the population is to examine the obstacles these countries face in 
getting its citizens to support tough, but necessary, economic reform measures. One such 
obstacle could be the deep political polarisations created in these societies. Indeed, since 
mid-2011, the Egyptian public opinion has been extremely polarised and deeply divided. 
Many would argue that this has been a result of electoral politics. In other words, that 
electoral competition since 2011 has done nothing but turning politicians against each 
other. Those politicians relied heavily on polarising the population rather than mobilising 
the population to supporting tough reforms to the country’s challenging problems. In this 
spirit, the fourth chapter in this thesis investigates whether elections, being the 
cornerstone of democracy, are helping or not, in reforming Egypt’s major economic 
problems. We examine whether political polarisation in elections is an obstacle to reform 
in an incentivised laboratory experiment using natural ideological differences in Egypt.  
Specifically, we create political societies which subjects join based on ideological 
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preferences.  Then, voters choose between enacting a reform, which will lead to higher 
payoffs for all (but has a differential benefit for supporters of one of the political 
societies) versus not enacting the reform and everyone facing the same lower payoffs.  
We find that when voters are provided with information that support for the reform varies 
across ideological societies in previous sessions, they are significantly more likely to 
report that their vote choices are influenced by their society membership to a greater 
extent than when such information is not provided.  We also find evidence that polarising 
information influences voter choices in the election.  Our results suggest that ideological 
polarisation in elections can impede economic reform.  
Moving on to trust, one finds ample evidence indicating its contribution to 
economic, political and social success (Knack & Keefer, 1997a; Zak & Knack, 2001a). 
Nevertheless, 78 percent of Egyptians are un-trustful of each other (World Values 
Survey, 2012). With negative campaigning becoming a dominant feature of current 
Egyptian politics with politicians trying to discredit their opponents- both with respect to 
personal traits and policies- the final chapter of this thesis focuses on negative 
campaigning and examines its effect on both trust among citizens and trust in the overall 
political system. Election campaigns have originally been created to help citizens make 
voting decisions through communicating information about candidates (Brians & 
Wattenberg, 1996; Lipsitz et al., 2005; Sides et al., 2010; Stevens et al., 2008). However, 
recent campaigns have increasingly been relying on a negative tone. In this chapter, I 
contribute to the broad literature on the effect of negative campaigning on turnout and 
candidate evaluations, by looking carefully at one important mechanism through which it 
operates, namely interpersonal trust. I use a laboratory experiment in which subjects are 
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randomly assigned to a control group, a positive campaigning condition or a negative 
campaigning condition. They then take part in the well-known trust game introduced in 
Berg et al. (1995). One novelty of this study is that instead of only relying on attitudinal 
reports of trust in other citizens and candidates, we generate a behavioural measure of 
trust by having participants play “the trust game”. I find that when subjects are faced with 
negative information regarding potential candidates’ personality, they are significantly 
more likely to contribute a smaller amount of money in the trust game (13 percent less) 
than when such information is not provided.  My results suggest that negative 
campaigning in elections can impact negatively on people’s trust in each other.  
I believe that understanding the behaviour of Egyptians to political 
transformations taking place in the country, during this critical transitional period, will 
definitely shed significant light on where the current Egyptian economy stands and where 
it is likely to be headed. It will also act as guidance for other countries in the region 
which face similar economic and political challenges. 
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Chapter 2 
Political Institutions and Corruption: An Experimental 
Examination of the “Right to Recall” 
2.1    Introduction 
 
“There can be no doubt, that if power is granted to a body of men, called  
representatives, they like any other men will use their power 
not for the advantage of the community but for their own advantage,  
if they can.” 
  
James Mill (1773-1836)
1
 
 
The World Bank (2004) considers corruption to be “…the single greatest obstacle to 
economic and social development”.  There are many definitions and versions of 
corruption, some blatantly illegal, others more nuanced and sometimes even legal.  We 
will confine ourselves in this chapter to the definition used by the World Bank (1997)  
and Bardhan (1997, p.1321) which see corruption as the use of public office for private 
                                                          
1
 For more details, see (Ball, 1992.). 
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gains, where an official assigned the authority of making decisions for the group abuses it 
by delivering decisions that lead to private enrichment.  
There is by now an extensive literature that establishes strong association among 
corruption, the inefficient allocation of public goods, and growth-related outcomes (Bai 
& Wei, 2000; Burki & Perry, 1998; Glynn et al., 1997; Kaufmann et al., 1999; Mauro, 
1995).
2
  In particular, corruption has been identified as a major source of government 
failure in public good provision.
3
 Understanding what factors breed corruption and 
whether they can be altered is an important line of inquiry. While there is substantial 
theoretical literature linking corruption to the type of political institution (Kunicová & 
Rose-Ackerman, 2005; Persson et al., 1997), the empirical literature is limited. This is 
especially true for economies in transition, which may be able to control corruption to 
some degree by adopting particular political institutions. 
Our study contributes to the emerging empirical literature on the determinants of 
government corruption with particular attention devoted to the role of citizens’ right to 
recall officials - a political institution that has not been rigorously examined in the 
literature.
4
 The idea is that the right to recall offers a political channel that may increase 
political accountability of officials compared to those officials who have a fixed term in 
office. The threat of recall, say due to dissatisfaction with the official’s rent-seeking 
                                                          
2
 There is an argument that corruption may reduce other transactions costs associated with investment and 
economic development but there is little empirical support for this “corruption greasing the wheels” 
hypothesis (see, for example Fuest, et al., 2013.). 
3
  “…public goods often face a double jeopardy: market failure compounded by government failure…” 
(Kaul, et al., 1999.). 
4
 The ‘right to recall’ exists in parliamentary systems under the name ‘no confidence vote’ where the 
parliament can initiate a motion to recall the prime minister. In presidential systems, however, there is no 
such right in the constitution, with the exception of Venezuela. In the US, for example, there are ‘right to 
recall’ governors but not presidents.  We do not consider impeachment as a ‘right to recall’ institution. 
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behaviour, may reduce the incidence of such behaviour.  In this context, this chapter 
makes several specific contributions.  First, we take a novel approach to understanding 
the role that the right to recall plays in deterring/enhancing corruption in a controlled 
environment through a series of laboratory experiments. Secondly, we are the first to 
study strategic interactions in a stylized game that integrates several games associated 
with public sector-citizen interaction, previously studied in isolation, such as public good 
games, tax compliance games, and recall elections. Thirdly, our findings add to the 
literature on equilibrium selection and behaviour in repeated games. A unique feature of 
our study is conducting experiments in Egypt (with Egyptian students) while the country 
was experiencing political turmoil; in Egypt the right to recall rulers has been practiced 
twice in less than three years (removing Mubarak in 2011 and Morsi in July 2013) and in 
both cases, corruption charges were among the demands of the protesters.
5
  
Ex ante, we expect the right to recall an official while in office to be more 
conducive to the socially intended functioning of officials than simply providing an 
unchallenged fixed term of office. We test this hypothesis in this chapter. Our 
experimental methodology is particularly relevant given the difficulty of collecting 
observational data on such events
6
. Specifically, we (i) model corruption that manifests 
itself through inefficient provision of public goods, (ii) identify two institutions, 
scheduled replacements and recall-enabled replacements, that may have different impacts 
                                                          
5
 As per the new constitution of Egypt (January 2014), the right to recall the president has been enshrined 
as a constitutional right – probably for the first time in a semi-presidential system. According to article 161, 
a two-thirds majority of parliament can initiate a motion to withdraw confidence from the president. Such a 
motion, however, has to be approved by the electorate in a public referendum. If rejected, the president 
remains in office and parliament is automatically dissolved.  At the time of our experiments, the right to 
recall was not yet institutionalised in the political system. 
6
 During the last three decades, various organisations have collected and published data on corruption. 
However, most corruption indicators are about perceived and not actual levels of corruption. 
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on limiting corruption, (iii) offer an equilibrium analysis of the two and (iv) test the 
empirical performance of such institutions in the lab.  
The need for empirical testing is of a great importance as theoretically the recall 
option can be predicted to limit corruption, or not, depending on the strategies employed 
by players; subgame perfect equilibrium predicts no recall-effect on corruption but there 
are other equilibria in which recall-enabled replacements are more effective in hindering 
corruption than scheduled replacements. Specifically, we simulate a familiar interaction 
between public officials and the citizenry (through a tax experiment) to investigate how 
scheduled replacements of officials versus recall-enabled replacements affect the 
decisions of officials in charge of public good provision. In our experiment, subjects earn 
money by performing a labour task and pay taxes according to their claimed income and 
face a given probability of getting audited and penalty schedule. Tax proceeds are used to 
fund a public good that is chosen by the group official. The official has the choice to fund 
a self-serving (and inefficient in equilibrium) public good or refrain the self-serving 
behaviour by funding a public good that benefits everyone equally and is more efficient 
(in equilibrium). The frequency of the self-serving public good choice is a stylized 
measure of corruption. Our data suggest that the recall-enabled replacement of officials 
has an important impact on limiting corruption behaviour but the resulting rate of 
turnover among officials is high which warrants awareness on other costs of this 
institution.
7
 
                                                          
7
  In practice, these other costs may include a loss of institutional knowledge due to high leader turnover 
and pecuniary costs and social costs associated with frequent recalls. Some of these costs will be tackled in 
the next chapter. 
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The chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, we present the literature 
review. The theoretical construct and derivation of hypotheses are presented in section 
2.3. Section 2.4 presents the experimental design. The empirical and experimental results 
are presented in sections 2.5 and 2.6, respectively. And the final section concludes.  
2.2    Literature Review 
Civilized societies have long been known for delegating the power to tax and to provide 
public goods to representatives. A large fraction of public spending, however, is not 
devoted to useful public projects, but rather to support projects of self-interested officials 
and other pork-barrel projects. The political process has been recognised by the economic 
literature to be a major factor behind this inefficient provision of public goods (Lizzeri & 
Persico, 2001).  Representative democracies have been hailed as providing accountability 
between elected leaders and those who elect. However, democratically elected leaders are 
not immune to corruption as evidenced in countries as different as Zimbabwe, Venezuela, 
and the U.S. Accountability of elected officials through the ballot box is thought to curtail 
the use of public resources for personal gain, but to date, there has been limited empirical 
analysis of this conjecture. 
Public officials are entrusted with decision-making functions, the provision of 
public goods to the community being an important one. Corruption can be manifested as 
an allocation of public funds to the provision of public goods that provide more benefit to 
officials at the cost of benefit to the general citizenry. In this chapter, we focus on 
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corruption as a phenomenon that involves public officials, other citizens, and the 
allocation of public-sector goods.
8
  
The argument that different institutional frameworks can affect levels of 
corruption follows from opportunities, constraints, and incentives these frameworks 
provide on strategic interactions among involved agents. One such angle is the “career 
concerns” approach of Hölmstrom (1999). In this regard, there are numerous studies that 
argue that leaders who are not eligible for re-election act differently than those who are 
(Alt et al., 2009; Besley & Case, 1995; Besley & Case, 2003; Ferraz & Finan, 2011). For 
instance, Alt et al. (2009) find that economic growth is higher and taxes, spending, and 
borrowing costs are lower under reelection-eligible incumbents than under term-limited 
incumbents. Ferraz and Finan (2011) show that, in Brazil, electoral rules that enhance 
political accountability play a crucial role in constraining politician’s corrupt behaviour.  
Lizzeri and Persico (2001) compare the composition of government spending 
under alternative electoral rules through a political-economy model where the provision 
of a public good is determined by the electoral incentives of office-seeking candidates. 
When candidates have the option of redistributing resources, public goods will be 
underprovided relative to the efficient outcome because benefits from the public goods 
cannot be easily targeted to groups of voters. In the same context, Persson and Tabellini 
(1999) construct a model of redistributive politics in which a majoritarian system 
generates less public good provision than a proportional system. Using cross-country 
                                                          
8
 Corruption may be carried out by others including bureaucrats but we do not specifically investigate 
those other channels in this chapter. 
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data, they find weak support for this prediction. This chapter contributes to this literature 
by proposing the absence of the right to recall as an explanatory variable for inefficiency 
of public good provision by government officials.  
Concerning the emerging literature on laboratory experiments of corruption
9
, 
Abbink et al. (2000; Abbink et al., 2002) introduce reciprocity games that mimic 
situations where corruption arises. Specifically, they separate the influences of the three 
main characteristics of corruption, namely (i) reciprocity relationships between bribers 
and public officials, (ii) negative welfare effects, and (iii) high penalties when 
discovered, in their experiment. In their study, it is a third agent, a sudden death 
treatment, who may punish corrupt behaviour by others. On the contrary, in our study 
punishment of corrupt behaviour can be carried out by the citizens via the recall of the 
official and/or tax compliance, neither explicitly tested via a political process in Abbink 
et al. (2002).   
Other research assumes that policymakers would act in the interests of those 
whom they represent simply because of the responsibility to do so by virtue of having 
been chosen to make decisions for others. Drazen and Ozbay (2014) present experimental 
evidence that policies chosen by leaders depend on whether they were elected or 
appointed. They find that elected leaders are significantly more likely to choose a policy 
not equal to their “type” than leaders who are appointed.  
No study – to the best knowledge of the authors – directly examined the effect of 
citizens’ right to recall an official during his/her term in office on corrupt allocations of 
                                                          
9
 For an earlier review of the literature, see (Abbink, 2006.). 
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the public good. This chapter bridges a gap within the literature using controlled 
environments and experimental methods to isolate effects of variables of interest 
(opportunity to recall in our study) on behaviour of decision-makers (prevalence of 
corruption in our study). We use a series of laboratory experiments to capture the 
reactions of “citizens” to “officials’ behaviour”, in different political settings, through a 
stylized official-citizen interaction over tax compliance.  
We turn next to the theoretical analysis of our stylized model of corruption in the 
presence and absence of the recall option.  
2.3    Theoretical Analysis and Derivation of Hypotheses 
To elicit the relationship between the form of political system and corruption, we model 
it through a natural interaction between citizens and government—that of tax payment 
and the provision of a public good; all players (citizens and the official) make decisions 
regarding their tax compliance and the official decides how to use the taxpayer dollars. In 
the no-Recall game (noR-game) the official is randomly chosen and sits as the incumbent 
for one fixed term (with a known duration). In the Recall game (R-game) the citizens are 
allowed to recall the official after they have observed his/her decision on how to spend 
the tax proceeds. If a recall is voted for, a new official is chosen among the citizens. To 
disentangle the effect of recall-enabled replacement on official’s behaviour (from the 
election effect), in both games officials are exogenously selected; they can be thrown out 
of office in the R-game but not in the noR-game.
10
   
                                                          
10
 In either game, we do not have elections per se as citizens do not have any control over who will come 
into office. This setting is close to Powell’s (Powell, 2000.) classification with respect to voters' objectives 
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We model the interaction between citizens and officials with the following 
sequential stage game. In both political settings, players report their earned income which 
is used to determine income tax liability. It is common knowledge that with some 
probability,𝑝𝑎 , any player can get audited. An audited player pays tax on his actual 
earned (not on declared) income plus a fine; the fine is a convex and increasing function 
of unreported income
11
. A player who is not audited pays according to his declared (not 
necessarily true) income, x. Tax proceeds
12
 are used to finance one of two available 
public goods; the G-good which favours the official at the expense of other citizens or the 
C-good, which  benefits all players equally. The official makes the decision which public 
good to fund. Valuation of public goods across players is common knowledge. The 
valuation of the C-good is identical for citizens and the official whereas the valuation of 
the G-good is higher than the valuation of the C-good for the official but lower for the 
citizens. If we let 𝛽𝑖
𝑗
 denote the marginal per capita return (mpcr) of j-good to i-player, 
valuation of public goods G and C across players is captured by the following set of 
inequalities,
13
  
(*)                                                  min{𝛽𝑜
𝐺 , 1} > 𝛽𝑜
𝐶 = 𝛽𝑐
𝐶 > 𝛽𝑐
𝐺 ≥ 1 (𝑛 − 1)⁄  
                                                                                                                                                                             
at election time and which makes voters use elections to reward or punish incumbents, instead of using 
elections to choose between prospective teams of future policymakers.  
 
11
 See appendix C for more details. 
12
 Penalties do not go into the public pool of funds; they go to cover administrative costs of auditing and are 
considered a loss. The G and C goods are produced at the same constant marginal cost. 
13
 Another way to think of payoffs from the G-good is a transfer of (1 −
𝛽𝑐
𝐺
𝛽𝑐
𝐶) 𝑇 to the official’s account 
(which captures rent extraction) and use the remaining of the tax proceeds, (
𝛽𝑐
𝐺
𝛽𝑐
𝐶) 𝑇 to fund the C-good. In 
this interpretation, (which is payoff equivalent for citizens to the one above with two public goods) there is 
only one public good to be funded that is equally valuable to everyone (think of defence) but the official 
makes a decision on how much of the total tax revenue T goes to funding it (while the rest is appropriated 
by the official). 
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where 𝑛 is the number of players; subscripts are used for player’s type (c for the citizen 
and o for the official) and superscripts for the type of public goods (G for the G-good and 
C for the C-good). The social dilemma follows from the lower bound 1/(n-1) and the 
upper bound 1 on citizen’s mpcrs. The official’s decision on which public good to fund is 
made known to all and payoffs are realised. In the R-game (but not in the noR-game) the 
stage game continues with the citizens voting on whether to recall the official.  
An official who uses office for private benefits would choose to fund the G-good 
as own return from the G-good (𝛽𝑜
𝐺) is higher than the return from the C-good (𝛽𝑜
𝐶) 
although the funding of the G-good is less preferred by the citizens. This captures in a 
stylized way some version of legal corruption. The frequency of the G-good being funded 
will be one of the measures of corruption. To measure the effect of the recall option on 
economic efficiency and fairness of redistribution of tax proceeds through public good 
provision we will look at the common measure of efficiency (the ratio between the 
realized group payoff and the maximum feasible group payoff) and payoff equity (Gini 
index of the distribution of payoffs) across the two games (R-game and noR-game).  
The main question of interest is whether recall-enabled rather than scheduled 
replacement of officials is a more effective institution in hindering corruption. There is no 
a priori clear yes/no answer to this question as non-corrupt officials can also be thrown 
out of office if craving for political power is widespread among voters; if so a recall-
enabled institution offers little incentive to officials to behave as socially intended.
14
 
Theoretically, the level of corruption is expected to be the same in both games if one 
                                                          
14
 The supermajority rule is preferred to the simple majority in protecting non-corrupt officials. It is also 
superior to the unanimity rule if “vote buying” is added to the equation as a corrupt official would need to 
“buy” one vote to survive a recall. 
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appeals to subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). However, in other Nash equilibria (not SPE) 
with players using “maxmin” actions (to punish corruption and tax evasion) out of the 
equilibrium path, the predictions are more/less corruption in the R-game than in the noR-
game depending on whether recalling the official is part of the strategy profile when the 
game approaches the end (see part 2 of the main results below). The intuition behind this 
result is that the official in either game funds the C-good as long as the instantaneous 
benefits from corruption (funding of the G-good) are smaller than future losses that occur 
as a result of the corruption triggering low compliance in both games and recalls in the R-
game. But while the instantaneous benefits are the same across the two games the future 
losses differ as the likelihood of being in the office (and therefore expected payoffs) after 
funding the G-good are different across the two games. In the following, we will state the 
equilibrium analysis of the two games (details in Appendix A) and use laboratory data to 
obtain further insights on the empirical validity of theoretical hypotheses.  
The following notation will be used: w is the individual’s income,  is the tax 
rate, 𝑝𝑎 and 𝑓(. ) are the auditing probability and the fine (a convex increasing function) 
on unreported income. If the likelihood that G-good is funded is 𝑝𝐺  then the expected 
mpcr of the public good to individual i is: 𝐸𝑖(𝛽|𝑝
𝐺) = 𝛽𝑖
𝐺𝑝𝐺 + 𝛽𝑖
𝐶(1 − 𝑝𝐺). Letting 𝑥−𝑖 
denote the vector of declared income by others, player i’s expected payoff in the stage 
game from reporting xi (when the real income is w)
15
 is  
𝐸(𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥−𝑖, 𝑝
𝐺)) = 𝑤 − 𝑦𝑖 − 𝑝𝑎𝑓(𝑤 − 𝑥𝑖) + (𝑇−𝑖 + 𝑦𝑖)𝐸𝑖(𝛽|𝑝
𝐺)      (1) 
 
                                                          
15
 For simplicity we assume homogenous income and that decision of how much to work are not part of the 
problem of our decision-maker. Since the optimal strategies have the dominance property these 
assumptions are innocuous.  
t
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where 𝑇−𝑖 is the expected total tax paid by others and 𝑦𝑖 = 𝜏(𝑝𝑎𝑤 + (1 − 𝑝𝑎)𝑥𝑖) is the 
expected payment by individual i as income tax.  
It follows from the linearity in the public good payoff specification that the 
optimal declared income is in dominant strategies. But unlike in linear public good 
games, full free riding (that is, declaring 0 income) is not optimal for penalty functions 
that are sufficiently convex. It follows from partial free-riding (through partial tax 
compliance) and statement (*) that in equilibrium under provision of public goods is 
expected. As the optimal free-riding decreases in the mpcr in our games, the higher the 
corruption the lower the public good provision.  
The outcomes of the subgame perfect equilibrium in either game (see Proposition 
1.1 and 2.1 in Appendix A) are underfunding of the G-good which is the only public 
good being funded; in addition, in the Recall game the officials are always thrown out.  
The subgame perfect equilibrium builds on the Nash equilibrium of the stage 
game. However, in our games players’ payoffs in the Nash equilibrium of the stage game 
are larger than the minmax payoff.
16
 Hence, there are Nash equilibria (not SPE) in which 
players’ payoffs are close to any strictly enforceable payoff profile if the game is played 
long enough. In such equilibrium with grim punishing actions being triggered by 
corruption or free-riding, there exists an r* such that C-good is funded during the first r* 
rounds of the game and the G-good is funded during R-r* end rounds, R is the total 
number of rounds the stage game is played. The number of rounds without corruption, r*, 
                                                          
16
 If we let 𝑥𝐺  denote the vector of optimal declared income when the G-good is funded (i.e, pG=1) then in 
the Nash equilibrium of the stage game the payoff of individual i is 𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖
𝐺 , 𝑥−𝑖
𝐺 , 1) which is larger than the 
minmax payoff,  𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖
𝐺 , 0,1) in which the official funds the G-good and every player but i declares 0 
income; the expected difference of the two payoffs is   𝛽𝑖
𝐺(1 − 𝑝𝑎)𝜏 ∑ 𝑥𝑗
𝐺(> 0)𝑗≠𝑖 . 
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varies with the length of the service term (i.e., the value of R), but the number of end 
rounds with corruption, (i.e., the value of R-r*) does not. The number of end rounds in 
which the G-good is funded is determined by the ratio between the instantaneous benefit 
(the round additional payoff) that the official earns by making self-serving decisions and 
the future losses (the difference between the payoff he gets by not defecting and the 
minmax payoff in any following round): the larger the future losses (for e.g., the larger 
the fraction of voters that engage in punishing the official) the smaller the number of end 
rounds with corruption, R-r* (See Appendix A). In the R-game, there are similar Nash 
equilibria in which the official is recalled if he funds the G-good during the no-corruption 
rounds. In such equilibria the number of end rounds with corruption is (weakly) smaller 
than in the noR-game if the recall option is not exercised during the end rounds (with 
corruption). If the recall option is exercised during the end rounds then the recall-enabled 
replacement institution cannot be superior to the scheduled replacement in delaying 
corruption. There are many such Nash equilibria; which one is played out is an empirical 
question. Nevertheless, theoretical analysis shows that whether recall-enabled 
replacement (compared to the scheduled replacement) is a better institution in hampering 
corruption depends on strategies used during the end of the game. This may explain why 
we see both institutions across countries.  
Theoretical predictions of both SPE and equilibria with trigger strategies across 
the two games are summarised in the following main result
17
.   
 
                                                          
17 Note that we assume risk neutrality and that players’ preferences on the payoff space are represented by 
equation (1) above. 
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Main Results: 
1. SPE predict full corruption in both games. 
2. There are Nash equilibria with punishing (grim) strategies out of the equilibrium 
path that predict no corruption in all but the end rounds. The predicted number of 
end rounds with corruption is:  
a. Lower in the noR-game than in the R-game for strategy profiles that recall 
officials during the end rounds. 
b. Higher in the noR-game than in the R-game for strategy profiles that do not 
recall officials during the end rounds (i.e. when recall is exercised only after 
defections during the non-end rounds). 
3. Inefficiency of public good provision increases with corruption.   
 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
Our first hypotheses that follow from the outcomes of SPE stated above and part 3 of the 
proposition are:  
 
H1o: Corruption level is the same across the two institutions. 
H2o: Inefficiency of public good provision is similar across the two institutions. 
 
In the R-game, “always recall” the official is part of a SPE  (see Appendix A, result P2.1) 
so we have the third null hypothesis 
 
H3o: The likelihood of a recall does not depend on official’s behaviour. 
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The alternative hypotheses that follow from Part 2 and 3 of the Proposition are: 
 
H1a: Corruption level differs across the two games.  
H2a: Inefficiency of public good provision is different across the two games. 
 
The one-sided alternative hypotheses for the Nash equilibria of type 2.a (2.b) above are 
higher (lower) corruption and inefficiency of the public good provision in the R-game 
than in the no-R game. 
In the R-game, in (both types 2.a and 2.b) Nash equilibria with trigger strategies, a 
funding of the G-good by the official during the non-end rounds of the game triggers 
recalls. Hence, the one-sided alternative hypothesis to H3o is 
 
H3a: Funding of the G-good affects positively the likelihood of recall.  
 
We turn now to an explicit discussion of the experimental design. 
2.4    Experimental Design  
The experimental design that we report here is a 2x1 design implemented across 
subjects.
18
 In both settings, subjects are randomly matched into groups of five at the 
beginning of the experiment; groups remain fixed during the entire experiment. At the 
                                                          
18
 The instructions (in Arabic) were distributed in hardcopy to the subjects to ensure that subjects could 
refer to them at any time during the experiment for information on the audit rate, penalty structure, the 
value of the two public goods to officials and citizens and other details. Instructions are included in 
Appendix B. 
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beginning of round 1, an initial official is randomly selected. Subjects earn experimental 
pounds
19
 according to their performance in a simple task of correcting spelling mistakes 
in the Arabic language. After the earning money task is completed, subjects decide how 
much income to report; the reported income is taxable at the rate of 25%.
20
 No taxes are 
paid on unreported income unless a subject is audited; an audited subject, in addition to 
paying taxes on earned income, pays a penalty on any undeclared income determined by 
a known penalty structure; one out of the five members is randomly selected to be 
audited.
21
 Total taxes paid by all subjects are used to fund one of two feasible public 
goods as being decided by the official of the group. The mpcr of the C-good is 0.6 for any 
member of the group, whereas the G-good is valued most by the official (mpcr=1.5) but 
less so by citizens (mpcr=0.375).  
To capture non-excludability and non-rivalry characteristics of a public good, we 
follow a standard implementation in the experimental literature that distributes some 
multiple (3 for us) of the total individual investments in the public good (i.e., total tax 
revenue in our games) among group members. In case of the C-good, tripled tax revenues 
are equally distributed among group members; in case of the G-good, half of the amount 
goes to the official whereas the remaining half is distributed equally among the other 
group members, i.e., the other four citizens. Thus while the C-good is valued the same 
across group members, the G-good provides more benefit to the official at a cost of 
reduced benefit to the citizens--what we call a “corrupt” decision. The net of the round’s 
                                                          
19
 Accumulated payoffs in experimental pounds were converted at the end of the experiment into Egyptian 
pounds. 
20
 All subjects in our experiment knew that they faced the same tax rate as all other subjects. 
21
 Penalties are not added to the public fund and are therefore considered wasted resources. 
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earnings for each subject is then calculated (earned income minus taxes less penalties (if 
audited) plus the payoff from the public good chosen by the official). One full term in 
office lasts for seven rounds and the whole experiment consists of 14 rounds.  
The two experimental settings differ as follows. In the no-recall treatment the 
official remains in power for seven rounds whereas in the recall treatment the group 
members are allowed to vote for a recall-replacement at any round out of the seven 
rounds. If the majority of members (including the official)
22
 vote for a recall, the 
computer randomly chooses a new official from eligible members.
23
 After the first seven 
rounds, a new official is randomly selected in the no-recall treatment, and the experiment 
continues for seven more rounds (i.e., until the 14
th
 round); in the recall treatment a 
random selection of an official takes place only if the initial official was never recalled 
for seven rounds. Several studies (for example, Blume & Sobel, 1995; Crawford & Sobel, 
1982; Farrell & Gibbons, 1989) find that communication can affect behaviour. Therefore, 
after the tenth round in both treatments we allow subjects for a “cheap talk” chat via text 
messages within the group members. Subjects were not allowed to communicate with one 
another during the experiment other than the chat allowed after round 10. 
After completion of the main experiment, subjects completed a post-experimental 
online questionnaire
 
(see Appendix D) that included questions designed to get 
information about idiosyncratic individual characteristics such as attitudes toward risk, 
                                                          
22
 This is our implementation of supermajority as the majority here is the same as three out of four citizens 
voting to recall the official. As an official would not vote to recall himself (confirmed in our data as 
98.21% of our “officials” did so), in the instructions we elected to go for allowing the official to vote as 
well and implement the majority rule as this was easier to explain to subjects. 
23
 A group member is eligible if he has not been a subject of recall elections during the last three elections. 
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views regarding the performance of political institutions, gender, religion, academic 
performance, etc.  
All 120 subjects (60 subjects in each treatment; each session was run with 30 
subjects) who participated in the experiment were volunteers from undergraduate classes 
at Cairo University. The experiment was conducted in March 2013, three months before 
the ousting of Egypt’s first democratically elected president, Morsi. Each subject 
participated only once in the experiment. At the end of the experiment, subjects were paid 
for all 14 rounds and the total earnings were typically between $26.00 and $60.00
24
. The 
experiment lasted approximately two hours, and it was conducted in Arabic. Both 
treatments were conducted in the Laboratory of the Faculty of Economics and Political 
Sciences at Cairo University.  
2.5    Empirical Results 
Before we report subjects’ behaviour, it will be helpful to look at incentives for 
corruption across the two games given parameters used in the experiment.  
We begin by noting that the maximum feasible payoff for a group is EP150. For 
optimal claims of income given the type of public good funding, if the tax proceeds go to 
fund the C-good then the round payoff is EP27 for everyone, whereas under corruption 
(G-good funding) the round payoffs are EP32 and EP21 for the official and the citizen, 
respectively. Thus, funding C-good offers not only more fair redistribution of tax 
proceeds but also higher efficiency as optimal claims are higher: economic efficiency is 
                                                          
24
 At the time the experiment was run, the exchange rate was: 1 USD = 6.78 EGP. The subjects’ earnings 
were between 180 EGP and 406 EGP. An average hourly rate is 33 EGP (CAPMAS, 2013.). Thus each 
subject earned at least twice what he could have earned outside the lab per hour. 
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90% (=135/150) in case of the C-good and down to 77% (=116/150) if the G-good is 
funded. Yet, the round payoff is EP5 higher for the official if the official decides to fund 
the G-good. 
Next, in a two-terms of service situation (two parts in our experiment, each with 7 
rounds), a norm of corruption might be tempting in the scheduled replacement treatment 
as the expected payoff to an official is EP386 which exceeds the expected payoff of 
EP378 from no corruption (C-good always funded). A ‘norm’ of corruption is less 
tempting in the recall-enabled replacement treatment as a recalled official needs to wait 
for three elections before he becomes an eligible member for office, so subject’s expected 
payoff under a ‘norm of corruption’ is bounded from above by EP338 which is smaller 
than expected payoff of EP378 if the norm of no corruption is in place.
25
  
The SPE predicts full corruption in either institution. Given the parameters used 
in our experiment, the Nash equilibria of type 2a reported in the Main Result also predict 
full corruption (in both games) as seven rounds are not sufficient to support rounds with 
no corruption: 
 
the round gain is 22.5 whereas any future round comes with a loss of 3.5, 
hence the predicted number of rounds with corruption is 7. Nevertheless, for equilibria of 
type 2b (that restrain from recalls during the end of the game) seven rounds are enough to 
support rounds with no corruption in the recall-enabled replacement treatment as the 
round gain remains the same, 22.5, but the future round loss is almost tripled, 9.34; so the 
predicted number of end rounds with corruption in the R-game is 3. If so, then the 
frequency of corruption is between 43% and 100% (depending on whether recalls are 
utilized during the end-rounds) in the R-game and 100% in the noR-game.  So, given the 
                                                          
25
 EP386 (=7*32+7(32/5+21*4/5)), EP378 (=14*27) and EP338 (=10*21+4*32). 
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parameters used in our experiment, the alternative hypotheses H1a and H2a are one sided 
as folows:   
H1b: Corruption level is higher in the scheduled replacement than recall-enabled 
replacement treatment.  
H2b: Inefficiency of public good provision is higher in the scheduled replacement 
than recall-enabled replacement treatment.  
Finally, if the C-good is funded more often in the recall treatment (H1b) then 
payoffs are more equal across group members because they all get equal returns for the 
public good. In addition if corrupt officials are often recalled then in case of G-good 
provision each player earns (the high) official’s payoffs in some rounds and (the low) 
citizen’s payoffs in others. Thus, it follows that: 
H4 (inequity): Inequality of final earnings is negatively affected by the recall 
option.  
2.6    Experimental Results 
Of the 60 subjects who participated in the no-recall treatment, 40 (67%) subjects never 
served as a group official, 16 subjects (27%) served as group officials for 7 rounds, and 4 
subjects (7%) served for 14 rounds. In the recall treatment, on the other hand, of the 60 
subjects, there were 6 subjects (10%) who never served as officials, 5 (8%) subjects 
served for 7 or 8 rounds, and no subject served for 14 rounds; half of the subjects (30) 
served as group officials for 2 or 3 rounds.  
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Figure 2.1:  Histogram of recalls  
 
 
Figure 2.1 shows empirical distribution of recalls across 12 groups; the mean 
likelihood of a recall is 56% (standard deviation=0.498). Clearly our subjects weren’t shy 
of exercising the option to recall the group official but the 56% is a far cry from 100% 
rate of recall predicted by a SPE (hypothesis H3o). So what determines the likelihood of 
a recall?
26
 
Recall and corruption.  If an intrinsic need for power is the main driver of a recall 
then we expect to see that the likelihood of recall does not depend on an official’s choice 
(C or G); a result that would be consistent with the SPE. On the other hand, and 
according to NE that are not SPE, a corrupt official can trigger recalls in the R-game; 
                                                          
26
 To vote an official out of office requires at least three votes. We can safely rule out that the high rate of 
recall is a result of trembles/ noise (such as subjects submitting ‘recall’ when they meant to submit ‘do not 
recall’). 
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meaning that we should expect no recalls of non-corrupt officials during the non-end 
rounds of the game (end-rounds as well for type 2.b equilibrium). Examining the data at 
the aggregated level, however, we found that the empirical likelihood of a recall is 
16.28% following a C-good and almost six times as high, 97.56% following a G-good 
funding.  Moreover, by classifying groups into two categories: committed (6 groups that 
recalled fewer than half of their officials) and volatile (6 groups that recalled more than 
half of their officials), we found that: (i) the likelihood of recalling non-corrupt officials 
is a high 41.67% (100% for the corrupt officials) among volatile groups and a low 6.45% 
(90.91% for corrupt officials) for committed groups, and (ii) the corruption level is 2.7 
times higher in the volatile category: 71.43% (volatile groups) and 26.19% (committed 
groups). So, although there seems to be some intrinsic need for power exhibited among 
volatile groups, the effect of corruption seems to be stronger. Indeed probit regression 
(with clusters at group level) supports the hypothesis that corruption is the main cause of 
recalls: the estimated effect of a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 (0) when the G-
good (C-good) is funded increases the likelihood of a recall by 81% (robust standard 
error = 0.057, p-value=0.000).
27
 We conclude that our data reject the null hypothesis H3o 
in favour of the alternative hypothesis H3a.  
Result 1:  Corruption, and not an intrinsic need for power, is the main cause of 
recalls.  
                                                          
27
 A linear regression (with clusters at the group level) with dependent variable the number of votes for 
recall tells a similar story. The estimate of the G-good being funded is 2.40 (robust std.err.=0.264, p=0.000, 
R
2
=0.663), that is, funding G-good increases the number of votes in favour of a recall by 2.4, which for the 
group size of five and the majority rule results in the official being voted out of office. There is no round 
effect, nor any chatting effect, on the number of votes in favour of a recall.  
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The strong effect of corruption on the likelihood of a recall brings to the forefront 
the question of the interaction between political institutions and the level of corruption. 
The data from the end game (round 14) supports the hypothesis that it is the threat of 
recall followed by ineligibility to serve as an official for at least three rounds that may 
sway officials to fund the G-good less often in the recall treatment. In the last round of 
the experiment (when the recall comes with no consequences) we observe that 83% of the 
officials fund the G-good which is not statistically different (Pearson chi2(1)=0.25, 
p=0.615) from behaviour of officials in the no recall treatment: 75%  choose to fund the 
G-good in round 7, the last round before a scheduled official replacement in the no recall 
treatment takes place.
28
 On the contrary, for round 7 (which is not the end of life in office 
for 83% (10 out of 12) officials in the recall treatment) only 33.33% of the officials 
decided to fund the G-good (Pearson chi2(1)=4.20, p=0.041).  
Overall there is less corruption in the recall treatment. With groups as the unit of 
observation, we find that the mean of the distribution of frequencies of G-good until the 
chatting event is 63% (95% confidence interval is (0.41, 0.86)) in the no recall treatment 
and down to 46% (95% confidence interval is (0.27, 0.64)) in the recall treatment. To 
capture the evolution of “corruption” at a group level, we construct a new variable, “Time 
Frequency of G-good (TFG)”. The value of the new variable at round t for group i is the 
ratio of the total number of times that the G-good is funded up to round t and the value of 
t. This variable will be used in the statistical analysis of the determinants of corruption 
                                                          
28
 Data from round 14 in the no-recall treatment are less informative for comparison as we find a strong 
effect of communication (after round 10) in the No-Recall treatment but not in the Recall treatment. Further 
study is warranted to investigate the interaction between communication and officials’ behaviour. 
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reported below, but to get an overall impression of the effect of the Recall option on the 
frequency of corruption over time Figure 2.2 shows TFG values for the two treatments.
29
  
A visual inspection of Figure 2.2 suggests that: (i) the prevalence of corruption is 
negatively affected by the Recall option (as the Recall (dotted) line is everywhere (but at 
the very beginning rounds) by at least 10% below the no Recall (solid) line), (ii) subjects 
in the recall treatment learn quickly (as early as round 3) to fund the G-good less often 
but after that behaviour seems stabilised, (iii) chatting (after round 10) seems to have a 
positive effect on reducing corruption in the no recall treatment but not in the recall 
treatment and (iv) there is a persistent upward trend in the frequency of corruption in the 
no recall treatment until the chatting event.  
We turn our attention to finding out which of the features above survive statistical 
significance criteria. The use of probit model with clusters at the subject level is 
warranted as we have more than one observation per subject serving as a group official. 
The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1 (0) if the group official 
decides to fund G-good (C-good). In the list of regressors that are expected to affect the 
official’s decision are the frequency of G-good being funded in the official’s own group 
at the time of decision (TFG), whether in the preceding round the official funded C-good 
and remained in office (C&In), the opportunity to communicate via a chatting event 
(Chatting) and, in model 2, we add additional regressors that control for individual 
idiosyncratic characteristics such as gender, religion, etc. 
 
 
                                                          
29
 Data points at each round correspond to the averages of the TFG across groups at a given treatment.  
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Figure 2.2: Time Frequencies (at group level) of G-good being funded 
 
 
Table 2.1 reports estimated marginal effects (p-values in brackets) of the 
regressors. Estimates reveal that previous level of corruption is positively associated with 
officials’ self-serving choice of funding G-good: 31.6% increase in the likelihood of 
corruption (p=0.057). Variables that are negatively correlated with corruption include 
retaining a non-corrupt official (the event of a C-good provision and the official not being 
recalled) in the preceding round (-26.3%), being a Muslim in the recall treatment (-
23.7%) and good academic performance (-25.1%).  
To get some information on the association between the two types of institutions 
and the level of corruption we used the pooled sample and added two dummy variables 
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for the No-Recall treatment: one captures additional chatting effect whereas the other 
measures the overall effect of taking away the Recall option on the observed likelihood of 
G-good funding. Our data support the conclusion that in the absence of Recall option the 
likelihood of corruption goes up 13.7% (one-sided p=0.04). Our data reject the null 
hypothesis H1o in favour of the alternative hypothesis H1b. 
Result 2: The level of corruption is lower if citizens are allowed to recall the 
official. 
Allowing chatting among group members has no significant effect on the 
likelihood of corruption; however, in the absence of Recall, communication lowers the 
likelihood of corruption by almost 38.7%.
30
  
 
  
                                                          
30
 The persistency of the effect of communication on corruption remains a question for another study; our 
design is not well-suited to address it as the experiment continued only for four rounds after the chatting.  
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Table 2.1: (Marginal Effects) Probit regression of G-good Funding 
 
Finally, we look at the inefficiency of the public good provision across the two 
treatments. The average inefficiency of public good provision is 15.22% in the no recall 
treatment and 22.63% in the recall treatment. According to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test, data rejects the null hypothesis, H2o of similar inefficiencies of public good 
provision across the two treatments.  
 
Recall Data 
 
All Data 
G-good Funding (D) (1) (2) (1) (2) (3) 
C-good & no Recall (C&In 
preceding round) -0.263** -0.245** 
 
-0.243** -0.236** 
 
(0.034) (0.049)  (0.029) (0.030) 
Time Frequency of G-good 
(lagged) 0.316* 0.361* 0.641*** 0.407*** 0.369*** 
 
(0.057) (0.057) (0.000) (0.002) (0.009) 
Chatting (D) 0.109 0.119 0.122 0.112 0.102 
 
(0.127) (0.111) (0.121) (0.122) (0.168) 
 
Demographics   
 
  
Female (D)  -0.138   -0.085 
 
 (0.197)   (0.334) 
Muslim (D)  -0.237**   0.019 
 
 (0.041)   (0.886) 
Single (D)  -0.018   0.086 
 
 (0.919)   (0.643) 
Junior and up (D)  -0.135   -0.125 
 
 (0.313)   (0.167) 
High GPA (D)
  
-0.251*** 
(0.008) 
 
 
-0.223*** 
(0.003) 
 
Treatment Effects 
Chatting No Recall (D)  
 
 
-0.344** 
 
-0.386** -0.387*** 
 
  (0.014) (0.017) (0.009) 
No Recall (D)   0.147* 0.154* 0.137* 
 
  (0.085) (0.053) (0.081) 
Nr. Of Observations 156 156 312 312 312 
Nr of Clusters 54 54 74 74 74 
R
2
 0.127 0.189  0.168 0.200 
Log-likelihood -94.40 -87.67 -184.4 -179.4 -172.4 
Obs. P 
Predicted P 
0.487 
0.483 
0.487 
0.484 
0.532 
0.539 
0.532 
0.538 
0.532 
0.538 
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Result 3: Inefficiency of public good provision is higher if citizens are allowed to 
recall the official. 
As the inefficiency of the public good provision is determined by tax compliance, 
we’ll have more to say about this in the following paragraph.  
Economic consequences of the Recall Option. An expected economic 
consequence of a lower level of corruption in our experiment is lower income 
inequality.
31
 The range of payoffs in the Recall treatment is [239, 405] which is a strict 
subset of the range of payoffs in the No-Recall treatment, [213, 550]. The Gini index in 
the No-Recall treatment is twice the index in the Recall treatment: 10.3% (No-Recall) 
and 5.1% (Recall). Figure 2.3 shows estimated kernel densities of the distributions of 
final earnings in the two treatments (the solid line shows data from No-Recall treatment 
whereas the dashed line correspond to data from Recall treatment). The null hypothesis of 
final earnings in the two treatments coming from the same distribution is rejected by 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (p=0.028).  
Result 4: The Recall option has a positive effect on income equality. 
Lower income inequality can also result from a high frequency of recalls; if so 
then lower inequality might not be that desirable as frequent recalls signal cabinet 
instability. To test whether the high recall is the main cause of the low earning inequality, 
we look at data from the Recall treatment and compare equality of earnings’ distribution 
of subjects from groups with Recall frequencies below 50% (dash-dot line in Fig.2.3) and 
above 50% (short-dot line in Fig.2.3). The null hypothesis of earnings in these two 
                                                          
31
 Income is measured as the final earnings, i.e., income after tax and transfers. 
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categories being drawn from the same distribution is not rejected by Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test (p=0.236). We conclude that: 
 Result 5: Low corruption and not high rate of recalls is the main cause of low 
inequality of earning distributions. 
A remaining question is whether the lower inequality of income distribution in the 
Recall treatment comes at a cost of lower economic efficiency, which is measured as the 
ratio of the realised earnings and the maximum possible earnings. We find that realised 
efficiency is 82.22% in the no-recall treatment and 79.91% in the recall treatment; 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test doesn't reject the null hypothesis of equal distributions of 
efficiency across the two treatments (p=0.403). 
 Result 6:  Economic efficiency is similar across the two institutions, with and 
without the Recall option.   
Our data do however reveal higher wasted resources through higher penalties in 
the Recall treatment (26.79, 95% CI (12.63, 24.51)) than in the No-Recall (18.57, 95% CI 
(19.50, 34.08)); the null hypothesis of equal penalties across treatments is rejected in 
favour of the alternative hypothesis of (p=0.067 (t-test)). 
 Result 7: Recall option has a positive effect on wasted resources through 
penalties.  
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Figure 2.3: Estimated Kernel Densities of Final Earnings 
 
Allowing citizens to recall the official seems to provide incentives for officials to 
limit the use of office for private benefits but, paradoxically, at the same time it 
encourages lower compliance rates. What could explain these perverse patterns? Some 
thought exercises are in order: (i) a thrown out of office official can retaliate by 
contributing less to the public fund, and he can do so through low compliance, and (ii) 
low level of corruption can be sustained by the use of punishing strategies (such as 
minmax actions). One might expect that type (ii) reasoning should be more pronounced 
in the No-Recall treatment as there low compliance is the only tool to discipline the 
official but the problem is that it is also more costly to do so than in the Recall 
treatment.
32
 To see whether type (i) reasoning has any validity we looked at our data: the 
                                                          
32
 Take for example using minmax strategies (that punish the official) in three sequential rounds: the payoff 
to a citizen in the No-Recall treatment is 5.6(=3*15/8) whereas in the Recall treatment is four times higher, 
26.25 (=2*15/8 (out of the office) + 22.5 (in the office)). 
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mean compliance rate of a citizen who was previously an official and was recalled is 70.9 
percent whereas it is 79.7 percent for officials in office (not recalled).  The difference is 
significant at the 5 percent level.  This suggests support for the retaliation hypothesis.  
2.7    Conclusion 
Can political institutions impact corruption? In this chapter, we find experimental 
evidence to suggest that indeed, the type of institution can have a limiting effect on the 
level of corruption in government. Through a laboratory experiment run in Cairo, we 
differentiate officials’ behaviour regarding the use of public funds in situations that allow 
“citizens” to recall the official or not. In cases where officials take a “corrupt” decision 
(by choosing to use public funds in a public good that benefits themselves and reduces 
the benefits to other group members—G-good), there is a substantially larger chance of a 
recall than when the official has taken the more equitable decision (C-good). In addition, 
we find evidence that the culture of corruption is quickly affected by the recall treatment. 
We find that the prevalence of corrupt decisions falls early and significantly in the 
experiment in the recall treatment. In the no-recall treatment, there is an upward drift in 
the prevalence of corruption until subjects chat. The recall environment also shows 
promise for increased social stability by the correlation we find with equity in the post-
experiment distribution of income. 
There is significant policy relevance of these findings especially considering the 
number of nascent democracies resulting from the Arab Spring Uprisings. Corruption has 
been hailed as one of the primary reasons for toppling these governments. The practical 
limitations and complications of establishing new representative democracies have 
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become painfully obvious in countries including Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Yemen, 
among others. In many countries the definition and practice of representative governance 
will be years in the making.  In the meantime, the results of this experiment strongly 
suggest that citizens’ ability to censure their leaders (through recall) can reduce 
corruption, and is therefore an important lever to consider in the development of new 
political processes.  
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Chapter 3 
The ‘Right to Recall’ and Tax Compliance:  
Experimental Evidence 
3.1    Introduction 
One of the driving forces behind the eruption of the 2010-11 revolutions in Arab Spring 
Countries, in general, and Egypt in particular, is the deteriorated economic situation and 
living conditions of the majority of the population. A multidimensional reform process is, 
thus, inevitable for the new governments of these countries to build a modern society 
with high growth prospects. Managing fiscal policy effectively in this transition period 
requires a clear picture of the main factors affecting tax compliance behaviour of citizens 
in these newly democratised societies. Tax compliance directly affects the government’s 
ability to raise own source revenues which is a crucial requirement for a country’s long 
term fiscal sustainability. This in turn allows governments to engage in thoughtful long-
term planning and budgeting—all of which support the growth and development of 
nations.   
Tax evasion is a serious phenomenon for a number of reasons. It decreases tax 
revenues, thereby affecting citizens’ receipt of public goods and services. It affects the 
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accuracy of macroeconomic statistics. It has a negative impact on social capital through 
its negative effect on citizens’ respect for the law, trust in government institutions, and 
feelings of unfair treatment. Moreover, taxpayers’ altering of behaviour to evade taxes 
leads to misallocation of resources (Alm, 1999a; Alm et al., 2004; Andreoni et al., 1998; 
Cowell, 1990; Slemrod & Yitzhaki, 2002).  
Since 2011, Egypt could be argued to have exercised the right to recall its rulers 
twice in less than three years (removing Mubarak in 2011 and Morsi in 2013), albeit 
however through mass demonstrations rather than a formal constitutional path. And in 
both cases, corruption charges were among the demands of the protesting masses. In fact, 
as per the new constitution of Egypt, approved in January 2014, the right to recall the 
president has been enshrined as a constitutional right – probably for the first time in a 
semi-presidential system.
1
 In a new democracy where voting in free elections is a newly 
acquired right, it is likely to be much more appreciated and thus also more significant – 
when compared to established democracies where such a tool is an everyday practice – to 
affect tax morale and hence subsequently tax compliance.  
Indeed, there are many ways by which citizens can interact with their 
governments.  They may vote for candidates and in the process be treated to public 
forums regarding the candidate’s viewpoints and plans.  Alternatively, they may simply 
accept decisions of their leaders with little direct input but avail themselves with 
alternative means to display support or displeasure with these decisions.  Taxpayer 
compliance is one mechanism that citizens have at their disposal to express reactions to 
                                                          
1
 According to article 161, a two-thirds majority of parliament can initiate a motion to withdraw confidence 
from the president. Such a motion, however, has to be approved by the electorate in a public referendum. If 
rejected, the president remains in office and parliament is automatically dissolved. 
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their governments (Alm et al., 1993; Alm et al., 1999; Frey, 1997; Pommerehne & 
Weck-Hannenmann, 1996).  
This chapter examines – through a lab experiment – the effects of empowering 
citizens with the right to recall government officials on citizens’ tax compliance 
behaviour
2
. Using novel treatments of governance, I allow subjects in groups of five to 
make decisions regarding their tax compliance and allow one subject in the group (as an 
official) to decide how to spend the collected tax revenues.  Specifically, subjects are first 
faced with a typical tax compliance decision: they earn income, they must decide how 
much to report as taxable income- knowing that there is some probability that they will 
be caught and penalised if they under-report- and they receive a return for their taxes in 
the form of public good earnings that depends upon the level of group tax payments and 
the public good chosen by the official. In one treatment, the official is chosen by the 
computer at the beginning of the experiment and sits as the incumbent until the middle of 
the experiment (i.e. till the end of round 7) when the computer chooses a new official for 
the remaining seven rounds.  In the second treatment, the citizens are allowed to recall 
the official at the end of each round after he/she chooses how to spend the public funds.  
If a recall is voted for by a majority of the voters, the computer chooses a new official. 
The aim is to test the effect of having frequent elections, through citizens’ right to recall 
officials, on tax compliance behaviour of citizens. 
                                                          
2 This is because despite having the results from the previous chapter suggesting  an important impact for 
the right to recall officials on limiting corruption behaviour, the resulting rate of turnover among officials 
was high which warranted awareness on other costs of this institution, like lower tax compliance for 
example. 
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I find experimental evidence that tax compliance is significantly lower in the 
environment where citizens are empowered with a ‘right to recall’ government officials. 
My result suggests that the constitutional introduction of the right to recall in newly 
democratised countries could have detrimental economic effects.  
The experiment has been conducted in March 2013 in Egypt, with subjects being 
volunteers from undergraduate classes at Cairo University. Egypt is an interesting 
country to test this hypothesis as it is the most populous Arab Spring Country and 
traditionally the most influential in the region. It has a population of 82.5 million, 
unemployment of 12.3%, GDP of $272 billion, and a budget deficit of 12% of GDP 
(International Monetary Fund, 2014). Government spending is 32% of GDP in 2014. Any 
individual employed in Egypt (be it public or private) pays a monthly withholding tax 
rate based on his/her salary, with the self-employed falling under a self-filing system. The 
top individual income and corporate tax rate is 25%, and according to the 2014 index of 
economic freedom, the tax burden is 13.8% of GDP. In the financial statement of the 
Government of Egypt budget plan for the year 2014/15, tax revenues are estimated to 
reach 15.2 percent of GDP, a figure well below world averages of 35.6 percent in 
developed countries, 25.5 percent in emerging markets, and 22.8 percent in low-income 
countries (The Ministry of Finance, 2014). This stresses the significance of my study in 
trying to have a well-specified understanding of the factors that might be influencing the 
tax compliance behaviour of taxpayers in the new democracies of the Arab Spring 
countries in general, and Egyptians in particular. The findings of this study are aimed at 
bringing scientific methods to bear on the formulation of advice on questions of policy, 
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through providing some evidence of the tax compliance behaviour of Egyptians to the 
government at this critical transitional period. 
Conducting this research via lab experiments is useful for the following reasons: 
(i) it provides a good instrument to analyse limitations and possible extensions of 
alternative theories, (ii) it allows the researcher to control the individual decision-making 
environment to a stronger extent than field studies, and (iii) it overcomes problems of 
reliability associated with obtaining information on such a sensitive issue in such a 
contentious environment.  Moreover, running the experiments in Egypt is one of the best 
ways to gain insight into the perceptions that Egyptians have toward alternative forms of 
governance at a critical time in their history.  It also reduces the potential bias associated 
with problems of external validity that plague many experiments.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. In the next section, I briefly review 
the related literature on what drives tax compliance behaviour. Section 3.3 outlines my 
theoretical argument, section 3.4 describes the experimental design, section 3.5 presents 
the experimental results, and section 3.6 concludes. 
3.2    Related Literature  
The standard analysis of tax compliance can be traced back to the theoretical work of 
Allingham and Sandmo
3
 (1972) who employed Becker’s (1968) economics-of-crime 
model to tax evasion. According to their simple model, tax evasion is just a function of 
                                                          
3
 Their standard theory of tax compliance assumes there is a demand for declared income which takes the 
following form: 𝐷 = 𝐷(𝐼, 𝑡, 𝑝, 𝑓), where I is income, t is tax rate, p is probability of audit, and f is the fine 
paid on each unreported dollar. 
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the probability of audit, the penalty rate, the tax rate and the income level. Consequently, 
an individual pays taxes only out of fear of detection and punishment.  
In most countries, the percentage of individual income tax returns that are subject 
to a tax audit is less than 1 percent of all returns, and the penalty rarely exceeds the 
amount of unpaid taxes (Alm & Gomez, 2008; Alm et al., 1992c). A purely economic 
analysis of the evasion gamble would thus suggest that most rational individuals should 
underreport taxable income (Alm et al., 1999; Frey & Feld, 2002; Webley et al., 1991). 
In the real world, however, evasion never rises to the levels predicted by the standard 
economic theory of compliance, even in the least compliant countries, and in fact there 
are often substantial numbers of individuals who apparently pay all of their taxes all of 
the time, regardless of the financial incentives they face from the enforcement regime
4
. It 
is only with very high levels of risk aversion (Arrow-Pratt measures of risk aversion of 
more than 30) that observed tax compliance rates can be explained. This extremely high 
risk aversion assumption is not supported though by empirical evidence from other 
studies
5
. It thus seems implausible that government enforcement activities alone can 
account for these levels of compliance. And as a matter of fact, the tax compliance puzzle 
should be restated as “why people pay taxes” not as “why people evade taxes”. This real 
life observation suggests that there are factors not captured by the economics-of-crime 
approach that might be affecting the decision to comply.  
Consequently, numerous extensions and refinements have been suggested that try 
to incorporate both economic and noneconomic factors in the tax compliance decision. 
                                                          
4
 In fact, 21% of my subject population reported 100% of their income 100% of the time. 
5
 A range of between one and two for the US has been reported in Graetz, et al., 1985. 
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Regarding the former, a set of economic factors have been suggested and analysed in the 
theoretical literature, including audit selection methods (Alm & McKee, 2004; Alm & 
McKee, 2006), the impact of complexity and uncertainty about the relevant fiscal 
parameters (Alm, 1999b; Alm & Cronshaw, 1995; Beck et al., 1992), the receipt of 
government services (Alm & Jackson, 1993; Alm et al., 1992c; Cowell & Gordon, 1988; 
Kim, 2002; Smith & Stalans, 1991), and the existence of positive rewards (Alm et al., 
1992a; Falkinger & Walther, 1991).  
Fiscal exchange for instance, as one of the economic extensions, views the 
relationship between taxpayers and government as a relational contract based on an 
exchange between the government and the taxpayers in both directions. Spicer and 
Lundtstedt (1976), show that taxpayers feel cheated if they believe that their tax burden is 
not spent well. Consequently, taxpayers will be more willing to comply with the taxes if 
they see the government acting trustworthily, efficiently, and in correspondence with 
taxpayers’ preferences. On the contrary, perceived unfairness increases the incentive to 
comply less. Alm et al. (1992c) find an individual’s compliance as a reflection of his/her 
valuation of the public goods and services provided by the government. 
As for the noneconomic factors, some research has been done that tries to expand 
the basic model by introducing some aspects of behaviour or motivation considered 
explicitly by other social sciences. On how people perceive probabilities, for instance, 
there is ample evidence from psychology that individuals overweight the low 
probabilities that they face in tax compliance (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Machina, 
1983) which might explain the observed high rates of compliance despite the low 
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probabilities of audit. Psychologists and other social scientists also argue that social 
norms and perceptions of fairness can affect tax compliance behaviour.  
Another factor has arisen from the theoretical and experimental work on public 
good provision. Private provision of public goods has been argued to be inefficiently low 
because of each individual’s incentive to free ride on the purchases of others (Isaac et al., 
1985; Isaac et al., 1984; Kim & Walker, 1984; Samuelson, 1954). This work suggested 
that people will be paying taxes voluntarily out of their valuation of the public goods 
provided, and their recognition that their individual payments are necessary to get other 
taxpayers to contribute. 
Tax morale, interpreted as the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes (Deci and Ryan 
1985, Frey 1997a), has also been used as an explanation for high compliance rates, with 
both social and institutional factors examined  (Bosco & Mittone, 1997; Torgler, 2001). 
For example, taxpayers might be driven by moral sentiments which imply moral costs if 
they act as free-riders and do not pay their fair share of taxes (Erard & Feinstein, 1994a; 
Erard & Feinstein, 1994b; Pyle, 1991; Roth et al., 1989). Other studies tried to analyse 
the extent to which moral suasion and social responsibility can influence taxpayers’ 
moral sentiments and thus the degree of co-operation (Blumenthal et al., 2001; McGraw 
& Scholz, 1991; Schwartz & Orleans, 1967). Some research has also been done on 
‘social capital’ (referred to as the institutions, norms, and networks that promote 
cooperation and enable collective action) and how it can impel individuals to pay taxes, 
despite a perceived low probability of detection (Alm & Gomez, 2008; Bourdieu, 1977; 
Coleman, 1988; Dasgupta & Serageldin, 2000). 
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On voting in general, some studies consider direct democracy and its impact on 
compliance. Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann (1996) and Frey (1997), for example, 
show in their field studies that tax evasion at the Swiss cantonal level is lower in direct 
democratic cantons where referenda on budgetary issues are used as compared to purely 
parliamentary cantons. Alm et al. (1993) present experimental evidence that tax morale is 
shaped through voters’ possibility of determining public spending; tax compliance is 
significantly higher when taxpayers can vote directly on the type of the public good than 
when the public good is imposed, and also when the vote is clear rather than close. Alm 
et al. (1999) extend this analysis by allowing subjects in their experiment to vote on tax, 
audit and fine rates. They find experimental evidence that the possibility of voting affects 
compliance rates significantly. In the same context, Lamberton et al. (2014) show that 
eliciting taxpayer preferences on government spending increases tax compliance.  
These studies find that voting increases tax compliance, attributing it to the 
argument that voting positively shapes social norms, social capital or intrinsic 
motivations. Specifically, these papers argue that a social or psychological tax contract 
between taxpayers and government, going beyond a pure fiscal exchange, emerges more 
easily if voters vote directly on crucial parameters of the tax compliance game.  
The right to recall as a political institution, nevertheless, has received no attention 
in studies examining the determinants of tax compliance. However, some of the studies 
that consider the economic consequences of different political institutions stand out. 
Lizzeri and Persico (2001) for instance, compare the composition of government 
spending under alternative electoral rules. In the same context, Persson and Tabellini 
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(1999) construct a model of redistributive politics in which a majoritarian system 
generates less public good provision than a proportional system. 
No study– to the best knowledge of the author – examined the effect on tax 
compliance of empowering citizens with the right to recall a government official during 
his/her term in office especially in newly democratising countries. That is where this 
chapter comes to bridge a gap within the literature using controlled environments and 
experimental methods to isolate effects of variables of interest (the right to recall as a 
political institution) on economic outcomes (tax compliance).  
Hence, in this chapter, I take advantage of the above mentioned long literature on 
laboratory experiments and determinants of tax compliance to turn to a different question 
regarding citizens and their interactions with governments. I study whether the ‘right to 
recall’ as a political institution has any economic consequences in terms of compliance 
rates. And since the different motives underlying the reasoning of taxpayers in their 
compliance decision with the tax law have to be controlled for as much as possible, this 
question is studied in an experimental setting.  
With most experimental and empirical evidence about tax compliance behaviour 
coming from the United States, Europe, Asia and Latin America, and hardly any 
conducted in the Arab Spring World, this experiment’s focus on Egypt overcomes this 
shortcoming and helps to check whether some effects might be independent of cultural 
environments.  
I now turn to the theoretical argument of the impact of different institutional 
settings on tax compliance behaviour in an experimental framework. 
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3.3     Theoretical Argument 
The central argument of this chapter is that empowering citizens, in newly democratised 
countries, with the right to recall government officials can affect tax compliance 
behaviour. In general, there is a strand in the tax compliance literature which views 
compliance as a reflection of attitudes towards incumbent governments (Alm & Jackson, 
1993; Alm et al., 1992c; Cowell & Gordon, 1988; Kim, 2002; Smith & Stalans, 1991). 
According to this literature, compliance is a function of how corrupt governments are 
perceived and hence is considered a tool in the hands of taxpayers by which they can 
punish governments for bad governance.  
I argue however, that in the presence of the right to recall, citizens’ use of tax 
compliance as a punishing tool will be minimised. My argument is based on the rationale 
that elections represent an institutional tool which provides voters with the ability to 
retain the incumbents in office or to “throw the rascals out”  (Lippmann, 1925; Powell, 
2000; Riker, 1982). According to this theory, the existence of free and fair elections 
guarantees that politicians can, to some extent, be held liable to the actions taken while in 
public office (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Any institution/rule that provides a punishment 
mechanism for politicians such as the loss of elections or the possibility of being forced 
out of office, can induce politicians to improve their behaviour by aligning their own 
interests with those of their electorates (Bailey & Valenzuela, 1997; Linz & Stepan, 
1996; Rose-Ackerman, 1999).  
To elicit the relationship between the right to recall (as a political instituton that 
provides citizens with a punishment mechanism for politicians) and compliance 
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behaviour of citizens, I simulate a normal interaction between citizens and government—
that of tax payment and the provision of a public good. Using novel treatments of 
governance, I allow subjects in groups of five (as citizens) to make decisions regarding 
their tax compliance, and designate one subject in the group (as an official) to decide on 
how to allocate the taxpayer dollars.  In one treatment (No-Recall), the official is chosen 
by the computer at the beginning of the experiment and sits as the incumbent until the 
middle of the experiment when a new official is randomly selected to serve for the 
remaining seven rounds. In another treatment (Recall), the citizens are allowed to recall 
the official after he/she chooses how to spend the tax revenues in the public funds.  If a 
recall is voted for by a majority of the voters, the computer chooses a new official. Thus 
in both treatments officials are exogenously selected; they can be thrown out of the office 
though in the Recall treatment but not in the No Recall one. These two treatments aim at 
isolating the effect of giving citizens a punishing tool by which they can discipline 
officials.   
3.4    Experimental Design6 
The experimental design is a 2x1 design as depicted in table 3.1 below. Specifically, I 
have a control group and a treatment group whose subjects are given a right to recall 
option that they can use at the end of every round of the experiment’s 14 rounds. For 
simplicity, I will call my control and treatment groups a ‘No Recall’ treatment and a 
‘Recall’ treatment, respectively.  
                                                          
6
 The experimental design here is the same as the one in the chapter on “Political Institutions and 
Corruption: An Experimental Examination of the ‘Right to Recall’”, albeit to answer a different research 
question. I’m including it here again for completeness. 
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Table 3.1: Summary of Treatments 
 
In both treatments, subjects are randomly assigned into groups of five at the 
beginning of the experiment; each group members remain in the same group for the 
whole experiment. At the beginning of round 1, one of the five group members is 
randomly selected by the computer to serve as the group’s government official, with the 
other 4 members assigned as citizens. All subjects are then given an easy task of 
correcting spelling mistakes. Depending on each subject’s performance in this task, each 
earns experimental pounds. Subjects are then asked to decide on how much income to 
report to the tax authority; the reported income is taxable at the rate of 25%
7
. No taxes are 
paid on underreported income; however, it is a common knowledge that there is a 20% 
probability that a subject gets audited, in which case he/she, in addition to paying taxes 
on actual earned income, pays a penalty on any undeclared income determined by a 
known penalty structure
8
.  
                                                          
7
 In both treatments, all subjects knew that they faced the same tax rate as all other subjects (i.e., horizontal 
equity was held constant across the two experimental conditions). 
8
 Check appendix C for the penalty structure.  
Treatment 
Name 
Provision of 
Public Goods 
Right to 
Recall 
Sessions Groups Total # of 
Subjects 
No-Recall Endogenous No 2 12 60 
Recall Endogenous Yes 2 12 60 
Total   4 24 120 
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Total tax revenues collected from all subjects are then tripled and used to fund 
one of two feasible public goods; Common-good or Government-good, as being decided 
by the government official of the group. The benefits of the Common-good are divided 
equally among group members. The Government-good, on the other hand, benefits the 
government official more than the other four group members; half of the public fund goes 
to the government official and the other half gets divided equally among the other four 
members. The official’s choice of the public good then becomes a common knowledge. 
The round then comes to an end with each subject knowing his/her earnings which is 
calculated as follows: earned income minus taxes less penalties plus the payoff from the 
public good. The same sequence of events is then repeated for the rest of the experiment 
which consists, all in all, of 14 rounds
9
.  
The two treatments differ from each other only in one aspect: the right given to 
group members to vote out or to keep their official at the end of every round, and hence 
the number of rounds a subject may serve as a government official
10
. In the no-recall 
treatment, the official stays in power for seven rounds, after which a new government 
official is randomly selected by the computer to serve for the remaining seven rounds of 
the experiment. In the recall treatment, however, at the end of each round, the group 
members are given the right to recall the government official through a voting process. If 
the majority of members (including the government official) vote for a recall, the 
                                                          
9
 This dynamic design captures well the decision to evade or not which is rather a dynamic than a static 
problem, as taxes are paid annually and today’s decisions might have an impact on the way taxpayers 
behave in the future. 
10
 Knowing that the treatment effect might be affecting, in a way or another, the behaviour of the 
government official and their choice of the public good, which in turn might affect the tax compliance 
behaviour of the citizens, in my analysis I will be controlling for the public good choices made by the 
official. This will enable me to focus on just the relationship between treatment effect and tax compliance 
behaviour. 
Chapter 3. The ‘Right to Recall’ and Tax Compliance: Experimental Evidence                                                       53 
 
 
computer randomly chooses a new official from eligible members
11
. Only if the 
government official was never recalled during the first seven rounds that the computer 
randomly selects a new one at the end of round seven
12. After the tenth round, a “cheap 
talk” chat session, via text messages within the group members, was allowed. Subjects 
were not allowed to communicate with one another during the experiment other than the 
chat session conducted after round 10 and before the start of round 11.  
At the end of the experiment, subjects were asked to complete a post-
experimental online questionnaire (see Appendix D) designed to get some information 
about idiosyncratic individual characteristics such as attitudes toward risk, gender, 
religion, academic performance, the performance of political institutions, … etc.  
All 120 subjects (60 subjects in each treatment) who participated in the 
experiment were volunteers from undergraduate classes at Cairo University in Egypt. 
Each subject signed a consent form before the start of the experiment and was allowed to 
participate only once in the experiment (see Appendix B).  
The experiment was programmed on Java and conducted in Arabic
13
. It lasted 
around two hours. Both treatments were conducted at the Laboratory of the Faculty of 
Economics and Political Sciences at Cairo University
14
. At the end of the experiment, 
                                                          
11
 A group member is eligible if he has not been a subject of recall elections during the last three rounds. 
12
 Data show that this happened only for two officials in the recall treatment. 
13
 The aim of conducting the experiment in Arabic was to avoid excluding any of the potential subjects who 
had different linguistic skills and also to avoid any misunderstanding of the instructions. 
14
 The lab was equipped with dividers to ensure subject privacy. 
Chapter 3. The ‘Right to Recall’ and Tax Compliance: Experimental Evidence                                                       54 
 
 
subjects were paid for their accumulated earnings over the 14 rounds, with total earnings 
ranging between $30.00 and $60.00
15
.  
3.5    Experimental Results 
Before beginning my discussion of the findings of the experiment, it is useful first to get 
a sense of the data by taking a quick look at subjects’ demographics, their answers to the 
post-experiment questionnaire, and the dynamics of their compliance behaviour. Table 
3.2 gives a summary of subjects’ demographics.  
Table 3.2: Subjects’ Demographics 
 
It is clear from table 3.2 that my sample consisted mostly of single, females and 
muslim students. As a result, and to avoid a possible effect on compliance behaviour, I 
will be controlling for these various individual differences in my analysis. Looking at 
subjects’ answers to the end-of-experiment-questionnaire, I find that 92% of the subjects 
believe that everyone should declare everything he/she earns to the tax authorities. On the 
other hand, 51% are convinced that most people try to avoid paying their fair share of 
                                                          
15
 At the end of the experiment, a subject’s total accumulated earnings in experimental pounds over the 14 
rounds were divided by the number of rounds and multiplied by 10 to reflect the conversion rate of 1 EP = 
10 Egyptian Pounds. Payments were made in sealed envelopes to protect the privacy of subjects. 
 No-Recall Recall 
Number of Subjects 60 60 
Gender (female) 88% 70% 
Marital Status (single) 95% 93% 
Age bracket (18-23) 98% 100% 
Religion (muslim) 95% 92% 
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tax
16. This means that each subject estimates others’ acceptance of tax evasion as being 
greater than his/her own
17
. This perception could have an implication on tax compliance 
attitude, hence, as extra controls, subjects’ answers to the questionnaire, together with 
their demographics, will be used in my analysis of the relationship between the right to 
recall and tax compliance behaviour. 
I have also classified subjects into “full compliance”, “partial compliance” and 
“zero compliance” categories18. Data reveal that, in the aggregate, subjects’ compliance 
behaviour strongly follows a bimodal pattern
19
, such that 48% of subjects reported their 
true income, 46% reported untrue non-zero amounts, and only 6% reported zero income. 
Figure 3.1 shows proportions in each compliance category for both treatments. I then test 
whether the proportion of individuals falling into each compliance classification varied 
based on the ‘right to recall’ condition. However, to accommodate the extremely small 
number of participants who reported zero income, I used a Fisher's exact test of 
proportions. This test revealed that, as expected, the right to recall has a significant effect 
on subjects' compliance tendencies (Fisher's exact test p = 0.003). 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16
 I think this could justify low compliance rates in the real world as stemming from this misperception.  
17
 This self–other discrepancy in tax ethics could undermine people’s tax compliance as they conform to the 
misperceived social norm. Hence, a policy implication of this is for the government to try to correct this 
misperception in order to improve compliance. 
18
 Compliance rate = reported income/income 
19
 This bimodal pattern is common in experimental studies on tax behaviour (Alm, et al., 2011, Alm, et al., 
1992b, Lamberton, et al., 2014.) 
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Figure 3.1: Compliance Proportions 
 
To check the variation in each subject’s compliance behaviour, I classified 
subjects into “static compliance” and “dynamic compliance” categories. I found that 25 
subjects out of the 120 (i.e more than 20 percent of my population) were highly static in 
their compliance attitude (i.e had the same compliance behaviour across the 14 rounds), 
no matter what environment they were in or how other group members behaved. Figure 
3.2 gives the standard deviation of subjects’ compliance behaviour across the different 
rounds. 
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Figure 3.2 Histogram of Variation in Compliance Behaviour  
 
 
I now begin my discussion of the findings of the experiment with a comparison of 
my two treatments; the No-Recall and the Recall.   
Starting with compliance rates, I find that mean compliance is 80% in the no-
recall treatment (sd=0.311, N=839, 95% confidence interval is (73.9, 86.0)) and 71% 
(sd=0.329, N=840, 95% confidence interval is (63.7, 78.3)) in the recall treatment, as 
shown in figure 3.3. The null hypothesis of compliance rates in the two treatments 
coming from the same distribution is rejected by Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (p=0.000). A 
mean-comparison test, t-test
20
, is also used and the null hypothesis of equal means is 
rejected at the 5 percent level (pvalue=0.024). 
 
 
                                                          
20
 This is independent samples t-test which compares the difference in the means from the two treatments to 
a given value (usually 0).  In other words, it tests whether the difference in the means is 0. 
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Figure 3.3: Mean Compliance Rates in the two treatments 
 
It is important to note however that the treatment effect (which is the right to 
recall option) might be affecting the public good choices of government officials (i.e 
officials’ corruption level), with subsequent effects on both officials and citizens 
compliance behaviour. To avoid this endogeneity problem, my analysis will focus only 
on citizens’ compliance behaviour while controlling for the government official’s choice 
of public goods.  
Before starting my analysis of the relationship between tax compliance and the 
right to recall, however, I will examine briefly my claim of the possible endogeneity of 
public good provision. Taking groups as the unit of observation, I find that the mean of 
the distribution of frequencies of G-good funding is 57 percent (95 percent confidence 
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interval is (39%, 76%)) in the No-Recall treatment and down to 49 percent (95 percent 
confidence interval is (49%, 79%)) in the Recall treatment. This means that, corruption, 
defined as the frequency of the G-good being funded, is higher in the No-Recall 
treatment. In addition, and to get a more robust idea in terms of statistical significance on 
the association between the two types of institutions and the level of corruption, I used 
my pooled sample to estimate a probit model where the dependent variable is a dummy 
that takes the value of 1 (0) if the group official decides to fund G-good (C-good). In the 
list of explanatory variables that are expected to affect the official’s decision is a dummy 
variable for the No-Recall treatment that measures the overall effect of taking away the 
Recall option on the observed likelihood of G-good funding. Data show that the 
likelihood of corruption goes up by 13.7 percent (one-sided p=0.04) in the absence of the 
Recall option.  
Based on the above evidence of a possible endogeneity problem, I will be 
controlling for public good choices made by government officials in my analysis of 
citizens’ compliance behaviour. First, I look at citizens’ compliance behaviour. I find a 
mean compliance rate of 78% (standard deviation=0.32, N=671) in the no-recall 
treatment, and 69% (standard deviation=0.34, N=672) in the recall treatment. The null 
hypothesis of compliance rates in the two treatments coming from the same distribution 
is rejected by Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (p=0.000). And the difference in means is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level using the t-test (pvalue=0.000). Second, I 
plot, in figures 3.4 and 3.5, the compliance distributions of citizens conditional on the 
type of public good provided. Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show a lower mean compliance rate in 
the recall treatment even after controlling for the type of public good provided. This 
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difference is statistically significant using the t-test (t=1.6, p=0.6 when conditional on 
good C) and (t=2.8, p=0.02 when conditional on good G). 
Figure 3.4: Citizens’ Mean Compliance Conditional on Good C Funding 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 3.5: Citizens’ Mean Compliance Conditional on Good G Funding 
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Third, and to get an overall impression of the effect of the Recall option on 
citizens’ compliance behaviour over time, I measured its evolution over the 14 rounds. 
Figure 3.6 shows its evolution for the two treatments. A visual inspection of Figure 3.6 
suggests that: (i) citizens’ compliance behaviour is negatively affected by the Recall 
option (as the Recall [red] line is everywhere below the no Recall [blue] line), (ii) there is 
a persistent downward trend in citizens’ compliance rates in both the No-Recall and 
Recall treatments until the chatting event, (iii) chatting (after round 10) seems to have a 
positive permanent effect on increasing compliance in the No-Recall treatment but just a 
temporary one in the Recall treatment.  
 
Figure 3.6: Time Series of Citizens’ Compliance Rates 
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I now turn to examining the effect of the right to recall option on citizens’ tax 
compliance behaviour. I use a censored regression model
21
where the dependent variable 
is the citizen’s compliance rate. In model 1, I included a dummy for the recall treatment 
(DRecall). In model 2, I have added additional regressors that control for subject 
idiosyncratic characteristics such as gender, religion,…etc., and questionnaire answers on 
perceptions of one’s and others’ compliance. An in model 3, I have added, as extra 
controls, the official’s previous choice of public good (Public Good) 22 , whether the 
citizen was penalised and/or audited in the previous round (Penalty and Audit, 
respectively), the opportunity to communicate via a chatting event (Chatting), the 
citizen’s public earnings in the previous round (Public Earnings), the citizen’s income 
level (Income), and the round number (Period number). Results are in table 3.3. 
Without any controls, the ‘right to recall’ has a significant negative effect on 
compliance (-20 percent, p=0.041). Recall continues to decrease tax compliance when 
including both demographic measures and questionnaire answers as controls (-22 percent, 
p=0.040). It also continues to decrease compliance when controlling for the official’s 
previous choice of public good and other variables of interest (-22 percent, p=0.042). 
Empirical Result: The ‘Right to Recall’ has a significant negative effect on 
compliance. 
 
 
 
                                                          
21
 Note that the use of a censored regression with clusters at the subject level is warranted as we have more 
than one observation per subject serving as a group citizen. For this regression, a variable called “censors” 
was created that takes value ‘-1’ for 0 compliance and ‘1’ for full compliance. 
22
 This variable is used to control for the possible endogeneity problem outlined above. 
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Table 3.3: Effect of the ‘Right to Recall’ on a Citizen’s Compliance 
 
Citizen’s Compliance (1) (2) (3) 
Treatment (DRecall) (D)  -0.202** 
(0.041) 
-0.218** 
(0.040) 
-0.217** 
(0.024) 
Public Good G (D)(Lagged)   -0.006 
(0.906) 
Penalty (D)(Lagged)   -0.124*** 
(0.000) 
Audit (D)(Lagged)   0.154** 
(0.013) 
Chatting (D)   0.087* 
(0.063) 
Public Earnings (Lagged)   0.016*** 
(0.000) 
Period number   -0.017** 
(0.021) 
Income   0.014 
(0.254) 
Demographics    
Gender (Female) (D)  -0.007 
(0.950) 
0.010 
(0.926) 
Marital Status (Single) (D)  -0.101 
(0.496) 
-0.137 
(0.334) 
Religion (Muslim) (D)  -0.0009 
(0.997) 
0.036 
(0.863) 
High grade (D)  0.134 
(0.222) 
0.143 
(0.158) 
Late years (D)  0.186 
(0.122) 
0.165 
(0.145) 
Low compliance not OK (D)  0.189 
(0.243) 
0.166 
(0.272) 
Others low compliance (D)  -0.115 
(0.251) 
-0.098 
(0.285) 
Intercept 1.035*** 
(0.000) 
0.9006*** 
(0.003) 
0.584 
(0.123) 
Observations 1343 1343 1248 
Pseudo R
2 
0.0135 0.0306 0.0316 
Log Likelihood -1141.9325 -1122.1111 -1051.689 
Standard errors in parentheses: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.  
Note that (D) stands for dummy variable. 
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The above empirical result is however counterintuitive as people might believe 
that empowering citizens with an election tool to discipline corruption could act as an 
alternative to the use of tax incompliance to express dissatisfaction. Although it is 
important to know that the right to recall has a negative impact on compliance, it is 
scientifically even more important to know how or by what means this effect occurs. This 
invokes the idea of mediation; the process by which some variables exert influences on 
others through mediator variables. Mediation hypotheses posit how, or by what means, an 
independent variable (X) affects a dependent variable (Y) through one or more potential 
intervening variables or mediators (M) (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). 
A possible channel could be that while the ‘right to recall’ increases citizens’ 
ability to punish governments, it nevertheless harms social solidarity – and hence reduces 
citizens’ motive to comply. It does so by dividing a society into winners and losers, with 
losers feeling alienated because the majority of society does not share their same views. 
Those losers hence would have no strong obligation to cooperate with fellow citizens for 
the benefit of all, and would act against the tax law, as psychological costs associated 
with incompliance are reduced. The rationale behind this potential mechanism is the 
theory of divisive elections. According to this theory, direct elections may decrease 
people’s level of trust and lower their personal satisfaction with the democratic process. 
This is because the zero-sum nature of elections always generates losers. These divisive 
elections result in a large part of the electorate; namely the supporters of the losing 
candidate, being dissatisfied with the outcome. This dissatisfaction may get translated 
into disillusionment with government institutions and the political process (Anderson et 
al., 2005; Brunell, 2005). The disappointment level will most probably be stronger if the 
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citizen has personally participated in the voting process, rather than just observing its 
outcome.  
To test this potential channel, I have first constructed a variable called “against-
majority vote”. This variable captures those citizens whose voting preferences were 
against the vote of the majority of their group members. It takes value ‘1’ if the citizen 
voted for ousting the current official whereas the majority of the group voted for keeping 
him, or if the citizen voted for keeping the current official in office whereas the majority 
of the group voted for his ousting. Figure 3.7 shows the proportion of citizens who voted 
against the majority of their group and hence could be used as a proxy for those losers out 
of the voting process. 
 
Figure 3.7: Proportion of subjects who voted against the majority 
 
Then, I added this variable to my censored regression analysis. The dependent 
variable is the citizen’s compliance rate. Specifically, in model 1, I included, as an 
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explanatory variable, whether the subject voted against the majority in the previous round 
(vote against majority), together with a list of other regressors that are expected to affect 
the citizen’s compliance decision. And, in model 2, I added additional regressors that 
control for individual idiosyncratic characteristics such as gender, religion, and grade, for 
example. Table 3.4 reports estimated marginal effects of the regressors (p-values in 
brackets).  
Table 3.4: Censored Regression Analysis of a Citizen’s Compliance Rate 
Citizen’s Compliance Rate Recall Data All Data 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Income 
 
0.005 
(0.661) 
0.002 
(0.866) 
0.0164 
(0.243) 
0.016 
(0.256) 
Period Number 
 
-0.019** 
(0.020) 
-0.018** 
(0.028) 
-0.0168** 
(0.016) 
-0.0172** 
(0.017) 
Chatting (D) 
 
0.130** 
(0.045) 
0.124* 
(0.056) 
0.109* 
(0.090) 
0.109* 
(0.097) 
Penalty -0.092*** -0.083*** -0.1279*** -0.1242*** 
(lagged) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Audit 0.080 0.058 0.1518** 0.142** 
(lagged) (0.278) (0.428) (0.020) (0.025) 
Public Earnings 0.0180*** 0.0176*** 0.024*** 0.0256*** 
(lagged) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Previous Funding of Good G -0.029 -0.014 0.0109 0.0132 
(lagged) (0.624) (0.806) (0.819) (0.786) 
Vote against majority -0.182** -0.180** -0.2275*** -0.2485*** 
(lagged) (0.019) (0.015) (0.002) (0.002) 
Demographics     
Female (D) 
 
 
-0.128 
(0.299) 
 
0.0386 
(0.723) 
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Muslim (D) 
 
 
-0.060 
(0.684) 
 
0.0220 
(0.911) 
Single (D) 
 
 
0.0242 
(0.874) 
 
-0.1039 
(0.414) 
Junior and up (D) 
 
 
0.081 
(0.453) 
 
0.130 
(0.215) 
High GPA (D) 
 
 
-0.0433 
(0.693) 
 
0.156 
(0.121) 
Treatment Effects     
No Recall (D) 
 
  
0.1669* 
(0.069) 
0.1808* 
(0.064) 
Chatting No Recall (D)   
-0.0400 
(0.611) 
-0.0436 
(0.588) 
Nr. Of Observations 624 624 1248 1248 
Nr of Clusters 60 60 116 116 
R
2
 0.0475 0.0587 0.0627 0.0743 
Log-likelihood -504.542 -498.599 -1017.952 -1005.32 
Obs. P 
Predicted P 
0.000 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Data reveal a significant negative association between a citizen’s compliance rate 
and his/her casting of a vote that was against the majority of the group (-23 percent, 
p=0.002).   
Finally, to check this mediation channel, I follow Preacher and Hayes (2008) 
bootstrapping methodology set at 1000 iterations, with a significant mediation indicated 
by a 95% confidence interval for the indirect path that does not include zero. This 
methodology revealed a possible mediating channel from the ‘right to recall’ to 
‘compliance’ via ‘voting against the majority’ (95% CI for indirect effect: -0.03 to -
0.0002). This result suggests that lower compliance rates in environments with a right to 
recall option could be partially explained by the existence of losers from the voting 
process. 
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3.6    Conclusion 
Social justice has been central among the demands raised by Arab Spring uprisings that 
swept a number of Arab World countries since 2010-11. The ability to transform this 
demand from being a mere protestors’ slogan to a reality on the ground depends partly on 
the ability of the new political system to improve its public finances. Understanding what 
determines tax compliance behaviour of citizens in these newly democratised societies 
thus becomes a crucial point.  
In the last three decades, economists have been keen on studying the determinants 
of the individual’s tax compliance decision. Despite these efforts, our understanding of 
the reasons behind an individual’s tax compliance behaviour remains limited. For 
instance, the traditional economic analysis which focuses mainly on deterrence was 
shown to be incapable of fully explaining the observed tax compliance behaviour of 
citizens. Consequently, there were many attempts that tried to incorporate other economic 
and non-economic factors into the tax compliance decision.  
By using a novel dataset from a laboratory experiment, run in post-revolutionary 
Egypt in March 2013, to analyse tax compliance as a dependent variable, I hope to fill a 
large, and largely unexplored, gap in the tax compliance literature on the determinants of 
tax compliance, especially the role of empowering citizens with a ‘right to recall ‘option, 
especially in newly democratised countries. 
Focusing on the case of Egypt, being the most populous Arab Spring country and 
where the right to recall the president has been recently enshrined in its constitution, I 
find a 20% decrease in compliance when citizens are given the right to recall their 
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officials. This result is however counterintuitive. Consequently, I tried to test for potential 
channels, in line with the Egyptian context, through which the right to recall could be 
impacting negatively on compliance; namely the divisive nature of elections and the 
creation of losers from the voting process. These losers feel unhappy with the outcome of 
the voting process and hence would have no strong obligation to cooperate with fellow 
citizens for the benefit of all. They would act against the tax law as a form of negative 
reciprocity towards their feeling of defeat, as psychological costs are reduced. So, the 
more frequent such ‘divisive ballots’ take place, the more the social capital of the society 
gets harmed. And indeed, this channel proved to be affecting compliance negatively in a 
significant way.  
In fact, Egypt has witnessed since 2011 a sharp increase in the number of times its 
voters were called to the polls. In addition to three constitutional referendums, two 
legislative elections, and two presidential elections which citizens voted on, there have 
been two massive uprisings both of which saw millions of Egyptians expressing their 
opinions regarding the incumbent president – and both of which have led to the removal 
of that president. Whereas frequent elections and high government turnover might 
indicate a high degree of political efficacy and government responsiveness, they might 
also backfire especially if they put opposing camps against each other in a highly charged 
environment that often. Indeed, all these seven voting processes mentioned above have 
been highly polarised – and polarising – in Egypt. They have divided the electorate to an 
extent probably never seen before by the current generation of Egyptians who were used 
to the artificial social harmony imposed by the pre-2011 authoritarian regime. Whether 
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one belonged to Islamists, liberals, or supporters of the deep state
23
, the drift between 
these three groups was created and widened by the divisive and frequent electoral 
contests in which they had to fight each other in just three years. In a country not used to 
such polarisation, electoral divisions were then transformed into religious divisions and 
allegations of country betrayal, working against the national interest and being agents for 
foreign governments.  
If divisive elections lead to real responses, then public policy initiatives addressed 
at tackling evasion may need to take account of them. Specifically, positive actions by the 
government in developing social capital can improve tax compliance. This could be done 
by integrating all factions of the society in the decision making process in order to 
enhance a feeling of solidarity among the citizens. However, it should be acknowledged 
that the current experimental design does not allow for rigorous testing of the hypothesis 
that compliance is lower with lower feelings of solidarity. Hence more scope for research 
is needed with more tailored and direct designs on issues of solidarity. The findings of 
my experiment suggest that there is yet more scope for research on moral coercion and its 
impact on feelings of solidarity and thus law avoidance. 
Moreover, additional research using lab experiments may render interesting 
insights if subjects are divided according to their ideological preferences and assigned 
into political groupings matching the three political ideologies that dominate political life 
in Egypt; namely ‘Deep State’, ‘Liberals’, and ‘Islamists’24. This potential future research 
                                                          
23
 Supporters of the deep state are those who support formal state institutions (military, security, etc.). A big 
bulk of them is those supporters of the previous regime of Mubarak. 
24
 Indeed my next two chapters will examine the effect of polarisation on support for reform and the effect 
of negative campaigning on interpersonal trust, respectively. 
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could provide better insights as to which political group, in case it was a loser in the 
voting process, could have a more significant impact on compliance. For instance, the 
‘Islamist’ group might be assumed to have a less negative impact on compliance than the 
‘Liberal’ group, due to its religious ideology and which considers tax evasion a taboo. 
The findings of this research might have important policy implications regarding the 
integration of losers into the political process. 
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Chapter 4 
Political Polarisation and Support for Economic Reform: 
Experimental Evidence from Egypt 
4.1    Introduction 
According to the International Energy Agency, the total cost of government subsidies for 
fossil fuels in the world increased from $311 billion in 2009 to $544 billion in 2012.  
Once lost tax revenues are included, this figure rises to around $2 trillion, equal to over 
8% of government revenues, according to a recent IMF report.  Furthermore, IMF 
research shows that only 7% of fuel subsidies in poor countries go to the bottom 20% of 
households; 43% end up in the pockets of the richest 20%.  Thus, in many countries with 
such subsidies there is often widespread acknowledgement from political leaders that 
reform and reductions of the subsidies would improve their economies.
1
 
Egypt’s use of fuel subsidies is a particularly noteworthy example of the problem.  
Such subsidies represent a substantial drain on Egypt’s budget, amounting to about 73% 
                                                          
1
 We outline the case of Egypt in this paper. For a discussion of the need for reform in Indonesia, see 
Pradiptyo, et al., 2012., and in Sudan, see James, 2014. 
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of all subsidies and approximately 21% of the country’s budget (Castel, 2012). 2  
Moreover, as shown in other countries, the subsidies are not benefiting most voters.  An 
IMF study (Coady et al., 2006) found that the bottom 40% of the population typically 
receive only 15-25% of the value of energy subsidies whereas another one (IMF, 2010) 
found that the top income quintile captures six times more in fuel subsidies than the 
bottom quintile.  Hence, from an economic perspective, a reform of the subsidy program 
should arguably be popular with the vast majority of voters and supportable across 
ideological lines. 
Indeed, in the last six years, fuel subsidy reforms have been attempted by all the 
major political parties in power. In 2008, Hosni Mubarek’s National Democratic Party 
(NDP) lifted some subsidies, increased petrol and diesel prices, and advocated additional 
further measures. After Mubarak’s removal and their ascent to power, the Muslim 
Brotherhood suggested a reform much similar to that of the plans suggested during the 
last years of the Mubarak regime (El-Zoghby, 2014). And in June 2014, newly elected 
Abdel Fatah al-Sisi, with the support of the founder of the ‘Tammarod (or Rebellion) 
Movement’ which led the public mobilisation to remove Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, raised petrol and diesel prices to deal with an imminent crisis of budget 
deficit in July 2014.  
                                                          
2
 The price of one litre of petrol in Egypt in 2012 is US $ 0.45 compared to a world average of US $1.41 
and an OECD average of US $ 1.95 (World Bank). Similarly, the price of diesel in Egypt is US $ 0.18 
compared to a world average of US $1.27 and an OECD average of US $ 1.88 (World Bank), even though 
Egypt is a net fuel importer. Official statistics show that fuel subsidies increased from 40 billion Egyptian 
Pounds (LE) (equivalent to about US$ 7.2 billion) in 2005/2006 fiscal year (FY) to LE 68 billion 
(equivalent to US$ 11.9 billion) in the 2009/2010 FY and peaked to over LE 100 billion in 2013/2014 FY – 
equivalent to 5% of GDP. In 2012, energy subsidies in Egypt amount to one-third of total public spending, 
four times total public spending on healthcare (excluding wages), seven times total spending on education 
(excluding wages), and sixty times total public spending on pensions for non-contributory pensioners. 
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Nevertheless each time these attempts at reform have been made, the advocates 
faced opposition from political actors out of power who supported almost the same 
measures when in power themselves.  That is, when Mubarak’s party enacted reforms in 
2008, all members of the then opposition Muslim Brotherhood voted against the 
legislation even though once in power themselves they proposed similar reforms.
3
  And 
in 2012/13 the liberal opposition to Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood cited as 
one of their principle complaints rising energy prices even though they later supported 
Sisi’s reductions of subsidies (Antar, 2014).  Yet, under Sisi, it was the turn of the 
Muslim Brothers to again reject such plans and even organise protests in opposition to 
fuel price increases (Ali, 2014).  
The fact that in July 2014 the Brotherhood chose to couple protests against price 
increases with those denouncing Morsi’s removal and the Israeli invasion of Gaza 
demonstrates how out of power political parties in Egypt have fused the issue of fuel 
subsidies to larger ideological debates, taking positions on reforms in opposition to the 
party in power even while acknowledging when they are in power themselves the need 
for such reforms (Tarek, 2014).   
We argue that the experience in Egypt speaks to a general problem with enacting 
common value reforms that can occur in countries with political competition and 
substantial polarisation on ideological grounds between the parties.  That is, we contend 
that when political parties align their positions on reforms to coincide with other 
ideological differences when in opposition to parties in power, the debate around such 
                                                          
3
 Minutes of Parliamentary Session, May 5
th
 2008. 
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reforms becomes guided by partisanship and ideological differences unrelated to the 
reforms themselves, decreasing the probability that such reforms can be enacted.   
In this chapter we investigate our contention by considering the effects of 
ideological polarisation on support for common value reforms.  We do so using an 
economics-style incentivised laboratory experiment, which incorporates naturally 
occurring political ideological divisions in Egypt.  In our main treatments subjects are 
first divided in societies corresponding to their ideological preferences.  They then are 
given the choice between voting for a measure (reform), which benefits all but with an 
additional benefit to the society with the most votes in favour of the measure, versus a 
less profitable alternative for all but with equal expected payoffs across societies.  Our 
principal experimental manipulation is the information subjects have about support for 
the reform measure from previous sessions.  That is, in our Baseline Treatment, subjects 
vote without any prior information concerning the relationship between society 
membership and support for reform.  But in our Informed Treatment, subjects are given 
information about previous vote choices in the Baseline Treatment by society 
membership, which suggests that one society is more supportive of reforms, while the 
other two are in opposition. 
We find that the polarising information has significant effects on how voters view 
their position on the reform measure; approximately 23% more are likely to explain their 
vote in terms of their society membership in the Informed Treatment than in the Baseline 
Treatment.  Furthermore, we find significant evidence that vote choices are similarly 
influenced in the expected directions; members of the society which was reported to most 
vote for reform in the Informed Treatment were 17% more likely to vote for reform than 
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in the Baseline and members of the societies which were reported to most vote against 
reform in the Informed Treatment were approximately 9% less likely to support reform 
than in the Baseline.  Our results thus demonstrate that coupling support for reform with 
other strong and substantive ideological differences can polarise voters decreasing 
support for reform for some voters while increasing it among others even when reform 
clearly benefits all voters in the absence of such polarising information.   
Furthermore, in subsequent treatments we find that one of the principal reasons 
for the effects we observe appears to be the differential benefit provided to one society 
over others when reform is enacted.  Although all subjects benefit, the fact that some 
appear to benefit more enhances the effect of polarising information.  When reform is not 
coupled with such a differential benefit (i.e. the fees paid are not distributed to any 
society but kept by the experimenters), polarising information has much less of an effect 
on voter explanations of their choices and their voting behaviour.  Finally, we find that 
voters are also much more likely to wish to purchase polarising information when reform 
has a differential effect as compared to the case where it does not, again supporting our 
conclusion that one primary reason why voters in our experiment are susceptible to the 
polarisation of reform stems from the possible differential benefit to one of the societies.  
In the next section of this chapter we briefly review the related literature on 
politics and reform. Section 4.3 outlines our theoretical argument, Section 4.4 describes 
our experimental design, Section 4.5 presents our results, and Section 4.6 concludes.  
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4.2    Related Literature 
The literature on how political factors can affect economic reform received a push in the 
early 1990s as a result of the democratising – and at the same time liberalising – countries 
of Eastern and Central Europe (for single-country studies see Aslund, 1995; Bartlett, 
1997; Bruszt & Stark, 1997; Sachs, 1995; Shleifer & Treisman, 2000). Two views can be 
identified. The first argues that the central dilemma of reform is temporal: reforms 
promise to generate large economic gains in the future but can be achieved only by 
imposing painful reforms today (Haggard, 1990; Nelson, 1990; Przeworski, 1991; 
Stiglitz, 1999; Williamson, 1994). To overcome resistance from groups losing from 
reform in the short term, thus, governments need to concentrate power in executives who 
are ideologically committed to reform, backed by international financial organisations, 
and insulated from popular pressure. The second view is the ‘partial reform’ one, which 
views that the main obstacles to economic transformation are the early winners from 
distortions in the transition economy who then use their gains to block further reform 
(Hellman, 1994). This second view suggests that robust political competition and diverse 
governing coalitions are essential to prevent the early winners from taking control of the 
state and sidetracking further reform.  
Political polarisation has received less attention in studies examining how politics 
can affect economic performance. However, some of the studies that consider 
polarisation stand out. Haggard and Kaufman (1993), for example, contend that polarised 
party systems impede support for economic adjustment because they make compromises 
less likely.  Furthermore, Alesina and Drazen (1991) suggest that the economic 
performance in post-communist countries is a reflection of the political struggle between 
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ex-communist and anti-communist factions who are engaged in a ‘war of attrition’ over 
economic and political resources, a situation that inhibits the introduction of coherent 
economic policies necessary to promote growth (see also Alesina & Rosenthal, 1995; 
Fiorina, 1996). Another way in which polarisation is viewed as an obstruction to reform 
is through its effect on increasing the probability of sharp changes in economic policy 
thereby undermining confidence in governments’ ability to make credible commitments 
to property rights (Alesina & Tabellini, 1990; Svensson, 1998). Frye (2002) also shows 
that political polarisation in post-1990 Eastern and Central Europe had a devastating 
effect on economic growth because it led to more volatile policies. 
Moving on to studies focusing on obstacles to subsidies reform in developing 
countries, the literature has concentrated on a range of social, economic and political 
factors. Nevertheless, political polarisation has been largely neglected in this literature. 
On economic factors, researchers have pointed to the associated loss of economic rents 
by affected parties, the inability to agree on who is going to bear the cost of funding 
subsidies’ removal, lack of institutional capacity to enact reforms, and fear of the 
potential inflationary consequences of price adjustments to energy (Abouleinein et al., 
2009; Blatter & Buzzell, 2013; Commander, 2012). The uncertainty regarding the 
distribution of gains and losses from reform (Fernandez & Rodrik, 1991) and the lack of 
information by voters on policies and by governments on voters’ preferences (Besley, 
2007) have also been emphasised. Moreover, Rodrik (2007) contends that the 
combination of external shocks with wider presence of frail institutions poses greater 
difficulty to reform. 
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As for the political factors studied, there is a general argument that authoritarian 
regimes are more likely to follow more redistributive income policies (Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2006) of which an effective tool is energy subsidies. Another obstacle is the 
expectation that reform might alter the distribution of political power by reducing the 
scope for politicians or parties to hand out rents or curbing the ability of recipients to 
fund political parties (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2001; Nikoloski, 2012). The existence of 
entrenched powers of particular lobbies and timing of reform in relation to the electoral 
cycle can also prove to be troublesome (Commander, 2012). Finally, some have indicated 
that the reasons behind the unwillingness to reform contain many country specifics 
(Nikoloski, 2012). 
Three recent experimental studies have examined voting over reform in the 
laboratory:  Cason and Mui (2003; 2005), Fischbacher and Schuddy (2014), and Paetzel 
et al (2014).  Cason and Mui focus on how costs of political participation can make it 
difficult to pass reforms under both conditions of certainty and uncertainty; Fischbacher 
and Schuddy consider how vote-trading among legislators may lead to failures to enact 
reforms; and Paetzel et al find that concerns about fairness and efficiency affect 
individuals’ willingness to support reform such that some who suffer from reform are 
willing to support them in the interest of efficiency while others who benefit may oppose 
reform because they are inequality averse.   
4.3    Theoretical Argument 
Our argument is that the existence of deep political divisions can affect voter attitudes 
towards public policies, which are not inherently ideological – i.e. policies which are 
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welfare improving for all voters. Polarisation can cause individuals to change their 
attitudes towards the same policy depending on the information received on how different 
political parties view that policy, even when fully informed as to the impact of the policy.  
We draw on the foundations of social identity theory according to which partisan 
attitudes are a natural psychological outgrowth of self-perceived membership in a 
political party or group (Greene, 2004). Once such affiliation is established, intergroup 
differentiation occurs through in-group favouritism and out-group derogation (Brewer & 
Brown, 1998). Whereas the former refers to the tendency to mentally exaggerate the 
favourable qualities of one’s group, the latter is exaggeration of the negative 
characteristics of out-groups. The net result of either process is enhanced group 
differentiation (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). A stronger partisan social identity thus leads to 
greater differentiation between groups, making defection from one’s preferred group less 
likely (Greene, 2004). Early treatments of reference groups placed emphasis on face-to-
face interactions and group cohesion whereas more recent work treats social groups as 
information cues (Tajfel, 1972; 1978) where the perception that one shares an interest 
with a group is sufficient to differentiate how people will act (Jackson & Sullivan, 1987).  
Hence, we hypothesise that voters will be affected by knowledge of the extent of political 
support for reform and be more (less) likely to support reform if they are told that their 
associated ideological group is supporting (opposing) reform, even when they are aware 
that all should benefit with reform.
4
 
                                                          
4
 That is, we argue that political polarisation on reform can have an effect independent of any signaling, 
cue, or heuristic effect that can occur when voters are uninformed about the choices before them (i.e. do not 
know which choice is best for society) and use endorsements and support by parties as shortcuts or devices 
to deal with their information uncertainty.  In our experimental design voters have full information on the 
likely effects of reform.  While they may not know which party will receive the differential benefit from 
reform, they can perceive that reform is better for all voters than non-reform.      
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Our second main hypothesis concerns the source of the effects of polarising 
information.  That is, we contend that polarising information affects voter preferences 
and choices primarily when reform also involves some differential benefit to the political 
parties that are the main proponents of the reform.  The evidence from Egypt (discussed 
in the Introduction) and other situations where reform is politicised suggests that reform 
is supported by political parties in power and opposed by those not in power.  Enacting 
reform may be a benefit to all or nearly all in a country, but being in political power can 
allow those in the government to use their control over government resources and 
influence to benefit to a greater extent from the reform than those out of power.  Hence, 
we expect polarising information to have a greater effect on voters when there are such 
possible differential effects; when supporters of reform benefit more than the opposition, 
even though all ultimately benefit.  Related to this hypothesis, we expect that voters are 
more willing to acquire polarising information when such differential benefits exist.  We 
summarise our predictions below: 
Prediction 1:  (a) Polarising information will affect voter views and behaviour when 
voting over reforms that benefit all, (b) but primarily when there are differences in the 
benefits from reform by political party.   
Prediction 2:  Voters are more willing to seek out costly polarising information on 
reforms that benefit all when there are differences in these benefits by political party.    
4.4     Experimental Design 
We faced a number of issues in designing an experiment that tests our two predictions 
above. First, we needed to design a voting situation similar to that faced when voting 
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over reform.  Second, we needed to be able to measure our subjects’ ideological 
preferences and to assign them to political groupings such that we could then manipulate 
information they had about support for reform across political groupings.  First we 
explain how we measured ideological preferences, second we discuss the voting game, 
and third we describe how we combined the two in order to manipulate polarising 
information. 
4.4.1    Measuring Political Preferences 
The experiment was conducted at Cairo University in early May 2014 over a 12-day 
period.  The time period is important to the context of the experiment and the difficulties 
in measuring political preferences as classes had ended early and exams were being 
administered so that the university could close early in order to prevent possible protest 
or unrest on campus, well ahead of the May 26-28 presidential election in which Sisi 
faced Egyptian Popular candidate Hamdeen Sabahi.  In June 2013, Sisi had deposed the 
previous elected president Morsi (from the Muslim Brotherhood) in a military-led coup.  
The Muslim Brotherhood’s banned Freedom & Justice Party did not participate in the 
May 2014 election.  As expected, Sisi won the election with almost 97% of the vote and 
turnout was approximately 47.5%.  Hence the period in which the experiment was 
conducted was a period in which there was both political tension in Egypt as there were 
protests and some acts of violence by Morsi supporters, yet also strong military control 
and a wide perception that Sisi would be elected to continue his policies.      
Because of this tension, to classify subjects we avoided using questions about 
partisan affiliation or voting behaviour.  Instead we created three hypothetical university 
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societies – each with different activities – that to a great extent match the three political 
ideologies dominating political life in Egypt:  “Deep State”, “Liberal”, and “Islamist”. 
For example, one activity of society ‘Z’ (which corresponds to Islamist ideology) is to 
organise activities to learn reciting the Quran; society ‘Y’ (which leans toward liberalism) 
organises student parties and holds talks over controversial novels, and society ‘X’ (deep 
state/old regime) hosts ‘popular’ cabinet ministers to give talks5. We then asked subjects 
– based on their consideration of the activities of each society – to indicate which society 
they would join if given the choice.  Note that the societies were always called simply X, 
Y, and Z, and never labeled their ideological names of Deep State, Liberal, and Islamist, 
respectively.  All these decisions, as in all of the decisions in the experiment, were made 
privately by subjects over a closed computer network, in separated booths by subject id 
number.  No individual subject’s choices were revealed to other subjects or recorded by 
name.        
To make sure that the activities of these societies distinguished between subjects 
along the ideological lines we postulate, a survey was conducted on a sample of students 
prior to conducting the experiment as a manipulation check as to how far these activities 
correspond to their actual voting behaviour and views of respondents of current events in 
Egypt. Based on the results of the manipulation check, some activities of the 
hypothesised societies were amended. We also conducted a similar survey at the end of 
each session on the last day of the experiment as an ex post check as well.  We found that 
society choices were roughly equally distributed across subjects with 32% choosing the 
Deep State Society (X), 32% choosing the Liberal Society (Y), and 36% choosing the 
                                                          
5
 See appendix E for the list of activities of each society. 
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Islamist Society (Z).  Appendix E presents the final list of activities and results from the 
survey. 
Subjects were paid a fixed amount of 10 Egyptian pounds for choosing a society 
(all payments were made after the experiment was completed).
6
   These procedures were 
made clear to the subjects beforehand so that they were free to express their choices and 
their only motivations in those choices should have been intrinsic.
7
    
4.4.2    Creating a Voting Game over Reform 
In order to create a voting situation similar to reform, we first created a “status quo” 
environment in which reform is needed.  That is, after choosing membership in a society, 
subjects engaged in an extremely simple real-effort task for which they were paid a fixed 
piece rate of 4 Egyptian pounds for each successfully completed. The task consisted of 
adding or subtracting two numbers 12 times, with all answers in single digits (a list of the 
problems used is provided in Appendix E).
8
  Subjects were given 5 minutes to complete 
the task.  The task did prove to be extremely easy, with only about 3% of subjects 
completing less than 10 problems and nearly 79% completing all 12 problems.  Subjects 
therefore earned on average approximately 47 Egyptian pounds answering these first 12 
problems.   
                                                          
6
 The exchange rate between the Egyptian pound and the U.S. dollar at this time was 1 USD = 7.0072 EGP. 
7
 Given that the experiment was conducted over a few days, it was possible that subjects in later sessions 
learned that they would be making these choices and the implications for such choices in the voting (as 
discussed below).  However, we do not observe any evidence of strategic behaviour in these later groups in 
their society choices.  Furthermore, in the ex post survey given on the last day we find coherence between 
political preferences and society choices as in the manipulation check.  Finally, note that the experiment 
was conducted fully in Arabic and only Egyptians not currently engaged in classroom instruction at the 
university were present during the sessions. 
8
 In early trials with 45 subjects, we considered slightly more difficult problems with a shorter time limit.  
Given the difficulty subjects had with these questions, we revised the design to use the easier questions we 
report.  The data from these trials are available on request. 
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After the twelfth problem, subjects were asked to continue the task for another 12 
times, but allowed to vote between two different scenarios for payment, Options A and B.  
Abstention was not allowed and the decision was made by majority rule.  Given that there 
were 15 voters in each voting group, there were no ties.  Under Option A, the piece rate 
was cut in half to 2 Egyptian pounds, while under Option B (Reform) the piece rate was 
kept the same, but subjects first had to pay a fixed up-front fee of 10 Egyptian pounds.  
Subjects were told that the fees collected when Option B was selected by the majority 
would be used to subsidise activities supported by the society, which provided the most 
votes in favour of Option B.  If two societies tied for the most votes for Option B, the 
experimenters kept the money.  Note that no deception was involved in the experiment 
and the fees were used as described if Option B was selected by the majority.  The fee, 
then, represented the cost of reform, and the distribution of the fee to activities supported 
by the society that voted most in favour of Option B represented the differential 
benefit/reward.  The reduction in the piece rate in Option A captured the costs of not 
engaging in reform.  Thus, the framing of the voting game captured the situation where 
reform is required to maintain the status quo, but is costly and has differential benefits to 
the party in power.    
Given the size of the fee, piece rates, simplicity of the task, and their previous 
performance in the task, the expected payoffs to almost all subjects was greater under 
Option B than Option A (even with the fee and the fact that not all benefitted from the 
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fee). Hence, the expected payoff maximizing choice was for voters to almost all vote for 
reform, Option B.
9
   
4.4.3    Manipulating Polarising Information 
We designed two principal treatments (Information and Baseline) in order to manipulate 
the degree to which voters perceived the societies as polarised over reform.  In the 
Information Treatment, before subjects voted (but after being explained the differences 
between Options A and B) subjects were given the following information (in Arabic):  
“The Society that voted most for Option B was Society Z and the Societies that voted 
most for Option A were Societies X and Y.”  The information provided to the subjects 
was truthful and based on voting which occurred in preliminary trials.
10
  Subjects were 
also shown again descriptions of the three societies and their activities as well as their 
own society choice.  We conducted two sessions in the Information Treatment.  In each 
session two groups of 15 subjects played the voting game independently.
11
  Hence, a total 
of 60 subjects participated in the Information Treatment.  
                                                          
9
 Only two subjects out of 405 across sessions earned less than 24 Egyptian pounds in the first task part of 
the experiment; almost 97% earned 40 Egyptian pounds or more.  Hence, even with the fee, Option B had a 
10 to 18 pound advantage over Option A and a subject should be extremely risk averse to prefer Option A 
to Option B.  As discussed below, we attempted to measure risk aversion to control for differences due to 
risk preferences, although we find no evidence to support risk aversion explaining votes for Option A.  
10
 As will become clear in the results section, in the Baseline Treatment subjects actually voted the opposite 
of the information we provide.   The preliminary trials from which the information was provided used more 
difficult problems and a piece rate under Option A of 3 Egyptian pounds.  We changed the design of the 
experiment after these trials in order to reduce the possible influence of risk aversion and increase the 
benefits to all subjects from supporting Option B.    
11
 The experiment was programmed in z-tree, see (Fischbacher, 2007.)  The laboratory consisted of 30 
workstations divided by privacy partitions.  Each session, subjects were randomly assigned to one of 2 
groups, each with 15 subjects.  Subjects did not know which of the other 30 subjects were in their group.  
Instructions (in Arabic) appeared on the subjects’ screens and were also read aloud by the same individual 
in all sessions and treatments.  Subjects were also given quizzes during the experiment to ensure they 
understood the instructions and could not proceed unless they gave correct responses.  The full instructions 
are provided in appendix E, and the z-tree program is available on request from the authors.     
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In the Baseline Treatment subjects were not provided with this information prior 
to voting. As with the Information Treatment, a total of 60 subjects participated in the 
Baseline Treatment (again in groups of 15).   In the Baseline Treatment, subjects were 
reminded of their society choice and the activities of the three societies prior to voting, as 
in the Information Treatment.  Hence, the only difference between the two treatments 
was the one sentence revealing the results of previous voting divided by society 
affiliation, and comparing voters’ choices between these two treatments allows us to 
measure the effect of polarising information.  In the next Section we compare their 
choices in two ways.  First, we have their revealed preferences in their voting behaviour; 
their vote choices.  Second, at the end of the experiment we asked them to explain their 
vote choices.  Specifically, we asked the subjects (in Arabic):  “What were your reasons 
for voting for the option you chose?”  Their answers to this question provides us with a 
measure of how much they were thinking about the information during the experiment 
and the influence of the information on their thinking of the choices between Options A 
and B.   
4.4.4    Measuring the Effect of Differential Benefits 
Comparing the Information and Baseline Treatments addresses the first part of Prediction 
1 – whether polarising information affects voters’ views and choices on reform.  To 
investigate the second part of Prediction 1 – that polarising information is important 
when there are differential benefits, we created two additional treatments:  Information 
No Reward and Baseline No Reward.  These treatments were exactly like their 
counterparts, Information and Baseline, except that the fee for Option B was not given to 
any of the societies but returned to the experimenters.  Hence, although as above almost 
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all subjects are better off with Option B as compared to Option A, there were no 
additional benefits to the society that most voted for Option B.  That is, in the 
Information No Reward Treatment subjects were shown the same sentence above and 
reminded of their Society choices and Society type, while in the Baseline No Reward 
Treatment subjects were not given this information.  By comparing the Information No 
Reward Treatment to the Baseline No Reward Treatment we are able to determine the 
effects of the polarising information when there are no differential benefits and by 
comparing the Information No Reward Treatment and the Information Treatment, we can 
measure the additional effect of differential benefits (as well as when we compare the two 
Baseline Treatments).  Thus, we can address the second part of Prediction 1 above.  
Ninety subjects (6 groups) participated in the Information No Reward Treatment and 75 
subjects (5 groups) participated in the Baseline No Reward Treatment.
12
    
Our Prediction 2 argues that voters are more likely to seek out polarising 
information when there are differential benefits.  In order to evaluate this prediction we 
created two more treatments:  Information Choice and Information Choice No Reward.  
These two treatments were the same as the Information and Information No Reward 
Treatments, respectively, with the exception that not all subjects automatically saw the 
polarising information.  Instead, after being explained how Options A and B worked, but 
before voting, subjects were given the opportunity to purchase information as to how 
previous voters had chosen by society.
13
  We used a Becker-DeGroot-Marshak (1964) 
                                                          
12
 One group of 15 subjects in the Baseline No Reward Treatment were given more difficult problems in 
the task part of the experiment (and a higher payoff for Option A) due to a computer glitch such that their 
data is not comparable to the other treatments.   
13
 Note that we conducted the choice treatments prior to the information treatments without choice in order 
to prevent possible cross effects if subjects knew someone who had participated in an earlier session.   
Chapter 4. Political Polarisation and Support for Reform: Experimental Evidence from Egypt                              89 
 
 
(hereafter, BDM) procedure to elicit subjects’ willingness to pay for the information.  
That is, subjects were asked if they wished to purchase the information.  If so, then 
subjects were asked to name a demand price between 1 and 5 Egyptian pounds for the 
information.  A price between 1 and 5 had been randomly drawn prior to each session 
(the price was a new random draw for each session) and recorded on a white board but 
hidden by a sheet of paper
14
.  
After each subject named his or her price (privately via the computer network), 
the previously chosen price was revealed.  Subjects whose demand prices were equal to 
or higher than the chosen price, had their payoffs deducted by the chosen price and were 
shown the polarising information.  Subjects whose demand prices were lower than the 
chosen price or who chose not to name a demand price did not see any information.   
The comparison of the treatments Information Choice and Information Choice No 
Reward, then, allows us to determine the extent that differential benefits affect the 
demand prices of subjects for the polarising information, specifically, Prediction 2.  
These treatments also allow us to compare the behaviour of subjects who willingly 
purchased the polarising information, at a cost, to those who were randomly assigned to 
receive the information by being assigned to one of the other information treatments.  
That is, we can determine if those who select to receive the information are differently 
affected by the information.  Such a question may be relevant in naturally occurring 
elections where individuals may choose or not to receive polarising information prior to 
voting.  Hence, comparing informed voter behaviour in Information Choice and 
                                                          
14
 We used this procedure to avoid using lottery mechanisms such as tossing a die or coin, which might 
have been offensive to some of the subjects since Islam prohibits gambling.  We were especially concerned 
about this issue given that we were asking questions related to religion in the component of the experiment 
where we measured ideological preferences. 
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Information Treatments (and informed voter behaviour in Information Choice No Reward 
and Information No Reward Treatments) allows us to measure the effects of self-
selection.  Sixty subjects (4 groups) participated in the Information Choice Treatment and 
60 (4 groups) participated in the Information Choice No Reward Treatment.  Table 4.1 
below summarises our 6 treatments. 
Table 4.1:  Summary of Treatments   
Treatment 
Name 
Information 
Provided 
Differential 
Benefits 
Choice Sessions Groups Total 
Subjects 
Baseline No Yes No  2 4 60 
Information Yes Yes No 2 4 60 
Baseline No 
Reward 
No No No 2.5
15
 5 75 
Information 
No Reward 
Yes No No  3 6 90 
Information 
Choice 
Yes Yes Yes 2 4 60 
Information 
Choice No 
Reward 
Yes No Yes 2 4 60 
Total    13.5 27 405 
 
4.4.5    Control Measures 
Although we use random assignment as our principal method to control for individual 
specific variation, which might affect behaviour, we also attempted to control for various 
                                                          
15
 As noted previously, in one of the sessions there was a computer glitch, which invalidated the data for 
one group of 15 subjects assigned to the Baseline No Reward Treatment.  Therefore, we only report the 
data from one of the groups in this session.   
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individual differences, which we suspected might affect the subjects’ choices and 
behaviour.  Specifically, we surveyed subjects after the experiment as to their age, 
gender, and religion.  A number of studies have shown that women tend to be more risk 
averse than men and if a subject was Christian or another non-Islamic religion, then he or 
she may be less likely to choose the Islamist society.  Our subjects were largely female 
(nearly 71%) and Muslim (94%).  The subjects ranged from 18 to 25, with a mean age of 
20.5 and a standard deviation of 0.77. 
We also attempted to measure subjects’ risk preferences as more risk averse 
subjects may be less willing to choose Option B.  After the subjects chose their 
ideological societies and before beginning the first set of mathematical problems, we 
used a variant of the Eckel and Grossman (2008) risk attitude decision-making task.
16
  In 
our variant, subjects were shown six different routes to the airport (labeled routes 1-6), 
with different taxi fares based on the degree of congestion of each route, which varied in 
uncertainty (congestion could be high resulting in a high taxi fare or low resulting in a 
low taxi fare), and then were asked to choose one route.  The routes were ordered such 
that more risk averse subjects should choose lower numbered routes.  They were given an 
endowment to pay the taxi fare and could keep the remaining endowment.  Before each 
session, for each route we randomly chose a traffic condition (either high or low) by 
tossing a coin.  The information was written on a white board but hidden from the 
subjects behind sheets of paper.  Then after subjects chose a route, we revealed the traffic 
                                                          
16
 We thank Chetan Dave for suggesting this version of risk preference measurement. 
Chapter 4. Political Polarisation and Support for Reform: Experimental Evidence from Egypt                              92 
 
 
conditions
17
.  Our subjects did appear to be strongly risk averse, almost half chose route 
‘1’ (49%), although gender correlates some with this choice with women choosing route 
‘1’ 50% of the time and men choosing route ‘1’ 45% of the time.        
Each of the 405 subjects participated only once in the experiment. At the end of 
the experiment, subjects were paid in a secure place and the total earnings were on 
average $15. The experiment lasted for approximately one hour and was conducted in 
Arabic with the same individual reading the instructions in all sessions.  None of the 
participants were students in the experimenter’s classes. All sessions were conducted in 
the Laboratory of the Faculty of Economics and Political Sciences at Cairo University.  
4.5    Results 
4.5.1    Evaluation of Prediction 1  
4.5.1.1 Evaluation of Prediction 1(a):  Explaining Vote Choices 
We begin our discussion of the results of our experiment with a comparison of our two 
principal treatments, the Information Treatment and the Baseline Treatment.  As 
discussed above, we have two measures of how voters responded to the polarising 
information; their explanations of their choices and their actual choices.  First we discuss 
how subjects explain their vote choices and second we discuss how they actually chose.  
We classified these explanations into four categories:  Non-Political Private; Political 
Own Society; Political All Societies; and Unclear.  Explanations classified as Non-
Political Private discussed only the anticipated earnings to the subject personally from 
                                                          
17
 Again, we used this method to avoid having subjects engage in obvious gambling, which some might 
have felt objectionable, especially given the discussion of religion in some of the other questions they 
answered.   
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the two options and did not mention society benefits at all.  For example, one subject who 
voted for B wrote: “The reward from Option A will be 2*12=24, and from option B will 
be 4*12-10=38.”  Another subject who voted for A explained: “I chose A to avoid the 
risk of losing 10 pounds.” 
Explanations classified as Political Own Society mentioned the benefits to their 
own society if Option B was passed and their society voted the most for Option B.  For 
instance, one subject who voted for A noted:  “Because the group I belong to is 
supporting option A in the stated example.” Another subject who voted for B, remarked: 
“I chose society Z because of its religious nature. I voted for B because my society made 
this choice before.”  We also classified subjects who may also have mentioned their 
private benefits as well.  For example, one subject stated:  “I voted for B because it will 
allow me to support the society that I like with a small amount of money, and also 
because it gives a bigger reward than A.” 
Explanations classified as Political All Societies suggested that they were voting 
for B (at least partly) to benefit some society, acknowledging it may not be their own.  
For instance, one subject wrote:  “Because it gives a bigger reward and supports a society 
with some useful activities in the university.”  Another explained:  “I voted for B to get a 
bigger reward, 38 pounds instead of 24, especially since I know that I will answer all 
questions correctly. And also, option B will benefit society (Y) and I never stand in the 
way of others’ benefit even if it was not my society. But in option A, no one will 
benefit.”  Finally, explanations classified as Unclear did not provide enough information 
to be categorised.  For instance, one subject said simply:  “I thought it might be chosen” 
and another remarked: “It matches my desires to a great extent.”  
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We find significant differences in the types of explanations between the Baseline 
and Information Treatments, as shown in Figure 4.1 below.
18
  In the Baseline Treatment 
the modal response is to only mention private benefits (43% of the explanations), while 
in the Information Treatment the modal response is to include a mention of one’s own 
society (48%) and only 38% mention private benefits only.  The increase in mentioning 
one’s own society appears strongly related to the decrease in mentioning benefits to all 
societies (in the Baseline Treatment explanations refer to all societies 27% of the time, 
whereas in the Information Treatment they do so only 8% of the time).  Thus it appears 
that receiving polarising information clearly structures the ways in which voters describe 
the two choices.   
Figure 4.1:  Distributions of Voter Explanations in the Baseline and Information Treatments 
 
                                                          
18
For the comparison overall the Pearson χ2 statistic = 10.40, Pr = 0.015 and Fisher’s exact test yields Pr = 
0.012. 
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It may be that voters who performed poorly in the math problems are driving this 
result.  So we also compared the distribution of explanations of just those subjects who 
received perfect scores on the first set of math problems, that is, answered all 12 correctly 
(also shown in Figure 4.1 above).  We find that our results are robust to this restriction; 
the polarising information results in significantly more voters mentioning their own 
society (52% among informed compared to 27% in the baseline), less their private 
benefits (37% among informed compared to 46% in the baseline), and less the benefits to 
all societies (10% among informed compared to 23% in the baseline).
19
 
We also estimated a multinomial logit of explanation type as a function of how 
many problems a subject answered in the first set of math questions and whether a 
subject was informed, female, and chose the first taxi route.  We find that none of the 
control variables are significant and that the qualitative results from the polarising 
information found above continue to hold although not significant at conventional levels 
(significance levels of being informed range between 10 and 5%).  The detailed results 
from the estimation are available from the authors.      
4.5.1.2    Evaluation of Prediction 1(a):  Voting Behaviour 
We turn now to examine whether the polarising information also affects how voters 
choose.  Recall that the polarising information reveals to voters that Society Z (the 
Islamist Society) votes the most for Option B (and presumably would receive the 
differential benefit if Option B is selected) and that Societies X and Y vote the most for 
Option A.  Hence, if the polarising information affects voter behaviour, then we expect 
                                                          
19
 The Pearson’s χ2 statistic for the comparison 7.55, Pr = 0.06 and the Fisher’s exact test yields a Pr = 0.04. 
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that voters in Society Z in the Information Treatment will be more likely to vote for 
Option B than they are in the Baseline Treatment and that voters in Societies X and Y 
will be less likely to vote for Option B than they are in the Baseline Treatment.  Figure 
4.2 below summarises voting behaviour in the two treatments by whether a subject is a 
member of the Islamic Society or not.  Figures 4.3 and 4.4 also show the distribution of B 
votes, in the two treatments, by both Islamists and non-Islamists, respectively.  
Figure 4.2:  Voting Behaviour in the Baseline and Information Treatments 
 
We find significant evidence supporting our prediction.  That is, we find higher 
support for Option B among Islamist Society members in the Information Treatment 
(96% in the Information Treatment compared to 79% in the Baseline Treatment) and 
lower support for Option B among non-Islamist Society members in the Information 
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Treatment (91% in the Information Treatment compared to 100% in the Baseline 
Treatment).  Both differences are significant using a one-tailed test of proportions, a one-
tailed t-test on equality of means, a non-parametric test on equality of distributions, and 
Fisher’s exact 1-sided test.20  
Figure 4.3:  Distribution of B-Votes by Islamists 
 
When we restrict our attention just to the subjects who answered all math 
problems in the first set correctly (shown in Figure 4.2 as well), we find the same 
relationships, also significant.  Islamist Society members who answered all problems 
correctly chose Option B 100% of the time when they received polarising information 
compared to only 79% of the time when not informed, while non-Islamist Society 
members who answered all problems correctly chose Option B 91% of the time when 
                                                          
20
 For the test of the proportions for Islamic Society members the z statistic = 1.77, Pr = 0.04 in a one-tailed 
test and for non-Islamist Society members the z statistic = 1.91, Pr = 0.03 in a one-tailed test.  For the t-test 
for Islamic society members, the t statistic = 1.78, Pr = 0.04 in a one-tailed test, and for non-Islamist 
Society members, the t statistic = 1.93, Pr = 0.03. For non-parametric ranksum test for Islamic society 
members the z statistic = 1.75, Pr = 0.08, and for non-Islamist Society members, the z statistic = 1.9, Pr = 
0.06.Fisher’s exact one-sided test for Islamic Society members yields Pr = 0.10 and for non-Islamic Society 
members Pr = 0.09. 
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they received polarising information, but 100% of the time when not informed.
21
 Thus, 
we find supportive evidence of an effect on voter choices, although weak. 
Figure 4.4:  Distribution of B-Votes by non-Islamists 
 
We also estimated a probit analysis of vote choice for Islamist Society members. 
Model 1 includes just a dummy for the Information treatment. Model 2 includes in 
addition other controls such as how many problems they answered correctly in the first 
set of problems, whether they were Female, and chose taxi route 1.  Table 4.2 shows the 
results of this regression. Model 1 shows that, when informed, Islamists are 17% more 
likely to vote for option B (p=0.09). In model 2, however, we find that none of the 
control variables are significant, but that informed Islamist Society members are 21% 
more likely to vote for Option B at the 5% level (z statistic = 1.95) than uninformed 
ones.
22
 
                                                          
21
 For the comparison with Islamist Society members, the χ2 statistic = 4.48, Pr = 0.03, Fisher’s exact test 
yields Pr = 0.07 and for the comparison with non-Islamist Society members, the χ2 statistic = 3.24, Pr = 
0.07, Fisher’s exact test yield Pr = 0.11. 
22
 We could not estimate the same probit for non-Islamist Society members because of insufficient 
variation in the data. 
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Table 4.2: Effect of information on Islamists’ Voting Behaviour 
B-Vote (1) (2) 
Informed (D)   0.171* 
(0.094) 
0.208*** 
(0.004)  
Taxi Route 1 (D)  0.04 
(0.52) 
Female (D)  -0.07 
(0.33) 
All math questions correct (D)  0.06 
(0.26) 
Observations 44 44 
Pseudo R
2 
0.1028 0.2364 
Log Likelihood -13.977 -11.89 
 
4.5.1.3    Evaluation of Prediction 1(b) 
We find that the polarising information appears to have a large effect on how voters 
describe their vote choices and a smaller, however still significant, effect on how voters 
vote.  To what extent is this effect driven by the fact that under Option B, although all 
benefit, there is a differential gain to the society which votes the most for that option?  In 
order to examine this question, we make two comparisons. First we compare the voter 
explanations in our Information Treatment with the Information No Reward Treatment as 
shown in Figure 4.5 below.  We find significant differences.
23
  In the Information No 
Reward Treatment the vast majority of subjects provide an explanation that only refers to 
their personal private benefits from the options (90%) and only about 7% refer to their 
own society in explaining their vote (recall these voters have received information about 
                                                          
23
 Pearson’s χ2 statistic for the comparison = 48.4, Pr = 0.00 and Fisher’s exact test yields Pr = 0.00. 
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their society’s position on the two options). None of the voters mention all societies.  
Clearly the differential benefit increases the tendency of voters to explain their positions 
by society.  The results are equally significant if we restrict to the subjects who answered 
all 12 of the first set of math problems correctly as shown in Figure 4.5.
24
   
Figure 4.5:  Distributions of Voter Explanations in  
the Information and Information No Reward Treatments 
 
Note that subjects in the Baseline No Reward Treatment never explained their 
vote in reference to the societies given that they received no polarising information and 
there were no differential benefits to the societies (no reward).  Hence we can think of the 
7% who mentioned their society in the Information No Reward Treatment as a measure 
of those who are viewing the options in society terms purely because of the polarising 
                                                          
24
 Pearson’s χ2 statistic for the comparison = 42.33, Pr = 0.00 and Fisher’s exact test yields Pr = 0.00.   
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information.  Therefore, the difference between 7% and the 48% who mentioned their 
own society in Information Treatment can be viewed as the effect of the reward in 
addition to the polarising information.  Alternatively, we can also think of the 25% who 
mention their own society in the Baseline Treatment as compared to the Baseline No 
Reward Treatment as the percentage who are polarised simply by the existence of a 
differential reward without polarising information.  Obviously the results suggest an 
interactive relationship between polarising information and differential benefits.
25
  
What do we find when we compare voting behaviour in these no reward 
treatments with the reward treatments?  Figure 4.6 compares voting behaviour in the no 
reward treatments with their respective reward treatments.  The behaviour is broken 
down by whether a subject is a member of the Islamist Society (Z) in the treatments with 
information, but not broken down in the non-information, baseline treatments (since there 
is no reason to expect a difference in behaviour by society choice).  We find in every 
comparison the differential benefit increases votes for Option B. For Non-Islamist 
Society Members for example, the mean votes for option B is 76% in the absence of 
differential benefits and rises to 91% in the presence of differential benefits. This 
difference is statistically significant in a one-tailed Fisher exact test (Pr = 0.054). When 
we restrict the observations to those who answered all 12 math problems in the first set 
correctly, we find similar relationships (with differential benefits 91% non-Islamist 
Society members who answered all problems in the first set correctly vote for Option B 
as compared to 84% without differential benefit and with differential benefits 100% of 
Islamist Society members who answered all problems in the first set correctly vote for 
                                                          
25
 We are unable to estimate a larger multinomial logit estimating these effects in combination on 
explanation types with controls due to a lack of sufficient variation in the data.   
Chapter 4. Political Polarisation and Support for Reform: Experimental Evidence from Egypt                              102 
 
 
Option B as compared to 89% without differential benefits), although the differences are 
not significant. Using a probit analysis to estimate the effect of differential benefits on the 
vote choice of non-Islamists, I find evidence that differential benefits increases the 
likelihood of non-Islamists voting for option B by 16% (std. err= 0.074, p= 0.062)
26
. 
Figure 4.6:  The Effects of Differential Benefits on Voter Behaviour 
 
 
In summary, we find evidence that differential benefits have a large effect on how 
voters view the choices between options; they are much more likely to mention their own 
society in explaining their vote choices when there are differential benefits to reform.  
They are also slightly more likely to vote for reform when there are differential benefits, 
                                                          
26
 We were unable to estimate a larger probit analysis of vote choice of these effects in combination with 
controls due to a lack of sufficient variation in the data.   
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although the difference is not generally significant.  The evidence suggests that the effect 
of differential benefits on vote choice appears to offset to some extent the tendency of 
non-Islamist voters to react to polarising information by voting for Option B less often as 
found above.        
4.5.2    Evaluation of Prediction 2 
We now focus on Prediction 2, that voters will be more willing to acquire costly 
polarising information when there are differential benefits from reform.  In order to 
evaluate this prediction, we compare the two treatments in which voters can choose 
whether to purchase the polarising information or not, the Information Choice and 
Information Choice No Reward Treatments.  Specifically, we examine the effect of 
rewards on the demand prices of the subjects. Figure 4.7 summarises the demand prices 
by treatment. We find that significantly more subjects choose a positive demand price 
and higher demand prices on average (the mean demand price in the Information Choice 
No Reward Treatment is 2.39 and is 2.54 in the Information Choice Reward Treatment).
27
  
Hence it is clear that significantly many more subjects value the polarising information 
when reform has differential rewards. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
27
 The Pearson’s χ2 statistic for the comparison is 12.66, Pr = 0.03 and Fisher’s exact test yields Pr = 0.02.  
When we regress demand price on treatment including controls for gender and our risk aversion measure 
we find that the treatment effect statistic equals 2.77, Pr = 0.01.  None of the controls are significant.   
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Figure 4.7:  Demand Prices in the Choice Treatment 
 
Our choice treatments also allow us to compare those who selected to receive the 
polarising information as compared to those who were given the information without a 
choice.  Figures 4.8 and 4.9 present comparisons of explanations and voting behaviour, 
respectively, of informed voters in the choice treatments as compared to their no choice 
counterparts (i.e. Informed Choice compared with Informed and Informed Choice No 
Reward compared with Informed No Reward).   We find little evidence of any selection 
effects.  We find no significant differences between the explanations of those who 
selected to receive the polarising information and those who were shown the information 
arbitrarily.  The only significant difference we find in voting behaviour is some slight 
evidence that Non-Islamist Society members who select to receive the information and 
there are differential benefits these voters are less likely to vote for Option B than those 
arbitrarily given the information.
28
  However, when we compare Islamist and Non-
Islamist Society members who are informed in either information choice treatment, we 
                                                          
28The Pearson’s χ2 statistic for the comparison = 4.27, Pr = 0.039.  A one-sided Fisher’s exact test yields Pr  
= 0.053. 
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find no significant differences.  Finally, when we restrict our observations to those who 
answered all 12 of the first mathematics problems correctly, we find no significant 
differences in explanations or vote choices between those informed by choice and those 
informed arbitrarily.     
Figure 4.8:  Distributions of Informed Voter Explanations in the Informed Choice 
Treatments compared to their No Choice Counterparts 
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Figure 4.9:  The Effects of Information Choice on Voter Behaviour   
 
4.6    Concluding Remarks 
One of the more puzzling aspects of political decision-making has been the inability of 
governments to pass reforms even when there seems to be widespread recognition that 
reform is needed.  In this paper we investigate one possible source of the lack of action – 
polarisation on reform on non-relevant ideological grounds.  We do so by using a novel 
approach of a combination of incentivised experiments with naturally occurring political 
ideological divisions in a polarised setting.  We find that polarising information causes 
significant numbers of voters to view their positions on reform through ideological lenses 
and some voters to change their votes on reform even when the reform is clearly an 
improvement for them. 
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However, our evidence suggests that the influence of polarising information is 
highly interactive with the existence of differential benefits from reform.  When reform 
offers differential benefits to the group of voters who are most in favour of reform (such 
as the party in power who enacts reform), then voters are most likely to see reform 
through polarised and ideological views and their votes are the most likely to be affected, 
even when reform has clear benefits for all voters, across ideological types.  
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Chapter 5 
Negative Campaigning and Trust: 
Experimental Evidence from Post-Revolutionary Egypt  
5.1     Introduction 
According to the World Values Survey (2008; 2012), people’s beliefs are likely to play a key 
role in economic development, the emergence and flourishing of democratic institutions, the 
rise of gender equality, and the extent to which societies have effective governments. Indeed, 
evidence indicates that trust, which encompasses people’s beliefs about others and their 
willingness to use that knowledge as the basis for action (Luhmann, 1982), contributes to 
economic, political and social success (Knack & Keefer, 1997b; Zak & Knack, 2001b). 
Despite the above evidence on the importance of trust, data from wave 6, 2010-2014, 
of the World Values Survey (2012) show that 78.5 percent of Egyptians do not trust others1. 
This low level of interpersonal trust among Egyptians can thus have serious implications on 
the country’s social capital, political transformation and thus economic development.  
                                                          
1
 When asked the question “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you 
need to be very careful in dealing with people?” 78% of Egyptians answered that they need to be very 
careful. 
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Since 2011, negative campaigning has been on the rise in Egypt with elections 
witnessing a significant increase in the attack tone. Common attacks that were used included 
for example the following expressions, “Slaves of military boots”, “Sheep”, and “Retired 
terrorists”. With the experience of free elections and the use of free campaign strategies 
being new to the Egyptian society since the ousting of its old authoritarian regime, this 
chapter consequently investigates the effect of different campaign 
environments/strategies, especially negative campaigning, on the level of interpersonal 
trust among Egyptians. Indeed, nowhere can democracy be better seen “in action” than 
during political campaigns (Gadarian & Lau, 2011). Although the conventional wisdom 
about negative political campaigning holds that it succeeds in achieving the consequences 
intended by its practitioners, many fear that it might have unintended but detrimental 
effects on both the economic and political systems (Lau et al., 2007). Specifically, I 
contend that when potential candidates revert to negative campaigning, people’s level of 
interpersonal trust in general gets affected.  
Exposure to different kinds of campaign environments is however endogenous to 
the environment rather than randomly and exogenously assigned by the investigator. 
Consequently, the effect of the campaign environment on pro-social behaviour such as 
trust is extremely difficult to infer from naturally occurring data. A controlled 
environment is thus required if one seeks to examine such hypothesis.  
Hence, I connect a classic paradigm from economics, the trust game of Berg et al. 
(1995), with a standard social psychological manipulation, a priming procedure. By doing 
so, I examine whether activating specific cognitive contents (negative and positive 
campaign ads in my case) via priming has an impact on the initial beliefs people form 
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about the trustworthiness of others. In this controlled environment, one can say that trust 
is present when one party (the sender/first mover) places resources at the disposal of 
another party (responder/second mover) under the expectation that this will increase the 
sender’s payoff, and in the absence of any enforceable commitment by the responder. 
To the best knowledge of the researcher, this study is the first to measure the 
effect of priming different campaign environments (negative and positive campaign ads) 
on the level of interpersonal trust, and the first to deploy laboratory experiments in an 
effort to understand the relationship between negative campaigning and trust. 
Specifically, I investigate my contention by considering the effects of negative 
campaigning on citizens’ behaviour in a trust game. I do so using an economics-style 
incentivised laboratory experiment.  In the experiment’s main treatments, subjects are 
first asked some personality questions.  They are then introduced to two videos that have 
some piece of news on two candidates competing in a hypothetical election for the 
president of the university’s student union. They are then asked to play the trust game. 
The principal experimental manipulation is the content of the video they watch. That is, 
in the Baseline Treatment, subjects play the trust game without any prior information 
concerning potential candidates. In the Positive Treatment, subjects are given information 
about candidates where the content of the video is positive policy pledges. In the 
Negative Personality Treatment, the news coverage is negative claims about the 
personality of the candidates and in the Negative Policy Treatment; the videos are about 
negative claims with respect to the two candidates’ policies.  
I find experimental evidence that negative campaigning with respect to 
candidates’ personalities has significant negative effects on how subjects play the trust 
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game. In other words, I find a negative effect of negative-campaign-priming on the 
amount sent by first movers to anonymous partners; approximately the amount sent is 13 
percent less in the Negative-Personality Treatment than in the Baseline Treatment 
(p=0.008).  Furthermore, I find significant effects of these three different campaign 
environments on voters’ intensions to vote in the upcoming elections.   
In the next section of this chapter, I briefly review the related literature on trust 
and negative campaigning. Section 5.3 outlines my theoretical argument. The 
experimental design and results are presented in sections 5.4 and 5.5, respectively. And 
section 5.6 concludes.  
5.2     Related Literature 
Trust and its complement, trustworthiness, are key concepts in both economics and 
political science because of their role in (i) the formation of social capital and civic 
engagement (Stolle, 1998), (ii) the reduction of the cost of exchange in daily market 
transactions (Knight, 2001; Sztompka, 1999), and (iii) the existence of stable political 
institutions (Putnam, 1993; 2000). Indeed, there has been evidence that trust has positive 
effects on economic growth, and that it contributes to economic, political and social 
success (Knack & Keefer, 1997a; Zak & Knack, 2001a).  
Two distinct research methods have been used to explore and measure the concept 
of trust. The first is the early research method that treats trust as a perception of norms in 
a society and which uses survey questions to assess it
2
. The second is the recent research 
                                                          
2
 For forty years, the General Social Survey (GSS), World Values Survey (WVS), and American National 
Election Studies (ANES) have used the same questions to assess trust (Wilson, et al., 2011.) 
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method that focuses on behavioural assessments of trust through the use of incentivised, 
economics-style laboratory experiments incorporating Berg et al. (1995) trust/investment 
game. According to this game, an individual decides whether or not to trust another by 
deciding to give him/her some or none of his endowment. 
Since the mid-1990s, more than 150 experimental studies have examined the 
concept of interpersonal trust, with the standard trust/investment game of Berg et al. 
(1995) proving to be a valuable vehicle for following research (Wilson & Eckel, 2011). 
For instance, trust experiments have examined the relationship between personal 
characteristics and behaviour in the games (Bellemare & Kroger, 2007; Croson & 
Gneezy, 2009; Uslaner, 2002). Zak and Knack (2001a) for example, have used 
macroeconomic data and have found a strong relationship between the incidence of 
formal institutions and generalised trust across countries.  
On the relationship between interpersonal trust and political institutions, literature 
extends back to Almond and Verba (Almond & Verba, 1963) who claim a strong 
correlation between citizen trust and democratic institutions. Recent work has examined 
the direction of this causality (Putnam, 1993; Rothstein, 2000). Nevertheless, the 
campaign environment has been largely neglected in this literature. In other words, no 
paper, to the best knowledge of the researcher, has examined the effect of different 
campaign environments (one of which is negative campaigning) on the level of 
interpersonal trust.  
This chapter hence tries to bridge the gap in this literature. However, with 
exposure to different kinds of campaign ads being endogenous to one’s environment (Zak 
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& Knack, 2001a), it is extremely difficult to infer the effect of different campaign ads on 
trust from naturally occurring data. A controlled environment that uses priming is thus 
required. Specifically, I use the priming techniques developed in social psychology to 
measure a citizen’s trust in others given exposure to different campaign 
environments/ads. The manipulation used in this chapter derives from the priming 
literature (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000; for an example from the economics literature, see  
Benjamin et al., 2010).  
Indeed, the priming techniques developed in social psychology provide 
researchers with the tools to systematically and exogenously manipulate context and 
information processing and thus to investigate the formation of beliefs and preferences in 
highly controlled laboratory environments. For example, a recent paper by Dufwenberg 
et al. (2011) investigates social behaviour in the laboratory by changing the framing of 
the games being played. It concludes that framing effects are a two-part process where 
frames move beliefs which, in turn, shape motivation and choice. The results of such 
behavioural economics studies, together with the corresponding social psychology 
theories, can then be the foundation of new economic models that capture the concept of 
‘‘economic cognition’’. 
Moving on to studies on campaigning, research has shown that negative 
advertising
3
 makes a greater impression on an audience than positive or neutral 
advertising, due to the greater weighting given to negative information over positive 
information by individuals while forming evaluations of social stimuli (Kellermann, 
                                                          
3  Attack advertising is an aggressive, one-sided, assault designed to draw attention to an opponent's 
weaknesses in either character or issue positions Pfau, et al., 1990..  
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1989; Lang et al., 1995; Lau, 1982). Scholars in a number of disciplines have observed a 
“negativity bias,” whereby audiences often give greater weight to negative information 
than to comparable positive information (Fiske, 1980; Holbrook et al., 2001; Klein, 1991; 
Lau, 1982; 1985).  
In fact, two strands in the literature on campaigning have been mushrooming in 
the last three decades. The first strand focuses on the effects of negative ads on turnout, 
citizen participation and democratic processes (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1996; 
Ansolabehere et al., 1994). Ansolabehere et al. (1994), for instance, using a lab 
experiment, have found that exposure to negative ads decreased intentions to vote by 5%. 
Other studies, on the contrary, see negative campaign ads as stimulating participation 
(Finkel & Geer, 1998; Freedman et al., 2004). Their justification for the increased level 
of participation is summarised in the following three points: (i) Negative advertising 
conveys a significant amount of policy and information to voters (Brians & Wattenberg, 
1996; Lipsitz et al., 2005; Sides et al., 2010; Stevens et al., 2008), (ii) The evidence that 
negative ads are given more weight in political information processing (Lang et al., 1995; 
Lau, 1982), and (iii) Negative ads may produce stronger emotional responses than 
positive ones (MacKuen & Marcus, 1994). 
The second strand in the literature has been concerned with the effect of negative 
campaign ads on candidate evaluations; both the sponsor and the target (Shapiro & 
Rieger, 1992; Zahedzadeh & Merolla, 2012). Kenney and Fridkin (2004), for example, 
suggest that negative messages delivered in a legitimate fashion and focusing on a 
relevant topic depress evaluations of opponents. In contrast, negative messages 
containing irrelevant information delivered in an overly strident manner depress 
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evaluations of both candidates involved in the campaign. Zahedzadeh & Merolla (2012) 
have examined the negative effects of attack ads on evaluations of candidates through 
lowering trust in candidates . While studies have looked at the effect of attack ads on 
turnout and candidate evaluations, they have not fully explored the mechanisms driving 
these relationships (Lau & Redlawsk, 2006). Craig & Rippere (2014) find little evidence 
that increased campaign negativity has contributed to the loss of public trust in 
government in recent decades. Referring to the “figure-ground hypothesis”4, they posit 
that negative campaign ads are most effective among those who possess a high level of 
trust in their political leaders. With high trust being uncommon in U.S. politics today, 
hence negative appeals may play to a smaller audience than in the past. Their data 
indicate, however, that a well-conceived negative campaign ad can influence voter choice 
regardless of one’s feelings about government. 
Two recent experimental studies have examined negative campaigning in the 
laboratory:  Zahedzadeh and Merolla (2012) and Craig and Rippere (2014).  Zahedzadeh 
and Merolla focus on the effect of negative advertisements on candidate evaluations, by 
looking carefully at political trust as one important mechanism through which negative 
advertisements operate. They use a laboratory experiment in which subjects take part in a 
hypothetical election and are randomly assigned to a control group or a negative 
advertising condition, and instead of only relying on attitudinal reports of trust in 
candidates, they generate a behavioral measure of trust by having some participants play 
the trust game with the sponsor of the attack and the other participants play with the 
                                                          
4
 The “figure-ground hypothesis” suggests that negative information is more likely than positive 
information to shape people’s attitudes and behavior, partly because negativity “stands out” in a world 
where most people have positive expectations of others (Lau 1985; Sears 1983). 
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target of the attack. They explore how the negative advertisement affects both measures 
of trust and how these in turn influence candidate evaluations. Craig and Rippere on the 
other hand, use a controlled experiment to measure the effects of negative political ads on 
voters with varying levels of trust. Thus their concern is not with political (mis)trust as a 
dependent variable, but rather as a possible moderator, that is, one factor among many 
that could make negative campaign ads either more or less effective. 
This chapter tries to add another dimension to the above literature. It goes one 
step further by examining the wider consequences of negative campaigning on the whole 
society. Although it is important to understand the effect of negative campaigning on 
trust in candidates and interactions with politicians, it is even more crucial to understand 
how this negative environment can impact on societal interactions.  
5.3    Theoretical Argument 
The central argument of this chapter is that trust among individuals (interpersonal trust) 
can be affected by the campaign environment citizens are living in. Specifically, I argue 
that negative campaigning causes a reduction in the level of interpersonal trust in the 
society. This argument is based on social psychology research which established that the 
mental representation of a phenomenon can have an effect on behaviour outside the 
context of that phenomenon (Evans, 2008; Higgins, 1996; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). An 
important driver of these behavioural effects is the limited cognitive abilities of humans 
which prevent them from accessing the most relevant mental representations required for 
a decision. This implies that mental representations that have been recently or chronically 
accessed have an effect on behaviour even if they are not directly relevant. This effect 
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can be thought of as a spillover effect of the mental representation (Al-Ubaydli et al., 
2013). 
According to economic reasoning, however, beliefs about another person’s 
trustworthiness for instance are formed via one rational process which encounters only 
relevant information. Specifically, researchers who study trust relations focus on the role 
of both preferences (which are assumed to be exogenous and stable over time, and thus 
represented by fixed utility functions in economic models, (Loewenstein et al., 2008)) 
and beliefs about how others are expected to behave in a given situation (assumed to be 
formed according to equilibrium conditions and are subject to rational updating if 
possible). Social psychological reasoning, on the other hand, suggests two systems to be 
accountable for belief formation, thus influencing one’s trust judgments and decisions; 
the ‘‘rational’’ system and the impulsive system.  
These dual-process theories have assumed a noticeable role in human judgment, 
decision-making, and behaviour (Evans, 2008). In addition to the rational, rule-based way 
of information processing, these theories propose another associative, experiential way. 
Consequently, two systems (a reflective and an impulsive system) are assumed to be 
operating simultaneously and influencing each other during the formation of social 
behaviour (Strack & Deutsch, 2004; 2005). The reflective system requires extensive 
cognitive resources, and integrates and weighs information on outcome-values and 
probabilities to reach optimal decisions. The impulsive system, on the contrary, requires 
little cognitive resources but can have unexpected effects on reflective decision making, 
through the heightened accessibility of information, that has been activated in the 
associative structures of the impulsive system (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). In fact, there is 
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a rich body of classic social cognition findings which demonstrates that people base their 
judgments and decisions on information accessible at the specific moment in time where 
this judgment or decision is to be made (Higgins, 1996).  
An interesting fact is that the activated information does not necessarily have to 
be inherently linked to the judgment to have an impact. Indeed, priming experiments 
demonstrate that judgment-irrelevant knowledge that is rendered accessible in preceding 
priming tasks critically shapes how people, in their reflective systems, see, interpret and 
judge others’ behaviours. 
With respect to one’s trusting behaviour towards others, the principle of dual 
processes should also hold. As every other judgment and decision, judgments about 
another person’s trustworthiness should occur in the reflective system, which may be 
influenced by the heightened accessibility of information in the impulsive system. 
Indeed, this assumption is supported by a recent body of experimental literature (Mayer 
& Mussweiler, 2011; Schul et al., 2008; Todorov et al., 2008).  Thus, according to social 
psychological theorizing and research, reflective trust judgments and trust decisions 
should clearly be influenced by contents that have been activated in a previous, unrelated 
task, and still exert their influence in the associative structures of the impulsive system 
(Posten et al., 2013). 
This chapter aims at putting these different assumptions about trust belief 
formation to a test. Specifically, I activate, through a priming lab experiment, different 
contents (the videos on negative and positive news coverage of a hypothetical election) in 
the impulsive system to demonstrate its influence on reflective reasoning in the domain 
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of ‘‘rational’’ trust decisions in an economic trust game. If judgments and decisions were 
solely reflective and no influence of the impulsive system existed, then activation of these 
different contents in the associative structures of the impulsive system should not exert 
any effect on the trust decision. If, however, some influence of the impulsive system 
existed, activation of these different contexts should have an impact on the trust decision 
of individuals.  
The priming used to test my argument is news coverage of a hypothetical election 
to decide the president of the university’s student union. In the Positive Campaign 
treatment, subjects watch a video where candidates are described as behaving positively 
in the campaign. In the Negative-Personality Campaign treatment, subjects watch a video 
where candidates are described as behaving negatively in personality claims in the 
campaign. And in the Negative-Policy Campaign treatment, subjects watch a video where 
candidates are described as behaving negatively in policy claims in the campaign. 
A secondary argument of this chapter is that negative (positive) campaigning can 
have a negative (positive) impact on voters’ intensions to vote. This argument is based on 
the literature on campaigning, especially the first strand, which focuses on the effects of 
negative ads on turnout, citizen participation and democratic processes (Ansolabehere & 
Iyengar, 1996; Ansolabehere et al., 1994). My argument could also be viewed as a 
byproduct of the findings of the second strand in the literature on campaigning which is 
concerned with the effect of negative campaign ads on candidate evaluations; both the 
sponsor and the target (Shapiro & Rieger, 1992; Zahedzadeh & Merolla, 2012). 
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The following is a summary of my predictions: 
Prediction 1:  A negative campaigning environment that targets the personality of the 
candidates can have negative effects on the level of trust among people (interpersonal 
trust). 
Prediction 2: Different campaign environments can have different effects on the level of 
trust in the political system, measured by voters’ intensions to vote in the upcoming 
election as follows: (i) Positive campaigns increase voters’ intensions to vote, (ii) 
Negative- campaigns (both with respect to personality and policy) decrease voters’ 
intensions to vote.   
5.4    Experimental Design 
The experiment was conducted in November 2014 with a sample of undergraduate 
students from Cairo University.  The time period is important to the context of the 
experiment with parliamentary elections being scheduled to take place in February 2015, 
thus the preparations of election campaigns by candidates.  
Because of the tension in the country at that time, the use of political wordings, 
like parliamentary elections, was avoided. Instead a context of a student union election 
with two candidates “A” and “B” running for President of the University’s Student Union was 
used.  
To be able to examine the impact of different campaign strategies, and not just 
negative campaigning, on my dependent variable (interpersonal trust), I have created 
three different treatments for the three possible campaign strategies; negative personality, 
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negative policy, and positive. Subjects in the experiment were then randomly assigned to 
a control group, a negative campaigning condition on candidates’ personality, a negative 
campaigning condition on candidates’ policies, or a positive campaigning condition. 
They were first asked to answer a set of survey questions, and then watched two videos 
on a news report, whose content depended on the treatment assigned. After that subjects 
were asked to play the trust game- to be elaborated on below- and then were asked to 
answer another battery of survey questions. I seek to test if trust among subjects who 
faced the negative campaigning condition was lower than among subjects who did not 
face that negative condition. Below, I report on more details of the experimental design. 
All decisions in the experiment were made privately by subjects over a closed 
computer network, in separated booths by subject id number.  No individual subject’s 
choices were revealed to other subjects or recorded by name. Subjects’ payments were 
made after the experiment was completed in a private place.
5
   The experiment was 
conducted fully in Arabic and the sessions’ instructor was not currently engaged in any 
teaching at the university.  
5.4.1    Sample and Procedures 
Undergraduate students at Cairo University were recruited by both an ad fixed in the 
university’s premises and email advertisements. They were promised a monetary reward that 
depends on their play in a decision making task. Two hundred and twenty four individuals 
agreed to participate in the study.  
                                                          
5
 The exchange rate between an Egyptian pound and the U.S. dollar at this time was 1 USD = 7.15 EGP. 
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Subjects first filled out a consent form. After signing the form, participants were 
informed that they would remain anonymous during the experiment (i.e., identified by 
code numbers), would receive the instructions for each part separately, and would be paid 
at the end of the experiment in a private place. The study was programmed in Z-tree. 
Subjects were randomly assigned to either the three treatments or the control 
condition. In Part I of the experiment, they were asked to complete a questionnaire 
collecting information on demographic characteristics as well as questions that measure 
their trust both in others and in politicians. In Part II, they were then shown two videos; 
those in the negative treatments groups watched a news report on an attack ad between 
the two candidates running for president of the University’s student union, and those in 
the positive treatment group watched a news report on the positive campaign pledges of 
the two candidates. Following exposure to the treatment (or not for the control group), all 
participants were asked, in part III, if they intend to vote in the election covered by the 
videos if it was to take place tomorrow
6
. In part IV, subjects were asked to play the trust 
game.  
After the trust game, subjects were asked to complete a more comprehensive 
questionnaire including questions about trust. After finishing the survey, subjects were 
compensated in a secure place and the total earnings were on average $15. The whole 
experiment took between 45-55 minutes to complete, and was conducted in Arabic with 
the same individual reading the instructions in all sessions.  None of the participants were 
                                                          
6
 The control group was asked the same question but with a slight change in the wording “If the student 
union election is to run tomorrow, will you vote in it?” 
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students in the experimenter’s classes. All sessions were conducted in the Laboratory of 
the Faculty of Economics and Political Sciences at Cairo University.  
5.4.2    Treatments 
Two hundred and twenty four subjects completed the experiment. Subjects were 
randomly assigned to four different groups: Control Group (n=56), Negative-Personality 
Campaigning Group (n=56), Negative-Policy Campaigning Group (n=56), and Positive 
Campaigning Group (n=56). Table 5.1 below summarises my treatments. 
Table 5.1:  Summary of Treatments  
Treatment Name Video Content Sessions Groups Total Subjects 
Baseline  Boring 2 4 56 
Negative Policies Policy attack 2 4 56 
Negative Personality Personal attack 2 4 56 
Positive Positive campaign 2 4 56 
Total  8 16 224 
 
Everyone in the Negative-Personality and Negative-Policy Campaigning 
treatment group watched the negative ad before getting to play the trust game. Subjects in 
the Positive treatment watched a positive campaign ad before playing the trust game. And 
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subjects in the control group watched a news report on a neutral, non-political, boring 
topic before playing the trust game
7
. I will elaborate on the details of the trust game next. 
5.4.3    Trust Game  
Despite the fact that surveys, which directly ask subjects about their level of trust in 
others, have been the standard way to measuring trust in political science (Cook & 
Gronke, 2005), some economists and political scientists are cynical of attitudinal reports 
and advocate for behavioural measures. Hence, the trust game of Berg et al. (1995) has 
become the standard laboratory experiment in economics for measuring trust through 
measuring a senders’ willingness to trust a receiver. This is done by endowing the trustor 
a given sum of money and asking him/her to start the first move, where he/she must 
decide how much, if any, to send to a trustee. Any money sent to the trustee is then 
tripled before reaching the trustee who is then asked to make the second move, deciding 
how much money to return to the trustor
8
.  
However, with one of the standard assumptions in economics being that 
individuals are motivated by only their material self-interest, solving the above trust 
game while assuming selfish preferences and rational choice theory, results in the only 
sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) being for the trustor to send no money to the 
trustee. This is because the trustor uses backward induction and thus can infer that the 
trustee will never return any money. Consequently, any money sent by the trustor is 
commonly used to measure his trust that the trustee will return his money, and money 
                                                          
7
 For a review of the videos’ scripts, see appendix G. 
8
 Note that player A’s move is a reflection of “trust” and player B’s move is a reflection of 
“trustworthiness” or reciprocity. 
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returned by the trustee is used to measure his trustworthiness. Since then, experimental 
economists have used economic games, such as Berg et al.’s trust game, to show that 
people’s behaviour might contradict the self-interest theory but is consistent with theories 
of fairness (Fehr & Schmidt, 2004).  
I wanted to generate a similar type of behavioral measure of trust among 
individuals within my experiment. Specifically, I wanted to see subjects’ decisions in a 
trust game with real monetary stakes following the priming they were exposed to. 
Knowing that this was a one-shot game, subjects knew that they needed to decide wisely: 
Can the subject they were to play the game with be trusted? In my experimental setting, 
the first mover got endowed with the equivalent of $10 and was told that any transferred 
amount will be doubled
9
. First movers had the option of choosing a costly trusting action 
by sending money to the second mover. If the first mover transferred some money, the 
total amount available for distribution between the two players would increase but, 
initially, the second mover will reap the whole increase. Would the second mover honour 
the first mover’s trust and share the monetary increase generated by the first mover’s 
money transfer? If the first mover sends money to the trustee (second mover) who then 
shares the proceeds of the transfer, both players will end up with a higher payoff. The 
first mover is thus trapped in a dilemma: if he trusts and the second mover shares, the 
first mover increases his payoff. However, there is also the risk that the second mover 
will misuse this trust in which case the first mover is worse off than if he had not trusted 
in the first place and, the second mover will be the one who has an unfair payoff 
advantage relative to the first mover.  
                                                          
9
 The doubling plays the part of a return on investment in the game. 
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Hence, those first movers who have trust in second movers, and thus were 
encouraged to transfer money to them, must have exerted an effort to overcome their 
aversion against this risk.  This allows me to address the question of whether the negative 
personality attack in the negative campaign treatment has an impact on the trusting 
behaviour toward other subjects with whom the subject plays the trust game. 
The amount transferred to second movers in the trust game serves as my 
dependent variable. I expect that subjects exposed to the negative news report will send 
less to their partners, compared to individuals in the control group who were not exposed 
to the negative news report (Prediction1). I also expect that subjects’ intensions to vote in 
the upcoming elections will be negatively (positively) affected by exposure to the 
negative (positive) news report (Prediction2). 
5.4.4    Control Measures 
Observational studies have pointed to heterogeneity in generalised trust within a given 
population. Trust experiments have thus examined the relationship between an 
individual’s personal characteristics, like gender and ethnicity, and his/her behaviour in 
the games (Wilson & Eckel, 2011). Many studies have examined religion and trust 
(Anderson et al., 2010; Danielson & Holm; Johansson-Stenman et al., 2009). Other 
studies found experimental evidence that age is related to trust and reciprocity. Croson 
and Gneezy (2009) find that out of twenty studies on gender differences, nine studies 
show that men trust more than women.  
Consequently, my approach was, in addition to the use of random assignment as 
the principal method to control for individual specific variation, I aimed at controlling for 
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various individual differences, which I suspected might affect subjects’ behaviour in the 
trust game. Specifically, subjects were surveyed at the beginning of the experiment as to 
their age, gender, and religion.  
5.5    Experimental Results 
Before beginning the discussion of my experimental findings, it is useful to get a sense of 
the data. Table 5.2 gives a summary of subjects’ demographics. A quick look at this table 
shows that the majority of my sample was Muslim and female undergraduate students. 
Consequently, and to avoid any possible effects on a subject’s behaviour in the trust 
game, I will be controlling for both religion and gender in my analysis. 
Table 5.2: Subjects’ Demographics 
 Baseline Negative Personality Negative Policy Positive 
Number of Subjects 56 56 56 56 
Gender (Female) 62% 57% 89% 53% 
Age bracket (20-22) 85% 96% 100% 96% 
Religion (Muslim) 91% 100% 96% 91% 
 
I now begin my discussion of the results of the experiment with a comparison of 
my four treatments; Baseline, Negative-Personality, Negative-Policy, and Positive.  As 
discussed above, I measure how subjects responded to the different types of campaigning 
priming by two variables; the amount of money sent by the first mover in the trust game 
(which I take as a proxy for the level of interpersonal trust), and voters’ intensions to vote 
(which is measured by the dummy variable “Yes” that takes a value 1 (0) if a subject’s 
response is ‘yes’ (‘no’) to the question “If the student union election that was covered by 
Chapter 5 Negative Campaigning and Trust: Experimental Evidence from Post-Revolutionary Egypt                      128 
 
 
the news report to be held tomorrow, will you vote in it?”. This measure is used as a 
proxy for the level of trust in the political system).  
I first classify subjects who played the role of first movers in the trust game into 
“full-trusting”, “to-some-extent-trusting”, and “un-trusting” categories. In the aggregate, I 
find that 1% of first movers are “full-trusting” (sent L.E 70), 21% of first movers are “un-
trusting” (sent L.E 0), and 78% of first movers are “to-some-extent-trusting” (sent other 
amounts). I then test whether the proportion of first movers falling into each trust 
classification varied based on the prevailing campaigning condition. Proportions in each 
trust category, sorted by treatment, are shown in Figure 5.1. To accommodate the 
extremely small number of participants who are full trusting, I use a Fisher's exact test of 
proportions. This test reveals that (i) Negative-Personality campaigning has a significant 
effect on participants' trust tendencies (Fisher's exact test p = .033), (ii) Negative-Policy 
campaigning has a significant effect on participants' trust tendencies (Fisher's exact test p 
= .021), and (iii) Positive campaigning has no significant effect on participants' trust 
tendencies (Fisher's exact test p = .241). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 Negative Campaigning and Trust: Experimental Evidence from Post-Revolutionary Egypt                      129 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Trust Proportions (by Treatment) 
 
I now turn to examining my measure of interpersonal trust; the amount of money 
sent by first movers in the trust game. I find that the mean amount sent is L.E 17.2 in the 
Baseline treatment (sd=16.9, N=28, 95% confidence interval is (10.6, 23.8)), L.E 7 
(sd=8.9, N=28, 95% confidence interval is (3.6, 10.5)) in the Negative Personality 
treatment, L.E 11 in the Negative Policy treatment (sd=10.3, N=28, 95% confidence 
interval is (6.9, 15.0)), and L.E 16.7 in the Positive treatment (sd=10.2, N=28, 95% 
confidence interval is (12.8, 20.8)), as shown in figure 5.2. A mean-comparison test, t-
test
10
, is used and the null hypothesis of equal means in the Baseline and (i) Negative 
Personality is rejected at the 1 percent level (p=0.0034), (ii) Negative Policy is rejected at 
the 10 percent level (p=0.0518), and (iii) Positive treatment is not rejected. I also used the 
non-parametric test on equality of distributions, ranksum, and the null hypothesis of equal 
distributions between the Baseline and (i) Negative Personality treatment is rejected at 
                                                          
10
 This is independent samples t-test which compares the difference in the means from the two treatments to 
a given value (usually 0).  In other words, it tests whether the difference in the means is 0. 
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the 1 percent level (z = 2.7, p=0.0064), (ii) Negative Policy treatment is not rejected (z = 
1.4, p=0.17), and (iii) Positive treatment is not rejected (z = -0.6, p=0.53). 
Figure 5.2: Mean Amount of Money Sent by First Movers in all treatments 
 
I then analysed, continuously, the exact amounts sent by the first movers in the 
trust game using a tobit regression model. Results are in Table 5.3. Model 1 provides 
results with just three dummies for the three different treatments incorporated in the 
regression, while model 2 presents results with demographic information incorporated as 
well to control for individual differences. 
Without any demographic controls, it is clear that negative campaigning has a 
significant negative effect on interpersonal trust, when the content of the attack is on a 
personality ground. The amount sent by first movers, exposed to the negative news report 
targeting candidates’ personality, in the trust game is 13% less (p=0.005). Negative 
campaigning with respect to candidates’ personality continues to decrease money sent by 
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first movers when including the demographic measures as controls, (coefficient=-13.11; 
p=0.008). 
As for the effect on interpersonal trust of negative campaign ads targeting 
candidates’ policies, the sign of the coefficient is negative, i.e. on the right direction, but 
insignificant whether demographic characteristics were controlled for or not. Regarding 
the effect of positive campaign ads, one can see an insignificant effect. Concerning the 
other control variables, I find an insignificant effect of both gender and religion on the 
amount sent by first movers. So, despite having a strongly women and Muslim focused 
sample, there are neither gender nor religion differences.  
Table 5.3: Effect of Different Campaign Dynamics on Amount Sent by First Movers 
Sent (1) (3) 
 Negative-Personality (D)  -13.23*** 
(0.005) 
-13.11*** 
(0.008) 
Negative-Policy (D) -6.72 
(0.117) 
-6.32 
(0.141) 
Positive (D) -0.44 
(0.916) 
-0.62 
(0.884) 
Most of Time Trust Others 
(D) 
 -1.09 
(0.684) 
Gender (Female) (D)  -1.12 
(0.750) 
Religion (Muslim) (D)  -1.69 
(0.631) 
Intercept  16.19*** 
(0.000) 
18.78*** 
(0.000) 
Observations 112 112 
Pseudo R
2 
0.0181 0.0187 
Log Likelihood -381.0 -380.8 
 
The above results show that what affects the level of interpersonal trust in a 
society the most is campaign ads that have a tough negative tone on candidates’ 
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personalities due to its impact on the public mood. Negative ads that target candidates’ 
policy pledges, on the other hand, do not have a significant effect on interpersonal trust, 
as expected, but should have an impact on the level of trust in the political system 
through lower intensions to vote as I turn to examine next.  
I now turn to my second theoretical prediction; the effect of different campaign 
environments on voters’ intensions to vote. In this regard, I have used a probit regression 
analysis. The dependent variable is the dummy variable ‘Yes’ that captures a subject’s 
answer (yes or no) to the following question: “If the student union elections covered by 
the video is to be held tomorrow, will you vote in it?” Table 5.4 presents the results for 
the three different campaign environments; Negative-Personality, Negative-Policy and 
Positive.  
In model 1, I included just dummies for the three treatments; Negative-
Personality, Negative-Policy and Positive. In model 2, I have added additional regressors 
that control for subject idiosyncratic characteristics such as gender, religion…etc., and 
questionnaire answers on one’s trust of others. 
Indeed probit regression supports my prediction that the campaign environment 
has an impact on voters’ intensions to vote: Without any demographic or questionnaire 
controls, (i) the estimated effect of a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the 
negative-personality treatment is in place decreases the likelihood of a subject voting in 
an upcoming election by 40% (robust standard error = 0.089, p-value=0.000), (ii) the 
estimated effect of a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the negative-policy 
treatment is in place decreases the likelihood of a subject voting in an upcoming election 
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by 31% (robust standard error = 0.093, p-value=0.001), and (iii) the estimated effect of a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the positive treatment is in place increases 
the likelihood of a subject voting in an upcoming election by 18% (robust standard error 
= 0.092, p-value=0.079).  
When including both demographic measures and questionnaire answers as 
controls, I find that Negative campaigning with respect to candidates’ personality 
continues to decrease voters’ intensions to vote (-40 percent, p=0.000), Negative 
campaigning with respect to candidates’ policy also continues to decrease voters’ 
intensions to vote (-32.9 percent, p=0.001), and Positive campaigning continues to 
increase voters’ intensions to vote (17.9 percent, p=0.075).  
Table 5.4: Effect of Different Campaign Dynamics on Voters’ Intentions to Vote 
Dyes (1) (2) 
Negative-Personality (D)   -0.397*** 
(0.000) 
-0.401*** 
(0.000)  
Negative-Policy (D) -0.314*** 
(0.001) 
-0.329*** 
(0.001) 
Positive (D) 0.176* 
(0.079) 
0.179* 
(0.075) 
Most of Time Trust Others (D)  0.057 
(0.447) 
Gender (Female) (D)  0.054 
(0.480) 
Religion (Muslim) (D)  0.003 
(0.987) 
Observations 224 224 
Pseudo R
2 
0.156 0.159 
Log Likelihood -125.13 -124.59 
 
The above experimental evidence points to the importance of the campaign 
environment in which voters live in on the level of interpersonal trust in the society. 
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Specifically, a campaign environment that is dominated by negative ads targeting 
candidates’ personal traits decreases significantly the level of interpersonal trust among 
citizens. My findings also show the importance of all campaign strategies (positive 
strategies stressing candidates’ campaign pledges, negative strategies that attack the 
personality of the opponent, or negative strategies that attack the policies of the 
opponent) on voters’ intensions to vote.   
 
5.6   Concluding Remarks 
Using laboratory experiments, I find evidence that priming different campaign 
environments (Positive campaign ads targeting campaign pledges of candidates, Negative 
campaign ads attacking the personality of the opponent, or negative campaign ads 
attacking the policies of the opponent) has an effect on people’s judgment of the 
trustworthiness of anonymous strangers and thus on trusting decisions. Specifically, I 
found a significant reduction in the amount of money sent by first movers in the trust 
game (-13 percent, p=0.008) for those subjects who were exposed to a news coverage of 
a hypothetical election between candidates ‘A’ and ‘B’ whose content was a negative 
attack by each of the two candidates on the personality of the other.  
In addition to finding a significant effect on the level of interpersonal trust, I also 
find significant effects on citizens’ intensions to vote in upcoming elections. Specifically, 
I find that Positive campaigning, where the campaign ads are stressing the campaign 
pledges of each candidate, increases voters’ intensions to vote by 18 percent (p=0.075), 
Negative campaigning with respect to personality, where the contents of the campaign 
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ads are mainly attacks on the personality of each candidate’s opponent, decreases voters’ 
intensions to vote by 40 percent (p=0.000), and Negative campaigning with respect to 
policies, where the contents of the campaign ads are mainly attacks on the policies of 
each candidate’s opponent, decreases voters’ intensions to vote by 33 percent (p=0.001).  
If negative campaigning can affect negatively the level of interpersonal trust, then 
public policy initiatives that aim at enhancing social capital and the level of trust among 
citizens should address this issue. For instance, actions by the government can address 
the tone of campaign ads, encourage substantive dialogue between candidates, etc.  
It should be noted however that the relationship between different campaign 
strategies and the level of interpersonal trust has been examined by this experiment in just 
one culture; namely the Arab culture following the Arab Spring Uprisings. There is thus 
more scope for future research that examines the same relationship in different cultures, 
with this framework serving as a platform for cross-cultural comparisons. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Annexes 
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Appendix A 
Chapter 2:  Equilibrium Analysis 
PROOF of the Main Result: 
Below, we provide equilibrium analysis separately for the two games. Part 1 and 2 of the 
Main result follow from part 1 and 2, respectively of Propositions 1 and 2 below. Part 3 
of the main result is a straightforward implication of statements (*) and (A.1).  
Q.E.D. 
 
 
Let w and x denote the earned and the claimed income by an individual. Let the penalty 
function 𝑓(. ) defined on underreported income, (𝑤 − 𝑥 ∈ [0, 𝑤]), be an increasing and 
convex function and 𝑓(0) = 0, 𝑓′(0) = 0.  Let the valuation of the C-good be identical 
for citizens and the official whereas the valuation of the G-good be asymmetric: it is 
valued more than the C-good by the official but less by the citizens. This is captured by 
the following order of the marginal per capita return, 𝛽 of the public goods G and C 
across players,  
(*)                                                  min{1, 𝛽𝑜
𝐺} > 𝛽𝑜
𝐶 = 𝛽𝑐
𝐶 > 𝛽𝑐
𝐺 ≥ 1 (𝑛 − 1)⁄  
where 𝑛  is the number of players, player type in subscripts and public good type in 
superscripts. The lower bound 1/(n-1) is a sufficient condition for funding of each public 
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good to be socially efficient whereas the upper bound min{1, 𝛽𝑜
𝐺} provides incentives for 
free riding. As we are mainly interested in cases for which the corruption is costly to the 
citizens as a population we will assume that n is large enough to satisfy, 
(**)                                                     𝑛 > (1 − 𝛽𝑐
𝐶)/(𝛽𝑐
𝐶 − 𝛽𝑐
𝐺) 
 
We use R to denote the total number of rounds the game is played, i.e., the full term of 
the official in the office. Assume selfish preferences and risk-neutrality. 
Proposition 1 (No-Recall Game) 
1. The outcomes of the SPE are: under provision of the G-good, the only public 
good being funded. 
2. There exist Nash equilibria that are Pareto improvement of the SPE. The 
outcomes of one such equilibria are: C-good being funded during the first r* 
rounds and G-good being funded during the remaining rounds, R-r*, for some r*. 
The number of rounds, r* during which the C-good is funded increases with the 
number of citizens using trigger strategies to punish corruption. 
PROOF.  First note that if public good j (j from (G, C)) is funded then it is optimal for player i 
to report income, xi from (0, w) given by 
  
𝑥𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖
∗, 𝑖𝑓 𝛽𝑖
𝑗 < 1 
      = 𝑤, 𝑖𝑓 𝛽𝑖
𝑗 ≥ 1 
                                                                                                                         (A.1) 
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where  
 
solves 𝑓′(𝑤 − 𝑥𝑖
∗) = 𝜏(1 − 𝛽𝑖
𝑗)(1 𝑝𝑎⁄ − 1) , and it is 0 if at x=w the left hand side of 
the last equation is smaller than the right hand side expression, i.e., 𝑓′(𝑤) < 𝜏(1 − 𝛽𝑖
𝑗)(1 𝑝𝑎⁄ −
1). 
Note also that (A.1) and statement (*) imply that 𝑓′(𝑤 − 𝑥𝑐
∗) ≥ 𝑓′(𝑤 − 𝑥𝑜
∗) and 
by convexity of the penalty function f(.) we get 
  
𝑥𝑐
∗ ≤ 𝑥𝑜
∗ 
                                                             (A.2) 
for a public good j.  
Next, let T denote the total tax revenue. At the end of the stage game, it follows 
from statement (*) that funding the G-good is optimal for the official as :
 
 
𝜋𝑜(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥−𝑖, 1) − 𝜋𝑜(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥−𝑖, 0) = (𝛽𝑜
𝐺 − 𝛽𝑜
𝐶)𝑇 ≥ 0 
Given that the G-good is funded, player i declares income, x
*
 that maximizes his expected 
payoff 
max
𝑥∈[0,𝑤]
𝐸(𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥−𝑖, 1)) = 𝑤 − (1 − 𝑝𝑎)𝜏𝑥(1 − 𝛽𝑖
𝐺) − 𝑝𝑎[𝑓(𝑤 − 𝑥) + 𝜏𝑤(1 − 𝛽𝑖
𝐺)] + 𝛽𝑖
𝐺𝑇−𝑖 
where the second and the third terms correspond to i’s payoff in two possible states of 
audition. As the penalty function, f(.) is convex and increasing, the optimal claimed 
income, x
*
 is determined by f.o.c., hence the specifications on the optimal xi as stated 
above follow. 
 
 
x
i
*
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Part 1. The SPE Nash equilibrium of the stage game is a SPE of the R-round game. Thus, 
G-good is funded in every round. Under provision of the G-good in the SPE follows from 
the observation that under full compliance, an amount of 𝑇𝑒 = 𝜏𝑛𝑤 goes to fund the G-
good which is a Pareto improvement. Indeed, the difference between T
e 
and the expected 
total tax revenue in the SPE is  
𝑇𝑒 − 𝑇∗ = 𝜏𝑛𝑤 − 𝜏 ∑ [(1 − 𝑝𝑎)𝑥𝑗
∗𝐺 + 𝑝𝑎𝑤] = (1 − 𝑝𝑎)𝜏 ∑ (𝑤 − 𝑥𝑗
∗𝐺)𝑗=1..𝑛𝑗=1..𝑛        
(A.3) 
and the payoff difference for any player i is positive, 
𝜋𝑖(𝐺|𝑇
𝑒) − 𝜋𝑖(𝐺|𝑇
∗) = 𝛽𝑖
𝐺(𝑇𝑒 − 𝑇∗) + 𝑝𝑎𝑓(𝑤 − 𝑥𝑖
∗𝐺) − (1 − 𝑝𝑎)𝜏(𝑤 − 𝑥𝑖
∗𝐺)
= 𝛽𝑖
𝐺(1 − 𝑝𝑎)𝜏 ∑ (𝑤 − 𝑥𝑗
∗𝐺) + 𝑝𝑎𝑓(𝑤 − 𝑥𝑖
∗𝐺) − (1 − 𝑝𝑎)𝜏(𝑤 − 𝑥𝑖
∗𝐺)
𝑗=1..𝑛
≥ (1 − 𝑝𝑎)𝜏 (
1
𝑛 − 1
∑ (𝑤 − 𝑥𝑗
∗𝐺)
𝑗=1..𝑛
− (𝑤 − 𝑥𝑖
∗𝐺)) + 𝑝𝑎𝑓(𝑤 − 𝑥𝑖
∗𝐺) 
≥
(1 − 𝑝𝑎)𝜏
𝑛 − 1
(𝑤 − 𝑥−𝑖
∗𝐺) + 𝑝𝑎𝑓(𝑤 − 𝑥𝑖
∗𝐺) 
where the second equality follows from  (A.3), the first weak inequality is implied by 
statement (*) whereas the second inequality follows from (A.2), the symmetry of 
citizen’s optimal choices and 𝑥𝑖
∗ ≤ 𝑤.  
Part 2.  Consider the following profile of strategies: the official funds the C-good (p
G
=0) 
in the first r* rounds and the G-good in the remaining R-r* rounds. If no defection occurs 
then each player i claims 𝑤 in rounds 1 to r* and 𝑥𝑖
𝐺  in the remaining R-r* rounds. Any 
Appendix A.                                                                                                                                                                    5 
 
 
defection at any round before r*+1 triggers funding of the G-good as of that round and 
claims of 0 income as of the following round until the end of the game. No deviation can 
be profitable after round r* as all players are playing Nash. The most tempting deviating 
strategy for the official is to defect by funding the G-good (p
G
=1) and declaring his G-
optimal level of income instead of w as of round r* (instead of r*+1): The official’s round 
payoff increases by 
∆𝜋𝑜
𝑁𝑅 = 𝜋𝑜(𝑥𝑜
𝐺 , 𝑤, 1) − 𝜋𝑜(𝑤, 𝑤, 0)
= {
(𝛽𝑜
𝐺 − 𝛽𝑜
𝐶)𝑇𝑤 + 𝜏(1 − 𝑝𝑎)(1 − 𝛽𝑜
𝐺)(𝑤 − 𝑥𝑜
𝐺) − 𝑝𝑎𝑓(𝑤 − 𝑥𝑜
𝐺),    𝑖𝑓 𝛽𝑜
𝐺 < 1,
 (𝛽𝑜
𝐺 − 𝛽𝑜
𝐶)𝑛𝜏𝑤,                                                                                          𝑖𝑓  𝛽𝑜
𝐺 ≥ 1.
} 
  
The total payoff in the remaining R-r* rounds decreases by 
∆𝜋𝑜
𝑅−𝑟∗ = (𝑅 − 𝑟∗)[𝜋𝑜(𝑥𝑜
𝐺 , 𝑥𝑐
𝐺 , 1) − 𝜋𝑜(𝑥𝑜
𝐺 , 0,1)] 
= (𝑅 − 𝑟∗)𝛽𝑜
𝐺(1 − 𝑝𝑎)𝜏(𝑛 − 1)𝑥𝑐
𝐺  
Thus the official is better off not deviating at r*, i.e. ∆𝜋𝑜
𝑅−𝑟∗ > ∆𝜋𝑜
𝑁𝑅  if R-r* is the 
smallest integer larger than the ratio of round r* gains and average future round losses; let 
𝛿𝑁𝑅  denote this ratio, 
𝛿𝑁𝑅 =
∆𝜋𝑜
𝑁𝑅
𝛽𝑜
𝐺(1 − 𝑝𝑎)𝜏(𝑛 − 1)𝑥𝑐
𝐺  
If m (instead of n-1) citizens use the punishing strategy (of claiming income 0 after a 
defection) then ∆𝜋𝑜
𝑅−𝑟∗ = (𝑅 − 𝑟∗)𝛽𝑜
𝐺(1 − 𝑝𝑎)𝜏𝑚𝑥𝑐
𝐺  whereas ∆𝜋𝑜
𝑁𝑅 is not affected. 
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Hence, the number of rounds of the C-good being funded (no corruption), r*, increases 
with the number of citizens engaging in retaliation.  
About citizens, it can be verified that a citizen’s defection at round r* by claiming 
some other amount 𝑥 instead of w changes the round payoff by   
∆𝜋𝑐
𝑁𝑅 = 𝜋𝑐(𝑤, 𝑤, 0) − [𝑝𝑎𝜋𝑐(𝑥, 𝑤, 1) + (1 − 𝑝𝑎)𝜋𝑐0] 
= 𝑝𝑎𝑓(𝑤 − 𝑥) + 𝑝𝑎(𝛽𝑐
𝐶 − 𝛽𝑐
𝐺)𝑛𝑤𝜏+(1 − 𝑝𝑎)(𝛽𝑐
𝐶 − 1)(𝑤 − 𝑥)𝜏 
>𝑝𝑎𝑤𝜏[(𝛽𝑐
𝐶 − 𝛽𝑐
𝐺)𝑛-(
1
𝑝𝑎
− 1)(1 − 𝛽𝑐
𝐶) (1 −
𝑥
𝑤
)]  
>𝑝𝑎𝑤𝜏[(𝛽𝑐
𝐶 − 𝛽𝑐
𝐺)𝑛 − (1 − 𝛽𝑐
𝐶)] 
where the first inequality follows from the penalty function being positive whereas the 
second one follows form  (1 − 𝑝𝑎)(1 − 𝑥𝑐
𝐺 𝑤)⁄ <1.  Hence, for n large enough (**) one 
has ∆𝜋𝑐
𝑁𝑅 > 0 , so the citizen’s round payoff decreases if he does not claim w. In addition 
the remaining rounds payoffs cannot increase either as with probability pa defection is 
detected and claims of all players (but our citizen’s claim) become 0 in response to 
defection, i.e., the change in future payoffs is 
∆𝜋𝑐
𝑅−𝑟∗ = −(𝑅 − 𝑟∗)𝑝𝑎𝛽𝑐
𝐺(1 − 𝑝𝑎)𝜏((𝑛 − 2)𝑥𝑐
𝐺 + 𝑥𝑜
𝐺) < 0.  
Q.E.D. 
 
 
Proposition 2: Recall Game.  
1. The outcomes of the SPE are: under provision of the G-good, the only public 
good being funded and smaller payoff inequality than in the NoR game. 
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2. There exist Nash equilibria that are Pareto improvement of the SPE. The 
outcomes of such equilibria are of the following two types: 
a. Official is always recalled: C-good is funded during the first ra* rounds 
and G-good is funded during the remaining rounds, R-ra*, for some ra* 
not larger than r*. 
b. Official is not recalled if he funds the C-good: C-good is funded during 
the first rb* rounds and G-good is funded during the remaining rounds, R-
rb*, for some rb* larger than both ra* and r*. 
 
PROOF. Note that adding  “always recall the official” to the profile of strategies of the 
NR-game SPE strategies remains SPE which concludes the proof of part 1. As the 
official is changing across rounds, players are taking rounds in enjoying the high payoff 
from the G-good, hence the payoff inequality is smaller. 
About part 2a, consider the following extended profile of strategies reported in part 2 of 
Proposition 1: the official funds the C-good in the first ra* rounds and the G-good in the 
remaining R-ra* rounds. If no defection occurs then each player i claims 𝑤 and votes 
against a recall in rounds 1 to ra* whereas in the remaining R-ra* rounds the declared 
income is 𝑥𝑖
𝐺  and the vote is in favor of a recall. Any defection at any round before ra*+1 
triggers claiming earned income is 0, funding of the G-good and voting in favor of a 
recall until the end of the game. No deviation pays off after ra* as all players are playing 
Nash. As in the proof of part 2 of the NR game, a citizen’s deviation at round ra* reduces 
the round payoff as well as future payoffs. Suppose that the official defects by funding 
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the G-good and declaring 𝑥𝑖
𝐺  as of round ra* (instead of ra*+1). The official’s round gain 
is the same as in the NR game,  
∆𝜋𝑜
𝑅 = 𝜋𝑜(𝑥𝑜
𝐺 , 𝑤, 1) − 𝜋𝑜(𝑤, 𝑤, 0) = ∆𝜋𝑜
𝑁𝑅 
Letting 𝛾 denote the probability of serving as an official in the remaining rounds, the total 
payoff in the remaining R-ra* rounds decreases by  
∆𝜋𝑜
𝑅−𝑟𝑎∗ = (𝑅 − 𝑟𝑎∗)[𝛾(𝜋𝑜(𝑥𝑜
𝐺 , 𝑥𝑐
𝐺 , 1) − 𝜋𝑜(𝑥𝑜
𝐺 , 0,1)) + (1 − 𝛾)(𝜋𝑐(𝑥𝑐
𝐺 , 𝑥𝑜
𝐺 , 1) − 𝜋𝑐1] 
The expression within the square brackets is smaller than the corresponding one in NR 
game if when the G-good is funded, others claiming 0 instead of their G-optimal level of 
income results in a citizen’s loss smaller than the official’s loss; formally is  
𝜋𝑐(𝑥𝑐
𝐺 , 𝑥𝑜
𝐺 , 1) − 𝜋𝑐(𝑥𝑐
𝐺 , 0,1) < 𝜋𝑜(𝑥𝑜
𝐺 , 𝑥𝑐
𝐺 , 1) − 𝜋𝑜(𝑥𝑜
𝐺 , 0,1) 
which is equivalent with 
𝛽𝑐
𝐺((𝑛 − 2)𝑥𝑐
𝐺 + 𝑥𝑜
𝐺) < 𝛽𝑜
𝐺(𝑛 − 1)𝑥𝑐
𝐺  
The last inequality for n big enough as the following inequality holds
1
 
𝑛 − 2
𝑛 − 1
+
𝑥𝑜
𝐺
(𝑛 − 1)𝑥𝑐
𝐺 <
𝛽𝑜
𝐺
𝛽𝑐
𝐺 
Hence 𝛿𝑁𝑅 > 𝛿𝑅𝑎 from which it follows that ra* cannot be larger than r*. Therefore, just 
as in the case of SPE, the recall option cannot hinder corruption in this equilibrium either.  
                                                          
1
 Recall that optimal claims do not depend on n, so the left hand side converges to 1 as n goes to infinity 
whereas the right hand side is strictly larger than 1 as the G-good is more valuable to the official than the 
citizen. 
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Part 2b. Consider the profile of strategies as in part 2a with only one difference: in the 
first rb* rounds “vote in favor of recall only if the official funds the G-good”, in rounds 
rb*+1 to R defection “vote against recall”. No citizen is better off by deviating in rounds 
earlier than rb*. If a citizen deviates and “votes in favor of a recall” after round rb* then 
his vote has no affect as the official leaves the office only if the majority (or the 
supermajority) votes for it. On the other hand, official’s defection increases the round 
payoff by the same amount as in the NR game. That triggers claims of 0 income, the 
official is recalled and remains out of the office until the end of the game. The ratio 
between the round gain and the average future rounds loss is smaller than in the NR game 
as 
𝛿𝑅𝑏 =
𝜋𝑜(𝑥𝑜
𝐺 , 𝑤, 1) − 𝜋𝑜(𝑤, 𝑤, 0)
𝜋𝑜(𝑥𝑜
𝐺 , 𝑥𝑐
𝐺 , 1) − 𝜋𝑐(𝑥𝑐
𝐺 , 0,1)
<
𝜋𝑜(𝑥𝑜
𝐺 , 𝑤, 1) − 𝜋𝑜(𝑤, 𝑤, 0)
𝜋𝑜(𝑥𝑜
𝐺 , 𝑥𝑐
𝐺 , 1) − 𝜋𝑜(𝑥𝑜
𝐺 , 0,1)
= 𝛿𝑁𝑅 
where the inequality follows from 𝜋𝑐(𝑥𝑐
𝐺 , 0,1) < 𝜋𝑜(𝑥𝑜
𝐺 , 0,1) . Thus, rb* cannot be 
smaller than r*. 
Q.E.D.  
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 Appendix B 
Chapter 2&3:  Subject Instructions for Recall Treatment  
(in English) 
Welcome and thank you for participating in today’s experiment. 
 
I. Introduction 
This is an experiment in the economics of group decision making. Your earnings will be 
determined by your own decisions and the decisions of others as described in the following 
instructions. SO, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU READ THESE INTRUCTIONS 
CAREFULLY. 
This experiment is structured so that only you know your earnings. All of the money that you 
earn will be paid to you privately in cash immediately at the end of today’s experiment. Various 
research agencies have provided the funds for the conduct of this research study. 
If you have any questions, RAISE YOUR HAND and an experimenter will come up to 
you to answer questions in private. Please feel free to ask as many questions as 
you like. 
Time  
This experiment will last around two hours. 
 
Scenario 
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In this experiment, you will be a member of a group of 5 individuals. You will be randomly 
assigned to a group and will remain in the same group for the entire experimental session.  
Every group has an official who is selected randomly from among your group members 
by the computer at the beginning (before period 1) and in the middle (before period 8) of the 
experiment in the absence of a recall “election”. Thus, a selected official remains the official of 
the group for seven periods unless the majority of members vote for a recall election. In case of a 
recall election, another official is selected randomly from among the eligible members of the 
group. A member of the group is eligible if he/she has not been a subject of a recall election 
during the last three elections. There are 14 decision periods in this experiment.  
Anonymity 
You will not know the rest of your group members, neither will they know you. 
 
II. Monetary payoff 
You earn money in Experimental Pounds (EP) in each decision period. This amount will be 
displayed on your computer screen at the completion of the decision period. At the end of today’s 
experiment, your total accumulated earnings in experimental pounds divided by the number of 
periods will be converted into Egyptian pounds at the below mentioned conversion rate. The 
more experimental pounds you earn, the more Egyptian pounds you will be paid.  
1 Experimental Pound = 10 Egyptian Pounds 
The following section explains how to earn money in each decision period. 
 
III. Task and decision making process 
In this experiment, you will go through the below mentioned sequence of events in each 
of 14 decision periods.  
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Event I 
All subjects are given a simple task to find the spelling mistakes in a piece of text on the 
computer. You will be given 2 minutes to conduct the task. You can make corrections to the text 
by using your mouse to place your cursor in the correct area and make the correction. Use the 
mouse to move you to other parts of the text. You will earn 2 Experimental Pounds for each 
mistake that you correct accurately. There are a total of 10 errors. This income will be displayed 
on your screen at the completion of the task. 
Event II 
Your earned income is what you earn in Event I. You will make the choice of how much of this 
earned income to report using the sliding scale on your screen. There is an income tax at 25% that 
you need to pay on the income you report. This tax rate is the same for all individuals belonging 
to the same group. As you move the slide to determine how much income you will report, you 
can see the consequences of your choice in terms of your net income if you are audited or not. 
You can choose to report none of it, part of it or all of it. Consequently your reported tax 
liability is equal to: 25%* Reported Income. 
Event III 
Once you choose the level of income you will report, a random audit will be performed. One 
subject out of five in the group will be chosen for audit so the likelihood of a subject being 
audited is 20%. If you are chosen for the random audit, your earned income will be disclosed to 
the official. If the audited individual’s reported income in Event II is less than the earned income 
in Event I, then the individual pays, in addition to the tax of 25% of the earned income, a tax 
penalty that increases in the difference between the earned income and reported income as in the 
table that was handed out to you. 
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You pay a tax penalty only if you are audited and if your reported income is less than the 
earned income. 
Event IV 
Income taxes in this experiment will go into your group fund; they will be used to fund a public 
good that is valuable (in terms of experimental pounds) to you and your group members. Each 
experimental pound (EP) that goes in the public fund is tripled. Therefore, 
Public fund = 3 * Income taxes collected from all the members in your group 
(Note: Tax penalty is not added to the public fund) 
There are two types of public goods available in this experiment, Type C and Type G. 
The choice of which good is made available to you and your group is made by the official who is 
a member of your group.  
The benefits of Type C good are shared equally among all 5 members of the group, while 
the benefits of Type G good accrue 50% to the official with the remainder split among the other 
four group members. 
Earnings if public project of Type C is funded 
Public good earnings of:  
- the official = Public fund / 5 
- of each other member = Public fund / 5 
Earnings if public project of Type G is funded 
Public good earnings of:  
- the official = Public fund / 2 
- of each other member = Public fund / 8 
 
For example, if  
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Income taxes collected by the government in your group = 20 EP  
Public fund = 3*20 = 60 EP 
Earnings from public good of Type C:  
When this good is chosen, then all the group members earn equal amount and the money in public 
fund is equally divided between all the group members.  
Public good earnings = 60 /5 = 12 EP 
Earnings from public good of Type G: 
When this good is chosen, then the official will earn more than the rest of the group members: 
Half of the total amount of money in public fund is given to the official; the remaining half of the 
public fund is equally divided among all four remaining group members.  
Public project earning of the official = 60/2 = 30 EP 
Public project earnings of each other group members = 60/8 = 7.5 EP 
Event V 
Once the public good decision is made, you will see a screen that asks whether you would like a 
recall election or not. If the majority of the group chooses yes, then the computer will choose a 
new official. 
The following diagram illustrates the sequence of events in every period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Earn EP 2 
for each 
correction 
Report 
earned 
Income 
Get 
audited 
with  
pr. 0.2 
Tax 
Revenue 
is tripled 
and  
funds 
public 
good  
     C or G  
Period 
Earnings  
Income 
 – Tax  
 – Penalty  
+ Public 
Good 
Vote for 
recall 
election 
If majority 
vote YES 
then a 
new 
official 
chosen by 
computer 
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Section IV below shows your total earnings or payoff in each decision period resulting from 
Events I to IV explained above. 
IV. Earnings in each decision period 
Scenario I: If you are not audited 
 Total earnings = Earned Income – tax liability + public good earnings  
(Note: As explained above, public good earnings depend on the type of public good provided to 
the group by the official)  
Scenario II: If you are audited 
Total earnings = Earned Income – tax liability – tax penalty + public good earnings  
(Note: Tax penalty is equal to zero if your reported income is equal to your earned income) 
 
Final earnings at the end of the experiment = (Total earnings in 14 rounds/14)*10 
 
V. Questionnaire and payment 
At the end of today’s experiment, you will complete a brief on-line questionnaire, receive 
payment of your earnings, and then the experiment is over. Information about your decisions will 
be kept without identifying information so no one can link you as an individual to the decisions 
that you make. 
  
16 
 
 
Appendix C 
Chapter 2&3:  Penalty Structure 
 
Unreported 
Income 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Tax Penalty 
if Audited 
0.10 
0.2
8 
0.5
2 
0.8
0 
1.1
2 
1.4
7 
1.8
5 
2.2
6 
2.7
0 
3.1
6 
3.6
5 
4.1
6 
4.6
9 
5.2
4 
5.8
1 
6.4
0 
7.0
1 
7.6
4 
8.2
8 
8.9
4 
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Appendix D 
Chapter 2&3:  Post-Experiment Questionnaire 
Below are several questions relating to your demographic information, your views 
concerning some economic and political issues, and experience with tax reporting. These 
questions may be of a sensitive nature. Although your name will not be matched with 
your responses in any way and all information provided will be kept strictly confidential, 
you may be uncomfortable or unable to answer all questions. Please indicate if you prefer 
not to answer a particular question or if you would like to leave the study at any time. If 
you choose to answer the questions, please answer them honestly and to the best of your 
ability. 
 
1. In what year were you born? 
 
Year:__________ 
 
2. Are you? 
Male 
Female 
 
3. What is your current grade point 
average? 
________ 
 
 
4. What is your field of study? 
 
________________ 
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5. What is your religious affiliation? 
Muslim 
Copt 
Catholic 
Protestant 
Other 
No Religion 
Prefer Not to Answer 
 
5. Are you currently working? 
Yes, I have a full-time job 
Yes, I have a part-time job 
Yes, I am self-employed 
No, I am still studying 
No 
Prefer Not to Answer 
 
6. Have you ever had a paid job? 
□ Yes 
□ No 
□ Do not know 
□ Prefer not to answer 
 
 
7. What is your year in university now? 
Freshman 
Sophomore 
Junior 
Senior 
Graduate Student 
I am not currently enrolled in university 
Prefer Not to Answer 
 
 
8. What is your current marital status? 
Single 
Engaged 
Married 
Separated 
Divorced 
Widowed 
Prefer Not to Answer 
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9. I seek opportunities for doing things that I never did before 
□ Yes 
□ No 
□ Don’t know 
□ Prefer not to answer 
 
10. I don’t worry about the consequences of what I do. 
□ Yes 
□ No 
□ Don’t know 
□ Prefer not to answer 
 
11. I never get lucky breaks. 
□ Yes 
□ No 
□ Don’t know 
□ Prefer not to answer 
 
12. I frequently get jittery and worry about things. 
□ Yes 
□ No 
□ Don’t know 
□ Prefer not to answer 
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13. I proceed with care in most endeavors. 
□ Yes 
□ No 
□ Don’t know 
□ Prefer not to answer 
 
14. I tend to do dangerous things without adequate precautions. 
□ Yes 
□ No 
□ Don’t know 
□ Prefer not to answer 
 
15. While at university, did you take part in social activities? 
□ Yes 
□ No 
□ Don’t know 
□ Prefer not to answer 
 
16. If yes in answer 15, in which social activities did you take part? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
17. Do you have friends? 
□ Yes 
□ No 
□ Don’t know 
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□ Prefer not to answer 
 
18. Do you share your secrets with some of them? 
□ Yes 
□ No 
□ Don’t know 
□ Prefer not to answer 
 
19. Would you say that most people can be trusted? 
□ Yes 
□ No 
□ Don’t know 
□ Prefer not to answer 
 
20. Do you think democracy, with multiple political parties and free elections, is the best 
system for governing Egypt?  
□ Agree 
□ Disagree 
□ Don’t know 
□ Prefer not to answer 
 
21. Do you think the following institutions are trustworthy? 
 Agree Disagree Don’t know Prefer not to 
answer 
 Judiciary     
 Parliament     
Government     
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Religious 
leaders 
    
State media     
Private media     
 
 
22. Thinking now of the country as a whole, do you think compared with five years ago, 
standards of living have? 
□ Fallen a great deal 
□ Fallen a little 
□ Stayed the same 
□ Risen a little 
□ Risen a lot 
□ Don’t know 
□ Prefer not to answer 
 
23. Here is a list of existing problems in Egypt today. Tick the biggest problem and the 
second biggest problem: 
 a. Biggest problem b. Second biggest problem 
Poor public goods and services   
Unemployment   
Poverty   
Corruption   
Security/crime   
Protests   
Wages and salaries   
 
 
24. What do you think about the following statement? 
 Agree Disagree Don’t know Prefer not to 
answer 
Free elections are the means to     
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solving the above mentioned 
problems. 
 
 
25. Are you generally satisfied with the quality of public goods and services provided by the 
government? 
□ Yes 
□ No 
□ Don’t know 
□ Prefer not to answer 
  
26. What do you think about the following statements? 
 Agree Disagree Don’t know Prefer not 
to answer 
It is okay not to declare everything 
one earns to the tax authorities 
    
Most people try to avoid paying 
their fair share of tax 
    
 
  
27. Have you participated in an 
economics experiment previously? 
□ Yes 
□ No 
□ Don’t know 
□ Prefer not to answer 
 
 
28. Have you filed tax return before? 
□ Yes 
□ No 
□ Don’t know 
□ Prefer not to answer 
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Appendix E 
Chapter 4:  Information Treatment 
Subject Instructions 
Introduction:   
Welcome to the experiment. During the following experiment, we require your complete 
attention, and ask that you follow the instructions carefully. Please turn off your cell phones. 
Please raise your hands if you have any questions. The experimenter will come to you privately 
and answer your questions. 
As you entered the experimental laboratory you were given an Experimental ID 
number.  Please note that your Experimental ID number and the seating chart are not 
linked to your actual identity. In other words, the experimenter cannot link any of your 
choices in this experiment to your identity.  
This experiment will take place in five Parts.  In Part 1 you will participate in a 
simple survey that will take just a few minutes.  For your participation in the survey, you 
will be paid ‘10’ Egyptian pounds. 
In Part 2 you will be asked to make a simple choice involving taxi routes that we 
will explain to you later.     
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In Part 3, you will complete a series of tasks via the computer.  For each 
successfully completed task, you will receive a payment of L.E 4.  The tasks involve a 
series of simple math problems.   In the math problems you will be asked to add, subtract, 
multiply, or divide some numbers.  For example, you may be asked to solve the following 
simple math problem:  31 + 15 = ? .  You will be given five minutes to answer 12 math 
questions.  The more correct answers you complete, the more money you will receive.  
So if you complete 10 correct questions, you will receive 40 Egyptian pounds. Note that 
the use of calculators is not allowed in this room. You can just use the pen and paper 
provided on your table. 
In Part 4, you will be given another set of 12 math questions which are similar in 
difficulty to the ones in Part 3, and you will also be given five minutes to answer these 
math questions.  Again, you will be paid based on the number of correctly answered 
questions.  
In part 5, you will answer a survey of just one question. We will now begin Part 1 
of the experiment, the survey.  
  
Part 1: The Survey 
Suppose the following activities are the activities of three different student societies at the faculty: 
 
Society Name Activities 
Society X - Hosting a popular cabinet minister to present the achievements of his 
ministry.  
- Demanding the toughening of sentences for those students who trigger 
riots inside campus. 
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- Rejecting the attempts made by some students to disrespect university 
professors. 
Society Y - Organising a singing party every term where a famous singer is invited. 
- Organising a discussion session with a novelist whose latest novel 
received reservations by the censorship authority, to present his point of 
view.  
- Organising the annual ‘prom’ party in a famous hotel where students 
from all years are allowed.   
Society Z - Forming groups to learn the good recitation of Quran. 
- Producing a wall journal that discusses in each edition the interpretation 
of some of Prophet Mohamed’s lessons (hadith). 
- Hosting a sheikh to talk about certain topics. 
 
Q1: Suppose you were asked to join one of the above mentioned student societies, which one will 
you choose based on these activities? 
 Society X 
 Society Y 
 Society Z 
Q2: To what extent do you feel close to the society you chose? 
 Very close 
 Close 
 Not very close 
 
Part 2:   
We will now begin Part 2, the taxi choice.  Imagine that there are six possible routes that a taxi 
could take from your home to Cairo airport.  You have 15 Egyptian pounds to spend on your taxi 
ride and any extra money that you do not spend you will get to keep.  Each route could hit high or 
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low traffic.  The taxi fare depends on whether you face high or low traffic.  The table below 
shows the different taxi routes and taxi fare associated with each traffic level: 
Routes Traffic Taxi Fare 
1 Low 5.6 
 High 5.6 
2 Low  4.8 
 High 7.2 
3 Low 4 
 High 8.8 
4 Low 3.2 
 High 10.4 
5 Low 2.4 
 High 12 
6 Low 0.4 
 High 14 
 
Please notice the six pieces of paper on the white board in front of the room.  Behind 
these pieces of paper is written whether the traffic will be high of low for each of the routes.  
After you choose a taxi route, then we will reveal what is written behind the pieces of paper and 
you will learn what you will earn.  You will then find that your L.E 15 are deducted by the cost of 
the taxi route you have chosen given the traffic conditions and you will get to keep all of the 
money left over. So suppose you choose taxi route 4 and the traffic turns out to be high.  You will 
earn 15 – 10.4 = 4.6 Egyptian pounds.    
Just to be sure you understand how this part of the experiment works, please answer the 
following question:  Suppose you choose taxi route 3 and the traffic turns out to be low.  How 
much will you earn? ____________ 
 [If they answer the question incorrectly, they are told that they answered it incorrectly, 
and are given the explanation again of how the question works and given a chance to answer 
again]. 
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Now please choose a taxi route: 
____ Route 1 
____ Route 2 
____ Route 3 
____ Route 4 
____ Route 5 
____ Route 6 
We now will reveal the traffic conditions for the different routes. (The experimenter 
removes the papers from the white board). 
 
Part 3:  
We will now begin Part 3, the math problems. In this part, you will have 12 math questions and 
you will be given 5 minutes to answer these questions. No calculator is allowed. 
 23 – 19  
 2 + 7  
 12 – 3 
 23 – 16 
 44 – 39 
 35 – 29 
 3 x 3  
 5 + 4  
 3 + 6  
 3 + 2  
 20 – 18  
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 68 – 59  
In this part of the experiment, you answered “xx” questions correctly. Each correct 
answer was worth L.E 4. Your total earnings in this part are “xxx” pounds. 
 
Part 4:   
We now turn to Part 4 in which you will also answer similar math questions as in Part 3. Again 
you will be given 5 minutes to answer the 12 math questions.  Before working the problems, 
however, you will first vote between two Options A and B.  You can vote for Option A in which 
you continue to answer the problems but will be rewarded only L.E 2 for every correct answer.  
You can vote for Option B in which you pay a price of L.E 10 before you participate but you will 
be rewarded, as before, L.E 4 for every correct answer.  Everyone will vote for either Option A or 
B.  If the majority votes for Option A, then everyone will continue to work the problems and be 
rewarded only L.E 2 for each correct answer.  If the majority votes for Option B, then everyone 
will find their earnings deducted by L.E 10 but will be rewarded L.E 4 for every correct answer. 
 The L.E 10 that will be deducted from everyone will be added together and spent on the 
activities supported by the Society that has voted the most in favour of Option B, IF Option B 
wins.  If two societies tied for the most votes for Option B, the experimenters will keep the 
money. 
 If, on the other hand, option A wins, no money will be deducted from any subject and 
hence no money will be spent on the society that voted most for option B.   
Here is an example for illustration: 
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“Suppose there are 15 voters in the room; 10 of which voted for option B and the remaining 5 
voted for option A. Knowing that society Y was the one that voted most for option B, while 
societies X and Z voted most for option A.” 
Voting outcome: option B wins. 
Society Allocation of the L.E 10 deducted from each subject: Society Y will get the sum of the 
deducted money. 
Quiz: 
Just to be sure you understand, please answer the following questions: 
1. “Suppose that there are 15 of you in this room and that 11 voted for option A and the 
remaining 4 voted for option B. Knowing that society X was the one that voted most for 
option B, while societies Y and Z voted most for option A”. 
 Which Option Won the Election? 
i. ____ Option A 
ii. ____ Option B 
 Which Society received the 10 pounds? 
iii. _____ Society X 
iv. _____ Society Y 
v. _____ Society Z 
vi. _____ None of the Societies 
 
2. “Suppose that there are 15 of you in this room and that 9 voted for option B and the 
remaining 6 voted for option A. Knowing that society Y was the one that voted most for 
option B, while societies X and Z voted most for option A”. 
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 Which Option Won the Election? 
vii. ____ Option A 
viii. ____ Option B 
 Which Society received the 10 pounds for everyone? 
ix. _____ Society X 
x. _____ Society Y 
xi. _____ Society Z 
xii. _____ None of the Societies 
Now, before voting between Options A or B, you will be told about the choices made between 
these two Options in a previous session of this experiment by Society affiliation.  That is, in one 
of the previous sessions, we brought in subjects just like you and they completed the same survey 
that you completed in Part 1 and voted between Options A and B just like you will be voting 
between Options A and B in a few minutes.  The results from that previous session were as 
follows:   
“The Society that voted most for Option B was Society Z and the Societies that 
voted most for Option A were Societies X and Y.” 
How do you vote in the election? (this choice is your binding vote):  
  ____ Option A 
  ____ Option B 
The results of the election are that Option “?” wins.  [Votes are revealed by Society Affiliation].  
If Option B wins, then it is announced which Society receives the collected sum of 10 pounds 
from each subject. You will now complete the task under Option “?”. 
Subjects complete task. 
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Part 5:  End of the Experiment Survey  
Thank you for participating in this experiment.  You have earned XXX Egyptian pounds in this 
experiment.  Before paying you, we would like to ask you the following question: 
What were your reasons for voting for the Option you chose?  
 [subjects have open ended space to complete answer]. 
  (After completing the question subjects see the following): We will now pay you by your 
experimental ID.  We will bring to you your payments privately in an envelope.   
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Appendix F 
Chapter 5:  Subject Instructions for all treatments 
Welcome to the experiment. During the following experiment, we require your complete 
attention, and ask you to follow the instructions carefully. Please turn off your cell 
phones. Please raise your hands if you have any questions; the experimenter will come to 
you privately and answer your questions. 
As you entered the experimental laboratory you were given an Experimental ID 
number.  Please note that your Experimental ID number and the seating chart are not 
linked to your actual identity. In other words, the experimenter cannot link any of your 
choices in this experiment to your identity.  
This experiment has five parts, which we describe below.  The payments you 
receive will depend partly on the choices you make as well as the choices made by others 
in the experiment.   
 
Part I: First Survey 
In this part of the experiment you will answer a set of survey questions.  Please answer as 
best as you can.  For each question, you will receive a fixed payment of 2 Egyptian 
pounds.   
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1. What is your gender?  Male or Female 
2. What is your age? ––––  
3. Which study year are you in? First, Second, Third, Fourth, Postgraduate   
4. What is your religion?  Muslim, Christian, Other 
5. For each of the following statements, please indicate the likelihood that you 
would engage in the described activity or behaviour if you were to find yourself in 
that situation.  Provide a rating from: Extremely Unlikely (1) to Extremely Likely 
(7): 
a. Admitting that your tastes are different from those of a friend. 
b. Disagreeing with an authority figure on a major issue. 
c. Choosing a career that you truly enjoy over a more secure one. 
d. Moving to a city far away from your extended family. 
e. Starting a new career in your mid-thirties. 
f. Speaking your mind about an unpopular issue in a meeting at work. 
6. We are interested in how you see yourself. Please mark how well the following 
pairs of words describes you (options extremely poorly (1), somewhat poorly, a 
little poorly, neither poorly nor well, a little well, somewhat well, extremely well 
(7)): 
a. Extraverted, enthusiastic  
b. Critical, quarrelsome 
c. Dependable, self-disciplined 
d. Anxious, easily upset 
e. Open to new experiences, complex 
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f. Reserved, quiet 
g. Sympathetic, warm 
h. Disorganised, careless 
i. Calm, emotionally stable 
j. Conventional, uncreative 
7. Were you a student at the university and eligible to vote in the last student union 
election?  Yes or No 
8. If the answer to the above is yes, then:  Did you vote in the last student union 
election?  Yes or no 
9. Are you interested in student union elections? (Very interested 1 to Not Interested 
at all 5) 
10. Have you ever run for an office or thought about running for office in the student 
union?  (yes or no)  If answered yes, identify which office: ––––. 
11. How often would you say that you can trust other people?  Always, Most of the 
time, Half of the time, Once in a while, Never, Don’t know. 
12. How often would you say that you can trust politicians?  Always, Most of the 
time, Half of the time, Once in a while, Never, Don’t know. 
 
Part II: Videos  
In this part you will watch two short videos.  After the videos you will be asked a 
question about the information contained in the videos.  You will be paid L.E 2 on the 
correct answer.  Please pay attention to the videos. 
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Treatment T0 – Baseline – Subjects watch a neutral, boring video.  Instructions 
before the video:  “This video is a news report on a new discovery.  Please pay 
attention to the video.” 
Treatment T1 – Positive Campaign – Subjects watch a video where candidates are 
described as behaving positively in the campaign.  Instructions before the video:  
“This video is news coverage of a hypothetical election to decide the president of the 
university student’s union.  Please pay attention to the video.”   
Treatment T2 – Negative Personality Campaign – Subjects watch a video where 
candidates are described as behaving negatively in personality claims in the 
campaign.  Instructions before the video:  “This video is news coverage of a 
hypothetical election to decide the president of the university student’s union.  Please 
pay attention to the video.”   
Treatment T3 – Negative Policy Campaign – Subjects watch a video where 
candidates are described as behaving negatively in policy claims in the campaign.  
Instructions before the video:  “This video is news coverage of a hypothetical election 
to decide the president of the university student’s union.  Please pay attention to the 
video.”   
 
Question on Video:  
Please answer the following question.  If you get the question right you will receive 
L.E 2.   
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T0 Question: “Garra Smarti” is the name of the fish discovered in the Arab region by a 
PhD student residing in the United Arab Emirates.  True or False?  
T1 Question: Candidate ‘A’ would like to have greater integration of students on a 
regular basis in the decision-making process of the Union.  True or False?  
T2 Question: Candidate ‘A’ claims that candidate ‘B’ is too busy with Karate to do a 
good job as the Union President.  True or False? 
T3 Question: Candidate ‘A’ claims that candidate ‘B’ is making promises about 
grade changes that are not possible within the powers of the Union.  True or False? 
 
Part III: Second Survey 
“Please answer the questions below.  There is no right/wrong answer, this is just to 
know your views.” 
T0 Question: 
1. If the student union election is to be held tomorrow, will you vote in it?  Yes or 
No? 
T1, T2, and T3 Question:  
1. If the student union election, covered by the video, is to be held tomorrow, will 
you vote in it? Yes or No? 
All treatments questions: 
2. Those who have answered ‘no’ to the vote intention question are asked: 
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“Why don’t you like to vote?”  Answer options, 1- Because I think none of the 
candidates deserve my vote. 2- Because I do not have enough information about 
the candidates 3- Because I think students’ union election are not important, 4- 
Because I would rather not vote in general, 5- Another reason, please write ___ 
(Subjects may choose more than one answer in order of importance). 
 
Part IV: The Game 
“You are now going to play a simple game.  In the game there are two players, First 
Mover and Second Mover.  You will be assigned to be one of these roles and matched 
with another player in the room anonymously who will play the other role.  The First 
Mover will be given L.E 70
1
.  The First Mover will then decide how much of the L.E 70 
to give to the Second Mover.  The First Mover can give any integer amount.  That is, the 
First mover can give 0, 1, 2, 3 … up to L.E 70 to the Second Mover.  Whatever the First 
Mover does not give to the Second Mover, he/she gets to keep.  The First Mover can 
decide to keep all of the L.E 70 or give all of it away or divide it any way he/she wishes.  
So if the First Mover gives L.E 20 to the Second Mover, the First Mover keeps 70–
20=50.  Or if the First Mover gives L.E 50 to the Second Mover, the First Mover keeps 
70–50=20 Egyptian pounds.       
Once the First Mover decides how much to give to the Second Mover, then that 
amount will be doubled before the Second Mover receives the money.  That is, if the First 
Mover decides to give the Second Mover L.E 30, the Second Mover will actually receive 
30 x 2 = L.E 60.  Or if the First Mover gives the Second Mover L.E 0, the Second Mover 
                                                          
1
 This is equivalent to $10, as per the exchange rate prevailing at that time. 
Appendix F.                                                                                                                                                                 39 
 
 
gets 0 x 2 = L.E 0.   Or if the First Mover gives the Second Mover L.E 50, the Second 
Mover gets 50 x 2 = L.E 100.   
After the Second Mover receives the money from the First Mover, which has been 
doubled, then he/she will have the opportunity to give back some of that money to the 
First Mover.  Whatever she/he does not give back he/she can keep.  So for example, 
suppose the First Mover gave the Second Mover L.E 40.  The Second Mover then 
receives 40 x 2 = L.E 80.  The Second Mover then can give back to the First Mover any 
amount of the L.E 80 and keep the rest. 
Before playing this game, please answer the following quiz questions.  You must 
get these questions correct before you can play the game. (If they answer incorrectly they 
get a message telling them their answer is incorrect.  They can go back to the previous 
screen to re-read the instructions, if they wish). 
1. Suppose that the First Mover chooses to give the Second Mover L.E 10.  How 
much will the Second Mover receive?  L.E 10, L.E 70 – 10, L.E 20.   
2. Suppose that the First Mover chooses to give the Second Mover L.E 50.  How 
much can the Second Mover give back to the First Mover?  Any amount less than 
or equal to L.E 50, Any amount greater than or equal to L.E 100, Any amount less 
than or equal to L.E 100. 
3. Suppose that the First Mover chooses to give the Second Mover L.E 20 and the 
Second Mover chooses to keep L.E 30.  How many Egyptian pounds does the 
First Mover have after the game is over?  L.E 30, L.E 10, L.E 40, L.E 70 – 20 + 
10. 
Now you will play the game.” 
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Subjects will simply be told you are a first mover or you are a second mover and play the 
game. 
 
Part V: Post-Experiment Questionnaire 
Thank you for participating in this experiment.  You have earned XXX Egyptian pounds 
in this experiment.  Before paying you, we would like you to answer the following 
questions: 
1. Were you a First Mover in the experiment?  Yes or No 
2. If Yes, then “Why did you give the amount you gave to the Second Mover?” 
3. If Yes, then “Why do you think the Second Mover gave you back the amount 
he/she gave you?” 
4. If No, then “Why did you give back the amount you gave to the First Mover?” 
5. If No, then “Why do you think the First Mover gave you the amount he/she gave 
you?” 
6. If given a choice, which position would you like to have?  First Mover or Second 
Mover?   
7. Why did you make the choice you made in #6? 
8. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you 
can’t be too careful dealing with people?  Most people can be trusted; some 
people can be trusted, but not all; I can’t be too careful dealing with people. 
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(After completing the questions, subjects see the following): We will now pay you by 
your experimental ID.  We will bring to you your payments privately in an envelope. 
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Appendix G 
Chapter 5: Videos’ Scripts  
(A sample from each treatment) 
I. Baseline treatment (T0) – boring news coverage:  
Welcome… 
The following is a summary of the most important events of today. 
A PhD student residing in the United Arab Emirates discovered a new type of fresh water fish in 
the Arab region, which she named “Garra Smarti”. 
The student Emma Smart, a member in the Emirates Association for Fungal life team - the World 
Wide Fund for Nature (EWS-WWF), has managed to discover that fish, saying "it is a very 
exciting discovery, and I am pleased that my project and research have led to the detection of this 
unique type of fish. This discovery demonstrates our lack of information about the region, and the 
possibility of the existence of more types of fungal life undiscovered yet. " 
It is noteworthy that, until now there were only sixteen major species registered of freshwater fish 
in various parts of the Arabian Peninsula, which underlines the importance of the new discovery 
and enhances the unique and great environmental value of the valleys in the Arab region. 
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This new type of fish differs from the others in a number of features, including the existence of 
three fins, the relatively small weight, the head is small and often protracted, and  having 
prominent teeth like a small tusk. 
It is expected that this new scientific discovery will be introduced in a scientific conference 
organised during the next summer in the Belgian capital, Brussels, a conference that has 
traditionally gained a wide academic and media attention. 
Thank you for watching, we will bring you more details in the upcoming newscasts... 
II. Treatment One (T1) – coverage of positive campaigning: 
Welcome… 
The following is a summary of the most important events that happened today with respect to the 
election campaign of the two candidates running for President of the University’s Student Union. 
Candidate "A" organised today an election rally in the hall allocated by the university 
administration for that purpose. He presented the main pillars of his election manifesto. These 
included greater integration of students – and on a regular basis – in the decision-making process 
within the Union. This will be done by conducting regular opinion polls on the Union’s website 
to identify the most important demands of the students, their opinions on the many services that 
are offered to them, how satisfied they are with those services, as well as their suggestions of any 
activities they want the Union to organise in the next month. 
The same hall witnessed two hours later an election rally by Candidate “B”, attended by almost 
the same number of students as the first meeting. Candidate “B” also used the meeting to present 
his most important election promises. He mentioned that he would take the initiative to publicise 
what he called a ‘periodical statement of activities’ at the end of each month on the Union’s 
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website. In this statement he would frankly present what he had implemented in the previous 
month with respect to the election promises he made during the election time as well as what 
could not be implemented, out of a belief – from his side – in accountability and transparency. 
This was our coverage of the most important events that happened today between the two 
candidates running for President of the University’s Student Union. 
Thank you for watching. We will provide you with more details in the following news bulletins. 
III. Treatment two (T2) – coverage of negative campaigning targeting personality of opponent: 
Welcome… 
The following is a summary of the most important events that happened today with respect to the 
election campaign of the two candidates running for President of the University’s Student Union. 
Following their election rallies both candidates went on the attack.  
From his side, Candidate "A" gave an interview to the university newsletter, in which he stated 
that Candidate "B" has in fact falsified his nomination papers, and that he did not win a National 
Championship in Karate as he claims. According to Candidate “A”, Candidate “B” does not play 
Karate in the first place but made this claim as a desperate attempt to match the great sporting 
record of Candidate “A” aiming at winning votes by fraud. In addition, Candidate "A" said that 
he would provide documents to prove this to the election committee supervising the elections in 
order to take the necessary punitive actions against Candidate “B”, and that he was certain of 
what he was saying. 
On his end, and in response to that, Candidate "B" said that Candidate "A" was the one who 
should not be on the list of candidates because he was caught cheating in one of the exams he sat 
for when he was still freshman in his faculty. Candidate “B” added that a report was filed 
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regarding that incident back then, hence Candidate “A” is the one who should be ashamed of 
himself, especially that the official documents of that cheating incident are still there and will be 
examined by the election committee in the next few days.  
This was our coverage of the most important events that happened today between the two 
candidates running for President of the University’s Student Union. 
Thank you for watching. We will provide you with more details in the following news bulletins. 
IV. Treatment three (T3) – coverage of negative campaigning targeting policies of opponent: 
Welcome… 
The following is a summary of the most important events that happened today with respect to the 
election campaign of the two candidates running for President of the University’s Student Union. 
Following their election rallies both candidates went on the attack.  
From his side, Candidate "A" gave an interview to the university newsletter, in which he stated 
that the electoral program of Candidate "B" exaggerates in giving promises that cannot be 
achieved and hence is in fact tricking students in order to gain votes. An example is that 
Candidate “B” promises to work on changing the bylaws of the individual faculties to redistribute 
the term grades to make the new distribution more favourable to students, although this is not in 
the authority of the Union in the first place – something that can be easily found out by reading 
the Union’s bylaw. He wondered how Candidate “B” could actually make these promises 
although he is supposed to be fully aware that they were not within the powers of the Union. 
On his end, and in response to that, Candidate "B" said that Candidate "A" is the one who makes 
this mistake because he mentions in his election manifesto that he would double the number of 
sport and entertainment activities that the Union would organise in case he wins the elections 
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although the money earmarked for these activities in the Union’s budget for next year is in fact 
50% less than what was earmarked to these items in this year’s budget. This then raises many 
doubts on whether Candidate “A” could fulfill this election promise which he makes a central one 
in his manifesto, especially that he didn’t mention in any part of the manifesto his intention to 
create new sources of income for the Union, making everybody wonder where the money would 
come from.  
This was our coverage of the most important events that happened today between the two 
candidates running for President of the University’s Student Union. 
Thank you for watching. We will provide you with more details in the following news bulletins. 
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